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This report commits only the Commission’s services involved in its preparation and does not 
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission. 
 EN 3   EN 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .............................................. 5 
1.1. Background in the development of the White Paper on Transport Policy................... 5 
1.2. Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 5 
1.3. Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Results of the consultation of the Impact Assessment Board ...................................... 7 
2. Problem definition........................................................................................................ 9 
2.1. General context ............................................................................................................ 9 
2.2. Description and scope of the problem – Mobility of people and businesses today is 
not sustainable............................................................................................................ 10 
2.3. What if present trends continue?................................................................................ 14 
2.3.1. Reference scenario assumptions ................................................................................ 15 
2.3.2. Reference scenario main results................................................................................. 16 
2.3.3. Sensitivity analysis..................................................................................................... 18 
2.4. The root causes of the unsustainability of transport................................................... 19 
2.4.1. Cheap for users, expensive to society: prices do not reflect true costs ...................... 20 
2.4.2. Research and Innovation: transport technologies do not achieve low carbon mobility
.................................................................................................................................... 20 
2.4.3. Supply of transport services: not sufficiently efficient .............................................. 22 
2.4.4. Transport planning: lack of coordination and insufficient awareness of interactions 23 
2.5. Does the Union have the right to act? ........................................................................ 24 
3. Objectives................................................................................................................... 26 
3.1. Policy objectives ........................................................................................................ 27 
3.1.1. General policy objective ............................................................................................ 27 
3.1.2. Specific policy objectives .......................................................................................... 27 
3.2. Trade-offs and synergies between sustainability goals.............................................. 29 
3.3. Consistency with horizontal objectives of the European Union ................................ 29 
3.3.1. EU 2020 Strategy and Single Market Act.................................................................. 29 
3.3.2. Sustainable Development Strategy ............................................................................ 30 
4. Policy options............................................................................................................. 30 
4.1. Preliminary note on methodology.............................................................................. 30 
 EN 4   EN 
4.2. Rationale behind a comprehensive and strategically coordinated EU action ............ 36 
4.3. Description of policy options ..................................................................................... 39 
5. Impact analysis of policy options............................................................................... 53 
5.1. Main modelling results............................................................................................... 54 
5.2. Economic impact........................................................................................................ 56 
5.2.1. Impact on transport as a business............................................................................... 56 
5.2.2. Impact of transport dynamics on:............................................................................... 60 
5.3. Social impact.............................................................................................................. 66 
5.3.1. Impact on the degree of citizens’ mobility................................................................. 67 
5.3.2. Impact on accessibility and cohesion......................................................................... 67 
5.3.3. Distributional impacts ................................................................................................ 69 
5.3.4. Impact on employment level and conditions (including on gender balance)............. 70 
5.3.5. Impact on safety ......................................................................................................... 72 
5.4. Environmental impact ................................................................................................ 72 
5.4.1. Impact on climate change........................................................................................... 72 
5.4.2. Impact on air and noise pollution............................................................................... 73 
5.4.3. Impact on efficient use of energy and renewable energy sources.............................. 75 
5.4.4. Impact on biodiversity and other environmental resources ....................................... 77 
5.5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 78 
5.6. Sensitivity analysis of policy options......................................................................... 80 
6. Comparison of the options ......................................................................................... 81 
7. Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 87 
8. Reference Documents ................................................................................................ 90 
9. Annexes...................................................................................................................... 93 
 EN 5   EN 
 
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES 
Identification 
Lead DG: Directorate General for Mobility and Transport 
Agenda Planning: 2010/MOVE/002 
1.1. Background in the development of the White Paper on Transport Policy 
1. In the last two decades, EU transport policy has been the subject of periodic 
assessments and of strategic guidance in the form of White Papers, which have 
provided policy evaluation and alignment with current priorities and general policy 
orientations. 
2. In 1992, the Commission published a White Paper on the common transport policy, 
which was essentially dedicated to market opening. Almost ten years later, the 2001 
White Paper emphasised the need to manage transport growth in a more sustainable 
way by achieving a more balanced use of all transport modes. 
3. The White Paper accompanied by this impact assessment report identifies the 
challenges that the transport system is likely to face in the future, based on an 
evaluation of policies and developments in the recent past and on an assessment of 
current trends. It then defines a long-term strategy that would allow the transport 
sector to meet its goals with a 2050 horizon. 
1.2. Organisation and timing  
4. For the preparation of the White Paper on Transport Policy an inter-service group 
was set up and meetings were organised between November 2009 and June 2010 in 
order to collect the views of various services1. 
5. This Impact Assessment was elaborated by DG MOVE in collaboration with DG 
ENER and DG CLIMA. In this context, an Impact Assessment Steering Group 
(IASG)2 was jointly set up and met three times between October 2010 and December 
                                                 
1 The services involved in this group included the Secretariat-General, DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, DG Climate Action, DG Competition, DG 
Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, DG Energy, 
DG Enterprise and Industry, DG Environment, Eurostat, DG Health and Consumers, DG Home Affairs, 
DG Information Society and Media, DG Internal Market and Services, the Joint Research Centre, DG 
Justice, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, DG Research, DG Regional Policy, and DG Taxation and 
Customs Union. 
2 The services involved in this group included the Secretariat-General, DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, DG Climate Action, DG Competition, DG 
Development, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities, DG Energy, DG Enterprise and Industry, DG Environment, , DG Information Society 
and Media, the Joint Research Centre, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, DG Research, DG Regional 
Policy, DG Trade, and DG Taxation and Customs Union. 
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2010. The timing of the proposal development and the key aspects of the proposals 
(including modelling results) were discussed extensively in the context of these inter-
service meetings. The last IASG meeting took place on 14 December 2010. A final 
version incorporating the comments made during this meeting was circulated on 16 
December 2010. 
1.3. Consultation and expertise 
6. With a view to preparing the ground for later policy developments, the Commission 
has launched a reflection on the future transport system in 2009, comprising a public 
consultation from 30 January 2009 until 27 March 2009, an evaluation study on the 
European Transport Policy (ETP); a debate within three ‘Focus Groups’; a study – 
‘Transvisions’ – identifying possible low-carbon scenarios for transport and a 
consultation of stakeholders, notably through a High Level Stakeholders’ Conference 
on 9-10 March 2009. 
7. The Communication on “A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, 
technology-led and user friendly system”3, adopted by the Commission on 17 June 
2009, summarises the results of this wide reflection. Through this Communication, 
the Commission launched an open debate covering the main challenges for EU 
transport policy, the key objectives for the transport system and the ways how to 
meet them. 
8. In this Communication, the Commission encouraged all interested parties to 
contribute their views on the future of transport and on possible policy options to 
address the future challenges of the transport sector. Following the public 
consultation which has run until 30 September 2009 and had attracted more than 250 
respondents, a second High Level Stakeholders’ conference took place on 20 
November 2009. It aimed at collecting stakeholders’ views on concrete measures 
which would need to be considered in the preparation of the new Transport White 
Paper.  
9. The summaries of the stakeholder meetings and the contributions received during the 
preceding public consultation are available on the Commission website4. 
10. Input from stakeholders has been taken into account in assessing the different 
possible actions to improve the sustainability of the transport system in the EU. 
External expertise was used to assess the various options available, including aspects 
raised during the public consultation. 
11. As shown by the detailed assessment presented in Appendix 1 of this report, it can be 
concluded that the minimum standards for the consultation have been respected. 
                                                 
3 COM/2009/0279 final 
4 1st high level conference of 9 March 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/events/2009_03_09_future_of_transport_en.htm; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/consultations/2009_03_27_future_of_transport_en.htm) and 2nd 
high level conference of 20 November 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/events/2009_11_20_future_of_transport_en.htm; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/consultations/2009_09_30_future_of_transport_en.htm). 
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1.4. Results of the consultation of the Impact Assessment Board  
12. Following the submission of a draft report to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 
20 December 2010 and a hearing with the IAB (which took place on 26 January 
2011), the IAB sent its opinion on 28 January 2011, asking DG MOVE to resubmit 
the draft report. A revised version of the IA report has been sent to IAB on 31 
January 2011. 
13. In its opinion of 28 January 2011, the IAB made five recommendations that were 
addressed in the final version of the IA report in the following manner: 
(1) The IA report should better explain how the IA report builds on evaluation of 
existing policies to better demonstrate the lessons learnt 
14. The main conclusions from the ex post evaluation presented in appendix 2 of the IA 
report have been introduced in the section on the problem definition. The connection 
has been reinforced between those conclusions and the baseline projection, the 
problem drivers, the objectives and the definition of policy options. 
(2) The IA report should define more clearly the concept of sustainable mobility 
and how it is reflected in the definition and prioritisation of objectives 
15. The concept of sustainable mobility has been clearly defined in the revised version 
and the specific objectives have been streamlined. A discussion on the prioritisation 
of the policy objectives and on the possible trade-offs between those objectives and 
other sustainability goals has been added to the Section 3 of the IA report. 
(3) The IA report should provide more clarity about the design, content and 
differences between the options and the features they have in common 
16. The revised version of the IA report provides greater clarity on how the seven policy 
areas and the policy measures were identified. Further explanation about the content 
of Table 4 has been provided and its presentation improved. The IA report has 
clarified how the differences between the various policy options have been reflected 
in modelling results. 
(4) The IA report should provide much greater clarity about the assumptions 
underlying the modelling results and give more clarity about cost figures, 
especially as regards the concept of ‘total transport costs’. 
17. The revised IA report has further explained the key assumptions that have been made 
in the modelling exercise. Subsection 5.6 on sensitivity analysis has been added in 
the section assessing the possible impacts of the various policy measures. The 
different concepts of costs used in the IA report have been clarified further. 
Additional modelling results (in particular on costs) have been provided. 
(5) The IA report should provide a global assessment of the most affected 
industrial sectors, social groups and regions, differentiating between short and 
long term impacts. 
 EN 8   EN 
18. The revised IA report gives a qualitative assessment about which industrial sectors, 
social groups, and regions will be most affected by the proposed policies in Section 5 
on the assessment of impacts. 
19. The revised IA report has also been fine-tuned on the basis of the more technical 
comments transmitted to DG MOVE. 
20. On 2 February 2011, the IAB issued a second opinion on the revised IA report with 
several recommendations which have been taken into account in the following 
manner: 
(1) Clarify certain baseline issues, define sustainable transport in a more 
operational way, and reconsider subsidiarity with respect to some urban 
mobility issues 
21. This recommendation has been addressed by clarifying in footnote 25 why some 
policy initiatives are not included in the baseline, by explaining in point 102 the 
concept of "society's economic, social and environmental needs" and by 
reconsidering subsidiarity with respect to some urban mobility issues in point 95. 
(2) Further clarify the content of and differences between policy options. 
22. This recommendation has been addressed by: 
– clarifying further the third specific objective linked to congestion in point 103, 
– explaining better the choice of the endogenous variables under each Policy Option 
in point 136, 
– stating clearly that the IA refers to CO2 level in excise duty in footnote 101.  
– explaining to what extent the assumptions concerning urban mobility can be the 
same across options, given that the CO2 shadow price is an endogenous variable 
in option 4 in footnote 108. 
(3) Improve transparency about the assumptions underlying the modelling results 
23. This recommendation has been addressed by explaining the assumptions concerning 
fuel price elasticities in footnote 377, by explaining better the role of the modelling 
specifications in point 148 and Table 4 and by providing more explanations about the 
contribution of price signals and sensitivity analysis in section 5.6 and footnotes 83 
and 160.  
(4) Strengthen the presentation of cost categories and clarify remaining 
inconsistencies 
24. This recommendation has been addressed by reinforcing the presentation of cost 
concept in point 249 and by checking the summary tables. 
(5) Procedure and presentation 
25. A concise version of Table 4 has been added. 
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2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1. General context 
26. On 17 June 2010, the European Council endorsed the Europe 2020 strategy 
(hereinafter “the EU 2020 strategy”) for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth5, 
setting out a vision of Europe’s new social market economy for the 21st century6. The 
EU 2020 strategy rests on three interlocking and mutually reinforcing priority areas: 
Smart growth, developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation; 
Sustainable growth, promoting a low-carbon, resource-efficient and competitive 
economy; and Inclusive growth, fostering a high-employment economy delivering 
social and territorial cohesion. In order to meet the agreed EU-level targets, the 
Commission has proposed a Europe 2020 agenda consisting of seven flagship 
initiatives to catalyse progress under each priority7. Among these, the aim of the 
resource efficiency flagship8 is to support the shift towards a resource-efficient and 
low-carbon economy that is efficient in the way it uses all resources. The stated aim 
is to decouple economic growth from resource and energy use, reduce CO2 
emissions, enhance competitiveness and promote greater energy security. 
27. The White Paper on Transport Policy accompanied by this impact assessment report 
falls within the scope of the resource efficiency flagship. In this respect, the 
assessment of impacts, in particular modelling the effect of various policy options in 
terms of GHG emissions, was jointly undertaken by the Directorates-General 
Climate Action, Mobility and Transport and Energy. Therefore the current report is 
part of a joint impact assessment for the Commission’s initiatives related to the 
transition to a low-carbon economy by 2050. This ensures consistency not only in the 
modelling framework, but also in the resulting development of policies. The overall 
policy goal is to design a path towards a low-carbon, competitive economy that 
would meet the long-term requirements for limiting climate change to 2 °C. 
28. At the same time, the White Paper on Transport Policy addresses also issues related 
to some other flagships, and notably “Innovation Union”, “An industrial policy for 
the globalisation era”, “A digital agenda for Europe”, “An agenda for new skills and 
jobs” and “European platform against poverty” (the territorial cohesion aspect). 
                                                 
5 COM (2010) 2020, EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
6 European Council 17 June 2010 Conclusions, document EUCO 13/10. 
7 The seven flagship initiatives are: Innovation union, Youth on the move, A digital agenda for Europe, 
Resource-efficient Europe, An industrial policy for green growth, An agenda for new skills and jobs, 
European platform against poverty. 
8 COM (2011) 21. A resource-efficient Europe – Flagship initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy 
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2.2. Description and scope of the problem – Mobility of people and businesses today 
is not sustainable9 
29. The transport services sector accounted for about 4.6% of total EU gross value added 
in 200810; this figure excludes other related activities, as the manufacturing of 
transport vehicles and equipment, the construction and maintenance of transport 
infrastructure, fuel refining, and own account transport11. 
30. Modern transport systems have given Europe a high degree of mobility with an ever 
increasing performance in terms of speed, comfort, safety and convenience. Average 
mobility per person in the EU, measured in passenger-kilometre per inhabitant, 
increased by 7% between 2000 and 2008, mainly through higher motorisation levels 
as well as more high-speed rail and air travel. Freight transport demand continued to 
grow by more than GDP over the last decade (with the exception of the crisis years 
2008 and 2009). 
31. However, this enhanced mobility has developed over the last decades in a context of 
generally cheap oil, expanding infrastructure and loose environmental constraints. 
Now that those framework conditions have changed, the transport system is no 
longer able to develop along the same path without serious unintended consequences 
in the form of environmental, economic and social costs. 
32. An in-depth ex post evaluation work undertaken by the Commission12, has shown 
that, while several features of the transport system have improved in the last decade - 
notably its efficiency, safety and security - there has been no structural change in the 
way the system operates. The inability to modify the current transport paradigm, 
presently founded on the use of fossil fuels and on the dominance of road transport in 
moving both freight and passengers, is one of the main causes of unsustainable 
trends: growing GHG emissions, persistent oil dependency and mounting congestion. 
33. The ex post evaluation has revealed that past policies have been ineffective in 
correcting the market failures that determine the present situation and in triggering 
the necessary transformation:  
– Charges and taxes do not fully reflect the societal costs of transport. The attempts 
at introducing policies to internalise the transport externalities and to remove 
present tax distortions have been unsuccessful. The road and aviation sector are 
the main beneficiaries of such distortions; 
– EU research policies have not been able to address the full cycle of research, 
innovation and deployment in an integrated way through focusing on the most 
promising technologies and bringing together all actors involved. As a result the 
                                                 
9 The Renewed Sustainable Development Strategy of the European Union adopted by the European 
Council in June 2006 defines a sustainable transport system as the one that “meets society’s economic, 
social and environmental needs whilst minimising its undesirable impacts on the economy, society and 
the environment”. Sustainable mobility is transportation undertaken using a sustainable transport 
system. 
10 Source: Eurostat. 
11 Own account transport refers to transport services that firms in all sectors provide for themselves i.e. 
with their own trucks and other vehicles. 
12 See in this respect Appendix 2 of the present Impact Assessment report. 
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potential of research and innovation in contributing to EU transport policy 
objectives has not been exploited to its full extent; 
– Investments to modernise the rail network and the transhipment facilities have 
been insufficient to address the bottlenecks in multimodal transport. Modal 
networks continue to be poorly integrated. TEN-T policy has lacked financial 
resources and a true European and multimodal perspective; 
– Legislation prescribing market opening in rail freight as of 2007 and in 
international rail passenger as of 2010 has been implemented slowly and 
incompletely in the large majority of Member States. Enforcement has been 
inadequate. National passenger markets, that represent the largest share of the 
business, are still largely closed. The crossing of national borders continues to 
cause inefficiencies and additional costs in rail. Also short sea shipping faces 
higher administrative burden compared to the land-based modes whenever 
national borders within the EU are crossed. The lack of competition and residual 
administrative barriers held back the quality and efficiency of the service and 
partly explain the low appeal of the main alternatives to road transport, 
particularly on medium and long distances; 
– EU policies have not addressed local and urban transport until recently. The 
concept of helping local government, while respecting subsidiarity, tackle 
congestion, pollution, and safety problems requires a new and integrated policy 
approach to urban mobility.  
CO2 emissions from transport are still growing  
34. Global warming is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in 
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of polar ice caps and 
glaciers, and rising global average sea levels. The dominant factor in the warming of 
the climate in the industrial era is the increasing concentration of various greenhouse 
gases (hereinafter “GHG”) in the atmosphere due to human activities. The GHG 
contributing most to climate change is CO2 and its emission has to be significantly 
reduced in order to limit climate change to 2 ºC above pre-industrial levels. 
35. Today transport accounts for around one-quarter of EU CO2 emissions13. CO2 
emissions from transport14 have been growing over the last 20 years. Only in 2008 
and in 2009 was there a drop in CO2 emissions from transport, but this was combined 
                                                 
13 The contribution of various modes to the total emissions of the transport sector was as follows in 2008: 
71.3% came from road, 15.3% from maritime, 12.8% from aviation, and 0.7% from rail transport. 
These figures include international aviation and maritime but exclude combustion emissions from 
pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road activities. The figure for 
rail only includes emissions from diesel use, but not from electricity use. Looking at final energy 
consumption by transport mode, electricity represents about 66% of the energy consumed by rail. 
14 In general, the notion of transport-related CO2 emissions covers vehicle exhaust emissions (i.e. tank-to-
wheel emissions). Unless stated otherwise, the references to transport-related CO2 emissions in this 
Impact Assessment report relate only to tank-to-wheel emissions. Emissions produced by the energy 
consumed in the extraction, processing and distribution of fuels, i.e. “well-to-tank” emissions, are not 
part of the targets assessed. In addition, the present Impact Assessment report does not cover the so-
called “embodied energy” CO2 emissions from the manufacture of vehicles and construction of roads 
and other components of the transport infrastructure. 
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with a drop in transport activity15. New vehicles have become more fuel efficient and 
hence emit less CO2 per km than earlier models did in the past, but these gains have 
been eaten up by rising vehicle numbers, increasing traffic volumes, and in many 
cases better performance in terms of speed, safety and comfort.  
Transport is extremely dependent upon oil 
36. The lack of progress in decoupling transport growth from the growth in CO2 
emissions results first and foremost from the fact that transport is one sector of the 
economy where substitution with other energy carriers has been negligible. Transport 
continues to rely nearly entirely on oil and oil products: for more than 95% of its 
needs worldwide and 96% in EU-2716. 
37. Gasoline and diesel consumption makes up for 95% of energy use in road transport. 
Diesel accounts for almost the entirety of the commercial fleet, and a growing 
proportion of private cars (a third in 2008). Maritime and aviation continue to rely 
entirely on fuel oil and kerosene, whereas in rail some further electrification has 
taken place in the last decade. 
38. Since Europe imports 84.1% of its crude oil from abroad17, this makes transport, and 
hence the wider economy of Europe, very reliant on the availability of oil and 
petroleum products on world markets. As “…energy supply security must be geared 
to ensuring the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical 
availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting environmental 
concerns”18, oil security is often equated with improving the security of supply for 
the transport sector. 
Rising levels of congestion prevent the EU transport system from keeping pace with 
the mobility needs and aspirations of people and businesses 
39. Whilst people and businesses value mobility highly, they have also become much 
more concerned about the adverse impacts of transport on health and quality of life 
and about their own experience as congestion mounts. In this respect, it is interesting 
to note that the Consumer Markets Scoreboard of October 2010, identified railways 
as one of the top four services market where consumers experienced most 
problems19. 
40. In many places, the current capacity of transport networks is not able to meet the 
demand that is, or will be, regularly placed on them. In those circumstances, the 
inevitable result is congestion in urban areas and regions, at the entrance of the main 
                                                 
15 There is also considerable concern regarding aviation’s total climate impact on the global climate which 
has been estimated by the IPCC as being two to four times higher than the effect of carbon dioxide 
emissions alone due to releases of nitrogen oxides, water vapour and sulphate and soot particles 
(excluding cirrus cloud effects). The figures in this impact assessment generally refer to only the carbon 
dioxide effects. 
16 European Commission, EU Energy and Transport in Figures, 2010 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/publications/statistics/statistics_en.htm. 
17 Source: Eurostat. 
18 COM(2000) 769, Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply  
19 The others were internet access, real estate services and investments, pensions and securities. 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/4th_edition_scoreboard_en.pdf 
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cities, and on the key transit roads, overcrowding on some public transport links and 
lengthy queues at some airports. When networks are overused, journey times 
lengthen and reliability suffers. 
41. Changes in commerce and personal travel patterns have increased the importance of 
a reliable and efficient transport system because of more complex and inter-related 
supply chains and increasingly complex scheduled activities. In this context, the 
unreliability and inefficiency of transport has a marked effect on downstream 
activities. The expectation from these demand trends is increasingly that transport 
should provide high levels of reliability and of efficiency. 
42. The building of new infrastructure to reduce congestion and accommodate higher 
levels of traffic is less and less a practicable solution. The impact of infrastructure on 
the environment is a growing concern. In addition, the current economic crisis 
reasserts the importance of putting budget accounts into a long-term sustainable path. 
This implies reducing public deficit and debt and improving the quality of public 
finance. More cost-effective solutions would have to be found to tackle congestion 
than relying on expanding ‘hard’ infrastructure. 
43. Congestion is not just a problem for the individual user. Congestion that is prevalent 
in agglomerations and in their access routes is the source of large costs. 
44. It has a negative impact on the environment since it results in increased air20 and 
noise21 pollution. Congestion also generates higher fuel consumption22: vehicle fuel 
consumption increases approximately 30% under heavy congestion23. The time 
wasted in traffic jams prevents the benefits of agglomeration effects to fully 
                                                 
20 In contrast to the evolution of CO2 emissions, the emissions of some air pollutants from transport 
vehicles were reduced significantly despite rising traffic volumes: transport-related emissions of 
particulate matter (PM10) and of acidifying substances have decreased by about one third between 1990 
and 2006, those of ozone forming substances have been nearly halved (see EEA, 2010, Towards a 
resource-efficient transport system — TERM 2009 (EEA Report No. 2/2010). Emission reduction has 
been more successful in road transport than in other modes of transport. This success is mainly due to 
the gradually more stringent EURO emission standards for road vehicles. It should be noted, however, 
that partly due to the discrepancy between real-world and test-cycle emissions of vehicles, road still 
accounts for the lion’s share (more than two thirds) of total pollutant emissions from transport, even if 
the total amount of pollutants and particulates has been significantly reduced. Moreover, the downward 
trends have not been observed for all pollutants (e.g. NOx), and the concentrations of NOx, ozone and 
particulate matters in many areas (particularly in cities) are still often beyond what is considered to be 
healthy. For example, twenty EU Member States have submitted notifications for time extensions for 
PM10 limits in line with the extension of the compliance year offered by Directive 2008/50/EC. 
21 About half of the EU-15 citizens are estimated to live in areas which do not ensure acoustical comfort 
for residents: 40% of the population is exposed to road traffic noise exceeding 55 dB(A) during 
daytime, and 20% to levels exceeding 65 dB(A). At night, more than 30% are exposed to sound levels 
that disturb sleep (>55 dB(A)) [See the WHO Night Noise Guidelines for Europe (WHO, 2009)]. 
Existing studies show that noise exposure increases the risk for high blood pressure and heart attacks. 
Surveys also show that (environmental) noise is a relevant reason for people moving out of the cities 
into the suburban are. [See SILENCE project (Integrated Project co-funded by the European 
Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme for R&D): SILENCE Practitioner Handbook for 
Local Noise Action Plans, 2008, http://www.silence-ip.org/site/fileadmin/SP_J/E-
learning/Planners/SILENCE_Handbook_Local_noise_action_plans.pdf] 
22 See in this respect COM/2009/0279 final. 
23 I.D. Grenwood and C.R. Bennett (1996), “The Effects of Traffic Congestion on Fuel 
Consumption,”Road and Transport Research, Vol.5, N°2, June 1996, pp18-31. 
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materialise. The costs of congestion have a negative impact on productivity, 
competiveness of the economy and quality of life. 
45. In light of the above, the Commission is of the opinion that today’s EU transport 
system does not sufficiently keep pace with the mobility needs and aspirations of 
people and businesses. High levels of congestion cause large costs to the society, 
inconvenience and dissatisfaction to people and companies24. This could ultimately 
become a brake on economic growth. 
Conclusion 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that the European Union has not succeeded in 
containing the growth of the economic, environmental and social costs of mobility while 
simultaneously ensuring that current and future generations have access to safe, secure, 
reliable and affordable mobility resources to meet their own needs and aspirations. 
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the EU transport system today is not 
sustainable enough. 
Firstly, it is not sufficiently resource efficient so as to promote sustainable growth in the 
meaning of the EU 2020 strategy. Transport is extremely dependent upon oil whereas CO2 
emissions from transport-related activities account are still growing. 
Secondly, with congestion growing, it does not sufficiently keep pace with the mobility needs 
and aspirations of people and businesses. 
2.3. What if present trends continue? 
46. The Commission has carried out an analysis of possible future developments in a 
scenario at unchanged policies, the so-called baseline scenario or “Reference 
scenario”. The Reference scenario is the same with the one used in the Impact 
Assessment of the “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap” and in the forthcoming 
2050 Energy Roadmap. The Reference Scenario to 2050 is presented in more detail 
in Appendix 3 of the present Impact Assessment Report, whereas the inventory of 
the policy measures included in this scenario is provided in Appendix 4.  
47. The Reference scenario is a projection, not a forecast, of developments in absence of 
new policies beyond those adopted by March 201025. It therefore reflects both 
                                                 
24 The costs of transport can be split into private/internal costs (those directly borne by the person engaged 
in transport activity) and external costs (i.e. those that are imposed on others but not supported by the 
user). The sum of private and external costs represents costs to the society. The boundary between 
internal and external costs is defined by the costs the person takes into account when deciding to use a 
transport service. This means that when engaging in a transport activity, a person will incur private 
costs linked to the use of a mode of transport (vehicle purchase, tolls or fuel use), but will not be aware 
of effects imposed on others such as pollution or congestion. His/her decision will not be based on the 
social costs of his/her activity. In other words, the costs imposed on others– environmental damages, 
accidents, congestion - generated by transport activities are external costs, more generally referred to as 
externalities. Most of them have increased over the past years despite technological progress (see in this 
respect the Impact Assessment on the internalisation of external costs - http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC2208:EN:NOT) 
25 The Reference scenario used for the purpose of this Impact Assessment is the same as the Reference 
scenario used in the Impact Assessment of the "Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. The cut off date 
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achievements and deficiencies of the policies already in place. This projection 
provides a benchmark for evaluating new policy measures against developments 
under current trends and policies. The Reference scenario builds on a modelling 
framework including PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, PRIMES-TREMOVE transport 
model, TREMOVE and GEM-E3 models26, 27.  
2.3.1. Reference scenario assumptions 
48. The projection is built on a set of assumptions related to population growth, macro-
economic projections, developments in oil price and technology improvement. 
49. Demographic change is transforming the EU with inevitable consequences also on 
the transport sector. In the Reference case, the population projections draw on the 
EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario (EUROpean POPulation Projections, base 
year 2008) from Eurostat, which is also the basis for the 2009 Ageing Report 
(European Economy, April 2009)28,29. The key drivers for demographic change are: 
higher life expectancy, low fertility and inward migration. The EU-27 population is 
expected to grow by 0.2% per year by 2035 and slightly decline afterwards, 
remaining fairly stable in number at around 500 million in the next 40 years.  
50. Elderly people, aged 65 or more, would account for 24% of the total population by 
2020 and 29% by 2050 as opposed to 17% today. Around one in six people in the EU 
has a disability. Over 20% of elderly people aged over 75 are severely restricted. 
Ageing and the extended longevity of people can be expected to lead to increasing 
numbers of elderly people with a severe disability30.  
51. In the Reference scenario, the average GDP growth rate for EU-27 is only 1.2% per 
year for 2000-2010, while the projected rate for 2010-2020 is assumed to recover to 
2.2%, similar to the historical average growth rate between 1990 and 2000. In the 
medium run the higher expected growth rate is due to higher productivity growth 
assumed in Member States that are catching up. GDP growth rate in the EU-27 is 
projected to fall to 1.6% during 2020-2050, mainly due to demographic ageing 
                                                                                                                                                        
for the policy measures included in the Reference scenario (March 2010) is common to both initiatives. 
In other words, the Reference scenario does not incorporate policy measures that were adopted by the 
Commission after March 2010. In particular, the Reference scenario does not cover the Commission 
Decision of 14 October 2010 re-launching of the CARS 21 High Level Group on the Competitiveness 
and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in the European Union. For the same reason, it 
does not capture the recent initiatives of car manufacturers as regards electric vehicles (hereinafter 
“EV”).  
26 A brief presentation of the models used is provided in Appendix 5. 
27 In addition, the oil price projections are the result of world energy modelling with PROMETHEUS 
stochastic world energy model, developed by the National Technical University of Athens (E3MLab). 
28 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and 
budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf. The “baseline” scenario of 
this report has been established by the DG Economic and Financial Affairs, the Economic Policy 
Committee, with the support of Member States experts, and has been endorsed by the ECOFIN Council. 
29 Demographic projections in the Reference scenario are common in PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, 
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model, TREMOVE and GEM-E3. 
30 European Commission, DG Employment: People with disabilities have equal rights - The European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=591&type=2&furtherPubs=no 
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which, with a reduction in the working-age population, is expected to act as a drag on 
growth31. 
52. The Reference scenario assumes a relatively high oil price environment compared 
with previous projections, and similar to projections from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA)32, with oil prices of 59 $/barrel in 2005 rising to 106 $/barrel in 2030 
and 127 $/barrel in 2050 (in year 2008-dollars) 33, 34. As a result, total fuel costs for 
the transport sector would be about 300 billion euro higher in 2050 relative to 2010 
which represents more than 70% increase over the period under review. 
53. In terms of technological developments, battery costs for plug-in hybrids and electric 
vehicles are assumed to remain high by 2050, at about 560-780 €/kWh35, but further 
improvements in the efficiency of both spark ignition gasoline and compression 
ignition diesel are assumed to take place. In addition, the market share of internal 
combustion engine (ICE) electric hybrids is expected to increase due to their lower 
fuel consumption compared to conventional ICE vehicles. 
2.3.2. Reference scenario main results 
54. Modelling projections show that, in a no policy change scenario, the unsustainable 
features of the EU transport system identified in the ex-post evaluation are likely to 
worsen in a context of growing demand for transport. Total transport activity is 
expected to continue to grow in line with economic activity even though a decrease 
is visible for 2008-2009 as a result of the recent economic crisis. The recovery 
foreseen starting with 2010 is reflected by transport activity returning to its long term 
trends. Total passenger transport activity would increase by 51% between 2005 and 
2050 while freight transport activity would go up by 82%36.  
55. Transport accounts today for over 30% of final energy consumption. In a context of 
growing demand for transport, final energy demand by transport is projected to 
increase by 5% by 2030 and an additional 1% by 2050 to then 32% of total final 
energy consumption, driven mainly by aviation and road freight transport. At the 
same time, however, the energy use of passenger cars would drop by 11% between 
                                                 
31 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and 
budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf. 
32 The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 assumes 115 $/barrel in 2008 prices for 2030 and 120 
$/barrel for 2050. 
33 The oil price projections are the result of world energy modelling with PROMETHEUS stochastic 
world energy model, developed by the National Technical University of Athens (E3MLab). 
34 This would translate into an oil price of 91 €/barrel in 2030 and 118 €/barrel in 2050. 
35 As said above, the Reference scenario does not cover the Commission Decision on re-launching of the 
CARS 21 High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive 
Industry in the European Union and does not capture the recent initiatives of car manufacturers as 
regards electric vehicles (hereinafter “EV”). 
36 Passenger transport activity includes international aviation, while freight transport activity also includes 
international maritime. 
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2005 and 2030 due to the implementation of the Regulation setting emission 
performance standards for new passenger cars37.  
56. Renewables would represent 10% of total energy consumption in transport by 2020, 
reflecting the implementation of the Renewables Directive38. Their share would 
gradually increase to 13% by 205039. However, the pace of electrification in the 
transport sector is projected to remain slow in the Reference scenario: electric 
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Figure 1: Evolution of total final energy consumption and CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2050 in the 
Reference scenario41 
57. As a consequence, the EU transport system would remain extremely dependent on 
the use of fossil fuels. Oil products would still represent 90% of the EU transport 
sector needs in 2030 and 89% in 2050 in the Reference scenario. 
58. In a no policy change scenario in which pricing mechanisms remain inadequate and 
in which the way the transport system operates is not improved substantially, people 
and businesses would not receive sufficient incentives to shift away from road 
transport. In this context, road would remain the dominant mode in both freight and 
                                                 
37 Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting 
emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated approach 
to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 1–15. 
38 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 16–62. 
39 The shares of renewables in transport reported here follow the definition from the Directive 
2009/28/EC.  
40 As said above, the Reference scenario does not cover the European Commission CARS 21 
(Competitive Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st century) initiative. This initiative may trigger 
a higher uptake of electric propulsion vehicles in the Reference scenario, which is currently negligible 
by 2050. In addition, the Reference scenario was finalised in early 2010 and does not capture the recent 
initiatives of car manufacturers as regards electric vehicles. As a result, the penetration of EVs might be 
higher and transport sector oil dependency and CO2 emissions might be lower in the Reference 
scenario. 
41 The CO2 emissions from transport include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion 
emissions from pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road 
activities. 
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passenger transport. In this context, whereas transport today accounts for about one 
fourth of total CO2 emissions42, the share of CO2 emissions from transport would 
continue increasing, to 38% of total CO2 emissions by 2030 and almost 50% by 
2050, following a relatively lower decline of CO2 emissions from transport compared 
to power generation and other sectors. This is due to the higher cost of abating 
emissions in the transport sector. Overall, CO2 emissions from transport would still 
be 31% higher than their 1990 level by 2030 and 35% higher by 2050, mainly owing 
to the fast rise of transport emissions during the 1990s43. Aviation and maritime 
would contribute an increasing share of emissions over time. This trend is not 
compatible with the objective of a low-carbon, competitive economy that would 
meet the long-term requirements for limiting climate change to 2 °C. 
59. External costs of transport would continue increasing. The increase in traffic would 
lead to a roughly 20 billion € increase of noise-related external costs by 2050 and 
external cost of accidents would be about 60 billion € higher44. The external cost of 
accidents in urban areas would increase by some 40%. Only the external costs related 
to air pollutants would decrease by 60% by 2050. 
60. In particular, congestion would continue to represent a huge burden on the society. 
Congestion costs are projected to increase by about 50%, to nearly 200 billion € 
annually.  
2.3.3. Sensitivity analysis 
61. Considering the high degree of uncertainty surrounding projections over such a long 
time horizon, especially for such a complex system as transport, a sensitivity analysis 
has been carried out with respect to developments in oil prices45. An evaluation is 
also provided below for the effects of higher GDP growth on transport activity by 
2030.  
62. If oil prices in 2050 were almost 70% higher than in the Reference scenario (212 
$/barrel in 2050 in year 2008-dollars, compared to 127 $/barrel in the Reference 
scenario), this would have only moderate effects on transport activity: passenger 
transport activity would be some 5% lower than in the Reference scenario in 2050 
and freight transport activity would be almost 8% lower. However, some modal shift 
would take place in favour of rail, which is expected to be largely electrified by 
2050: the modal share of rail in passenger transport would increase by some 3 
percentage points while in freight transport rail’s share would be more than 1 
percentage point higher in 2050 than in the Reference scenario46. The high oil price 
environment triggers the uptake of electric propulsion vehicles on a large scale but 
conventional ICE cars would still represent about 26% of the total passenger 
                                                 
42 The CO2 emissions include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion emissions from 
pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road activities. 
43 The CO2 emissions from transport include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion 
emissions from pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road 
activities. 
44 The costs are expressed in year 2005 euros. 
45 The Reference scenario with high oil prices is presented in more detail in the Impact Assessment of the 
“Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. 
46 Transport activity in this analysis includes international aviation and maritime. 
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transport activity in 2050. High oil prices would only lead to about 20% lower CO2 
emissions by 205047. CO2 emissions from maritime transport would decrease by 
about 20% relative to the Reference scenario in 2050. 
63. An estimate of the impact of higher GDP growth on transport activity can be 
provided by comparing the Reference scenario with a similar scenario from the 
Impact Assessment of the 2008 Climate and Energy Package, which assumes higher 
GDP (pre-crisis) projections48,49. In this scenario, GDP in 2030 is some 11% higher 
than in the Reference scenario. With higher GDP, both passenger and transport 
demand would be higher relative to the Reference scenario, although the effect is 
more pronounced for freight transport: passenger transport demand would be some 
3% larger by 2030 compared to the Reference scenario, while freight transport would 
add some 5% over the same time period. Without additional policies in place, CO2 
emissions from transport would be higher in this scenario than in the Reference 
scenario. The fact that in the Reference scenario the lower GDP growth translates 
into a less than proportional decrease in transport volumes reflects the view that 
transport is becoming less responsive to changes in overall economic activity. 
Indeed, we have already observed the decoupling of passenger traffic from GDP in 
recent years, possibly due to high congestion levels and the high car ownership in 
some EU-15 Members States where passenger car activity is close to saturation 
levels. A similar, though less pronounced development may occur in freight transport 
owing to the fading out of the effects of the enlargement, to the impact of growing oil 
prices and to the ever increasing weight of the service sector in the economy, but also 
due to the restructuring of logistics systems, the realignment of supply chains and the 
rescheduling of product flows.  
Conclusion 
It is clear from the above that, factoring in all the indicators, today’s unsustainable system of 
mobility is not likely to become sustainable if present trends continue. 
2.4. The root causes of the unsustainability of transport 
64. This section analyses why the transport system is not capable to adjust to changing 
external circumstances – such as climate change, infrastructure constraints and oil 
scarcity – and take a sustainable path. 
65. Transport is a complex system that is based on the interaction of many components 
all of which need to evolve together: vehicles, infrastructure, behaviour etc. This 
explains the strong inertia of the system and the need for addressing several problem 
areas in order to determine a paradigm shift. 
66. As indicated in point 33 above, the Commission has identified four main areas in 
which market and regulatory failures prevent the EU transport system to develop into 
                                                 
47 The 20% reduction refers to CO2 emissions excluding international maritime but including international 
aviation. 
48 Impact assessment of the 2008 Climate and Energy Package (SEC(2008) 85/3). 
49 However, this provides only a rough estimate, because not only GDP but also demographic projections, 
energy prices and some policy assumptions included in each scenario is different. 
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a sustainable system. These drivers are relative prices, technology deployment, 
conditions of supply and planning. 
67. At this stage, it is important to note that, whereas the drivers identified below are the 
root causes explaining why the EU transport system is not sustainable, it is not 
possible to strictly map a particular driver to a specific problem given the complexity 
of a system such as transport. 
2.4.1. Cheap for users, expensive to society: prices do not reflect true costs 
68. In transport, like in any other sector, there cannot be economic efficiency unless the 
prices reflect all costs - internal and external – to the society actually caused by the 
users. By providing information on the relative scarcity of goods or services, prices 
convey essential information to users, operators and investors. 
69. Today, as highlighted in section 1.1 of the ex post evaluation, most of the external 
costs of transport are still not internalised50. Where existent, internalisation schemes 
are not co-ordinated between modes and Member States. Many taxes and subsidies 
directly affecting modal choices have been designed without the internalisation goal 
in view, rather pursuing traditional fiscal aims: the internalisation part of fuel 
taxation for instance is not clearly identified against other components of the tax. 
There are inconsistent taxation rules between transport modes and fuels, between and 
within Member States. In the worst case, tax systems subsidise environmentally 
unsustainable choices: for example, the favourable company car taxation rules give 
incentives for an artificially high car use51. 
70. On the other hand, public support to the transport sector can be justified to the extent 
that transport brings about positive externalities to society – for example by 
connecting an isolated region and contributing to its economic growth – or in case of 
infrastructure that has the characteristics of a public good.  
71. As long as the total costs to society induced by transport activities (including the cost 
of infrastructure provision and maintenance) are not correctly reflected in the costs 
borne by transport users, the demand for transport stays above its optimal level and 
the pricing system fails to steer the customers towards most efficient and sustainable 
mobility choices52. 
2.4.2. Research and Innovation: transport technologies do not achieve low carbon mobility 
72. The ex post evaluation undertaken by the Commission has shown that transport 
research and innovation in Europe today are progressing in supporting the 
development and deployment of key technologies that are needed to develop the EU 
                                                 
50 The Impact Assessment (SEC(2008) 2208) accompanying the Commission Communication ‘Strategy 
for the internalisation of external costs’ (COM(2008) 435) provided ample evidence that the total costs 
to society are not correctly reflected in the costs borne by transport users.  
51 See in this respect: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/ 
economic_analysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_22_en.pdf 
52 See COM(2008) 435 final. “ Strategy for the internalisation of external costs”: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0435:FIN:EN:PDF 
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transport system into a modern, decarbonised efficient and user-friendly system53. 
However, bringing the products and services to the market to attain this objective is 
not fast enough. 
73. This situation is due to a wide variety of market and regulatory failures, such as non-
appropriability of research, coordination failures, and path dependency54. These are 
manifested as:  
– Weak innovation process resulting from the often missing direct link between 
research and development and deployment; 
– Lack of sufficient coordination of efforts between the EU, Member States, public 
and private actors related to insufficient data and information and lack of common 
setting of strategic priorities;  
– Excessive time to bring the technology to market, even though long lifetime of 
vehicles and infrastructure requires action now to meet our long term policy 
objectives; and  
– The complexity of technology options, which makes difficult to choose between a 
‘broad portfolio’ approach and strategic technology targeting of scarce financial, 
managerial and scientific resources. 
74. The continued oil dependence of transport-related activities is a clear manifestation 
of the problem55. 
75. User behaviour plays a determining role in the success or failure of new 
technologies. Users, apart from ‘early adopters’, are often unwilling to change their 
customary way of travelling and transporting goods, and accept alternative solutions. 
Lack of properly presented and reliable56 information and uncertainty may also 
influence decisions, as, for example, in the case of underestimation of fuel savings 
over the life time of an energy efficient vehicle. 
                                                 
53 The Commission Communication on the Innovation Union (COM(2010) 546) and its Staff Working 
Document (SEC(2010) 1161) explains in detail the key weaknesses of the EU research and innovation 
system, such as under-investment, system component-, system linkage- and system governance 
weaknesses.  
54 COM(2010) 546. “Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union”. 
55 The promotion of alternative fuels has been slow and fragmented across Member States. The share of 
alternative fuels remains below 5% in the EU on average. This situation is due to a series of obstacles 
such as: 
• a lack of high-level coordination and cooperation across relevant policy areas and stakeholders who 
have not necessarily cooperated before; which results in the absence of EU-wide standards, 
including on an accepted methodology that enables the comparison of economic, social and 
environmental impacts of using various fuels and energy carriers based on their production 
approach.  
• consumer myopia and lack of foresight; and 
• lack of correct pricing for the externalities of fossil fuel use 
56 Such as information based on the effective evaluation of real world emissions of vehicles, and a 
common methodology of calculating carbon footprints. 
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2.4.3. Supply of transport services: not sufficiently efficient 
76. Whereas the EU has opened to competition most of its transport markets since the 
90’s, a number of obstacles to a smooth and efficient functioning of the internal 
transport market persist. In this respect, a more detailed analysis of this driver, which 
is based upon the result of the ex post evaluation, is provided in Appendix 6 of the 
present Impact Assessment report57. 
77. The level of integration of the EU transport market remains low in comparison to 
other parts of the economy. A genuine EU-wide internal market exists only in air 
transport, while other transport modes suffer from different degrees of fragmentation 
along national borders; this concerns in first place rail and inland waterways, but 
road and short sea shipping are also affected. 
78. Cross-border transport and competition in national markets is hindered by 
protectionist regulations or attitudes, often defending the interest of incumbents and 
restricting access to domestic markets by foreign operators and new market entrants. 
In some liberalised market segments, a complete and correct implementation and 
enforcement of EU legislation by Member States is still missing. This is particularly 
the case for rail freight transport, which has been open to competition since January 
2007. 
79. Besides, transport infrastructure has been historically designed to serve national 
rather than European goals and cross border links constitute bottlenecks that are 
likely to become increasingly costly as the EU economy continues integrating. 
80. The lack of universally approved standards on, for example, traffic management and 
data exchange systems, on power supplies, and on educational requirements for 
transport workers are further obstacles to cross-border traffic and in some cases 
preclude the reduction of production costs achievable with a larger scale of 
production. 
81. Integration between transport modes is still far from being achieved. Multimodal 
infrastructure such as multimodal transhipment platforms for freight and integrated 
rail-air-public transport nodes for passengers is not sufficiently developed. 
Exchanging data between the modes is difficult because of the co-existence of non-
interoperable modal IT systems. 
82. In addition, the EU transport system suffers from an uneven level playing field 
regarding national health, social, safety and security standards, which is particularly 
felt in some market segments such a road transport. 
83. Finally, the human factor is a crucial component in transport to create a higher 
quality and more reliable transport system with a higher sensitivity to customers’ 
needs. In this respect, the EU transport system has suffered in normal demographic 
and economic conditions from skill shortages and a tight labour supply, not least 
given the difficulties inherent to the working conditions of mobile workers (working 
                                                 
57 The independent study underlying this section was published on the Europa website in 2009. http:// 
ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/studies/doc/future_of_transport/20090908_common_transport_policy_
final_report.pdf 
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far from home often at asocial working hours, safety and security risks…)58. The 
sector will be particularly vulnerable as it is ageing more than the economy-wide 
average and it is a sector where women’s participation is much lower than the 
average. These traits are particularly relevant in railways, inland waterways and short 
sea shipping which would receive traffic from the more energy intensive modes such 
as road transport and aviation.  
84. All these elements induce suboptimal modal choices, delayed adoption of new 
technologies, slower renewal of the fleet, and lack of investment in renewable energy 
sources and in certain types of infrastructure. These inefficiencies translate then into 
lower resource efficiency, higher transport externalities and higher overall transport 
costs to the society. 
2.4.4. Transport planning: lack of coordination and insufficient awareness of interactions 
Insufficient transport planning at local level… 
85. When taking land-use planning or location decisions, public authorities and 
companies often do not properly take into account the consequences of their choices 
on the operation of the transport system as a whole, which typically generates 
inefficiencies. The problem is particularly acute in urban areas59. Urban transport 
systems are integral elements of the European transport system and therefore are also 
of concern for the Common Transport Policy. They have a large influence on the 
achievement of European-wide goals such as those related to GHG emissions, 
biodiversity, oil-dependency and resource efficiency. 
86. Significant changes in urban mobility require comprehensive actions that bring 
together land-use planning, road use and parking, transport pricing, infrastructure 
development, public transport policy and much more. Achieving integrated and 
sustainable urban transport is an increasingly complex task which touches many 
stakeholders and interests. A greater coordination of all authorities having an 
influence on the transport system is highly desirable, possibly bringing together the 
responsibilities for land-use and transport planning, public transport, road use and 
transport infrastructure. Equally desirable is an extension of the co-ordination of such 
authorities beyond the strict city borders, so to cover entire metropolitan areas or 
regional transport systems. 
…and at continental scale 
87. Weaknesses in transport planning are also present with respect to the Trans-European 
Transport Network. TEN-T planning and implementation has so far not been driven 
sufficiently by a coherent European design. National infrastructure planning remains 
to a large extent disconnected from planning at EU level, and is mainly done at a 
modal level rather than in an integrated way across countries and modes of transport. 
The lack of international cooperation and coordination typically produced a number 
of inefficiencies: lack of joint traffic forecasts leading to differing investment plans; 
disconnected or even contradictory timelines; lack of joint investment calculation 
                                                 
58 See for instance the Commission Freight Transport Logistics Action Plan (COM(2007) 607) 
59 The Action Plan on Urban Mobility of 2009 (COM(2009) 490) identified as its Theme 1 the need to 
promote Integrated Policies.  
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and joint financial structures; incompatible technical characteristics; inadequate joint 
management of cross-border infrastructure projects. 
88. Moreover, national and European infrastructure projects have largely focused on 
developing individual priority projects rather than on creating a network. 
Infrastructure planning and assessment of individual projects failed to give an 
accurate representation of wider effects of infrastructure projects and of how these 
projects contribute to the overall infrastructure network. 
Conclusion 
89. The consideration of transport needs and of shifting transport flows is currently not 
sufficiently integrated in land-use planning decisions, resulting in excessive or sub-
optimally distributed transport demand. Consequently, the negative environmental 
and socio-economic impacts of transport are aggravated.  
2.5. Does the Union have the right to act? 
90. The right for the EU to act in the field of transport is set out in several articles of the 
TFEU, especially in Title VI, which makes provisions for the Common Transport 
Policy and in Title XVI on the trans-European networks. Article 192 TFEU also 
provides a legal basis for addressing the environmental sustainability of the transport 
system. 
91. Pursuant to Articles 90 and 91 TFEU, the Common Transport Policy should 
contribute to the broader objectives of the treaties. The goal of the common transport 
policy is to remove obstacles at the borders between Member States so as to facilitate 
the free movement of persons and goods. To this end, its prime objectives are to 
complete the internal market for transport, ensure sustainable development, promote 
a better territorial cohesion and integrated spatial planning, improve safety and 
develop international cooperation. 
92. All transport and environment policy proposals are decided by qualified majority, 
except for taxation measures which are decided by unanimity. As regards trans-
European networks, the Commission’s financing proposals have to be approved by 
the Member States, who are responsible for the planning and construction of 
projects. The Union has shared competence in the field of transport safety as set out 
in Article 4 of the TFEU and only limited competence in the field of urban mobility. 
93. In areas which do not fall within EU exclusive competence, EU action has to be 
justified. In the present case, it is therefore necessary that the subsidiarity principle 
set out in Article 5 (3) of the Treaty on the European Union is respected. This 
involves assessing two aspects. 
94. Firstly, it is important to be sure that the objectives of the proposed action could not 
be achieved sufficiently by Member States in the framework of their national 
constitutional system, the so-called necessity test. 
95. Given the fact that the overall concept is to create an EU-wide sustainable and 
integrated transport system, the Member States per se are not able to meet these 
challenges individually for the following reasons: 
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– The issues being addressed by the Transport White Paper, namely CO2 emissions, 
oil dependency and overall efficiency of the transport system, have transnational 
aspects which cannot be dealt with satisfactorily by Member States. These 
aspects, which concern for instance the cross-border connections between national 
infrastructure networks, need to be coordinated at EU level. International transport 
represents a significant and growing share of transport and can not be properly 
regulated at Member State level60. 
– The lack of EU action or the individual actions by Member States alone may 
hinder the development of the single market; give a competitive advantage to 
some players against the others and therefore negatively impact the free 
circulation of both goods and people, especially for transnational services. 
Coordinated action at EU level could overcome these disadvantages. 
– The issues identified above have different spatial effects and a strong variability, 
meaning that impacts across the EU could vary considerably. There is a need to 
ensure that solidarity is enshrined in the future transport policies. Similarly, it has 
to be ensured that the ones who are hit hardest by the problems identified will be 
able to adapt. Cohesion policy can further contribute to address the consequences 
of new disparities between those regions which suffer most and those that can 
more easily cope with their impacts. 
– Due to its scale, action at EU level can leverage greater results and magnify the 
efforts in many domains such as capacity building, research, information and data 
gathering, exchange of best practice, development and cooperation. In particular, 
only EU action would ensure that all EU citizens benefit from a resource efficient 
and competitive transport system. 
– Because it will be more effective, EU action on transport emissions and oil 
dependency will produce clear benefits compared with actions at the level of 
Member States. 
– As regards external action, the increased negotiating power of the EU, rather than 
individual Member States, may confer a leading role to the EU in some sectors. 
Moreover, since the unsustainable mobility has consequences for the EU economy 
and the EU supply of energy, there is a need for oversight and responsibility at EU 
level to complement the actions at national level and to avoid free riding. 
– In the field of urban mobility, there are several examples confirming the necessity 
to take action at EU level. One of the problems related to urban mobility and 
transport are emissions from road traffic, including emissions that contribute to 
climate change. This is a problem with a clear transnational dimension, where 
action by individual Member States, for example to set new limit values, 
introduce financial incentives or implement their own access restriction rules, 
could be in violation of EU legislation. Urban congestion affects enterprises from 
other Member States. No action by the EU in this field, or action by just a few 
                                                 
60 30% of total road freight is international and international road freight transport grows twice as fast as 
domestic road freight transport. Source: Road Freight Transport Vademecum, N°2, March 2009. 
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individual Member States, could lead to less informed decisions and damage the 
financial and policy interests of Member States61. 
96. Secondly, it has to be considered whether and how the objectives could be better 
achieved by action on the part of the EU, the so-called “test of European added 
value”. The rationale for a European action in the field of transport stems from the 
trans-national nature of the identified problem. However, it has to take into account 
that a ‘one size fits all’ approach would not be an adequate response. Therefore, an 
action at EU level coupled with actions at all administrative levels would yield 
significant added value. 
97. As regards urban mobility, dissemination of information and knowledge, expansion 
of the knowledge base and exchanges of best practice in the area of urban mobility 
are best carried out at EU level. This will avoid duplication of work and 
fragmentation of resources and allow decision-makers to benefit from the broadest, 
most diverse experience possible. In addition, emission and noise limits are best set 
at EU level in order to avoid an adoption of different standards in different Member 
States, which would add to the regulatory burden. Other examples include setting 
technical standards, e.g. for intelligent travel information and payment systems, 
including Galileo-based applications. There is also clear added value in action at EU 
level on information and data collection and monitoring. Based on the above 
observations, there is a basis to conclude that there is “added value” in EU action in 
the field of urban mobility and transport62. 
98. For these reasons, the policy objectives set out in section 3 of the present Impact 
Assessment report cannot be sufficiently achieved by actions of the Member States 
alone, but can rather, by reason or scale of the proposed action, be better achieved 
with high involvement of the EU. A thorough subsidiarity analysis will be performed 
for the specific policy measures contained in the proposed initiative. 
3. OBJECTIVES 
99. Section 2 has shown that the EU transport system is not sustainable to the extent of 
supporting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the meaning of the EU 2020 
Strategy. More specifically, it has been explained that the efficiency of the EU 
transport system in the use of natural resources and its ability to respond to the 
mobility needs and aspirations of people and businesses are not satisfactory. 
100. This section defines the general and specific policy objectives of the proposed 
initiative, discusses possible trade-offs and synergies between sustainability goals 
and verifies their consistency with other EU horizontal objectives. 
                                                 
61 See in this respect the Impact Assessment accompanying the Action Plan on Urban Mobility Impact 
Assessment (COM(2009) 490} {SEC(2009) 1212). 
62 See in this respect the Impact Assessment accompanying the Action Plan on Urban Mobility Impact 
Assessment (COM(2009) 490} {SEC(2009) 1212). 
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3.1. Policy objectives 
3.1.1. General policy objective 
101. A sustainable transport system is a crucial element for achieving smart, inclusive and 
resource efficient growth in Europe as defined in the EU 2020 strategy. To this end, 
as indicated under the resource efficiency flagship, the scale of the change that a 
resource-efficient agenda implies requires a massive technological improvement and 
a radical change in the transport system. 
102. Based on the assessment of the problem and its root causes, the general policy 
objective of this initiative is to define a long-term strategy that would transform the 
EU transport system into a sustainable system by 2050. The Renewed Sustainable 
Development Strategy of the European Union (hereinafter SDS) of the European 
Union63 defines a sustainable transport system as the one that “meets society’s 
economic, social and environmental needs whilst minimising its undesirable impacts 
on the economy, society and the environment”. More specifically, the main 
“undesirable impacts on the economy, society and the environment” caused by 
transport are: congestion, oil dependence, accidents, emissions of GHG and of other 
pollutants, noise, and land fragmentation caused by infrastructure. The following 
section formulates specific policy objectives in relation to the main sustainability 
concerns.  
3.1.2. Specific policy objectives 
103. The general objective of achieving a sustainable transport system by 2050 can be 
translated into more specific goals: 
(1) A reduction of GHG emissions that is consistent with the long-term 
requirements for limiting climate change to 2 °C64 and with the overall target 
for the EU of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 compared to 1990. 
Transport-related emissions of CO265 should be reduced by around 60% by 
2050 compared to 199066. This target has been derived from the results of the 
“Effective and widely accepted technology” scenario from the Impact 
Assessment on a “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”67. It includes 
aviation, but excludes international maritime68. 
                                                 
63 European Council, June 2006 
64 The “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap” identifies a path for the reduction of the EU GHG 
emissions by 80% by 2050 with respect to 1990. In the “Effective and widely accepted technology” 
scenario it is foreseen that the transport sector reduces its emissions by around 60%, industry by around 
80%, the residential sector and services by around 90%, and power generation by over 90%. 
65 Unless stated otherwise, the references to transport-related CO2 emissions in this Impact Assessment 
report relate only to tank-to-wheel emissions.  
66 As most GHG emissions from transport are CO2 emissions, this target can be considered as equivalent 
to the target of reducing GHG emissions by 60%, as expressed in the Impact Assessment on “Low-
carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. 
67 See also point 27 of the present Impact Assessment report. 
68 The results for international maritime are presented separately in section 5.  
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(2) A drastic decrease in the oil dependency ratio of transport-related activities by 
2050 as requested by the EU 2020 Strategy for transport calling for 
“decarbonised transport”. 
(3) Limit the growth of congestion. 
104. The three specific policy objectives could be broadly summarised as the prescription 
to ‘use less energy, use cleaner energy and better exploit infrastructure’. The first two 
objectives overlap to a large extent, and should be considered the absolute priority in 
line with the Resource Efficiency Flagship of the EU 2020 Strategy. There are, 
however, also significant synergies with the third objective that would typically call 
for a more extensive use of non-motorised and of public transport, which reduces 
both the use of space and the use of energy. 
105. At the same time, the achievement of the specific policy objectives identified above 
should not prevent that “current and future generations have access to safe, secure, 
reliable and affordable mobility resources to meet their own needs and aspirations.”69 
More specifically, this means, as suggested by the EU Transport Council70, that the 
EU transport system should: 
– in terms of accessibility: allow the basic access and the development of mobility 
needs of individuals and companies; 
– in terms of equity: promote equity within and between successive generations; 
– in terms of quality of services: offer safe, secure and reliable transport services of 
high quality; 
– in terms of provision of services: be affordable, operates fairly and efficiently, 
offers a choice of transport mode, and supports a competitive economy, as well as 
balanced regional development; it should promote high quality employment; 
– in terms of external costs to society: minimise the external costs of accidents, 
noise and air pollution, biodiversity loss and increased land use. 
                                                 
69 SEC(2010) 1606 final (14 December 2010) Commission Staff Working Document, “A European 
Strategy for Clean and Energy Efficient Vehicles - Rolling Plan”,  
70 See in this respect the definition of the concept of a sustainable transport system adopted by the 
European Union Council of Ministers of Transport (2004), according to which a sustainable transport 
system: 
• Allows the basic access and development needs of individuals, companies and society to be met 
safely and in a manner consistent with human and ecosystem health, and promotes equity within 
and between successive generations; 
• Is affordable, operates fairly and efficiently, offers a choice of transport mode and supports a 
competitive economy, as well as balanced regional development; 
• Limits emissions and waste within the planet's ability to absorb them, uses renewable resources at 
or below their rates of generation, and uses non-renewable resources at or below the rates of 
development of renewable substitutes, while minimizing the impact on the use of land and the 
generation of noise. 
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3.2. Trade-offs and synergies between sustainability goals 
106. It is generally accepted that sustainable transport implies finding a proper balance 
between (current and future) environmental, social and economic sustainability 
goals71. Two main trade-offs between sustainability goals can be highlighted.  
– First of all, there could be a conflict between cheap transport and GHG abatement. 
Fossil fuels have the great advantage of energy density. This is a valuable 
characteristic in mobile applications and the reason why fossil fuels are currently 
the cheapest option for transport. Clearly it will cost more to replace them. The 
trade-off is solved by setting a goal for emissions (the priority objective) and by 
devising a cost minimising strategy to achieve it. 
– Secondly, there could be a conflict between improving accessibility and lowering 
congestion, which could imply additional infrastructure, and land use. This trade-
off is more severe in the EU-12, where catching up with EU-15 makes certain 
infrastructure development a necessity. This trade-off is solved by giving priority 
to the upgrade of infrastructure over new construction and to ‘green 
infrastructure’72, but each project would have to be assessed individually on its 
own merits. 
107. This being said, there are also substantial synergies between sustainability goals. 
Policies to reduce GHG emissions can also be expected to reduce local pollutants, 
noise and energy consumption, thanks to new vehicles and clean fuels. Lower 
utilisation of road transport would also reduce the number of accidents. 
3.3. Consistency with horizontal objectives of the European Union 
108. The EU 2020 strategy, the Single Market Act and the Sustainable Development 
Strategy have set the scene for the transport sector.  
3.3.1. EU 2020 Strategy and Single Market Act 
109. The objective of the White Paper on Transport Policy clearly contributes to the 
objectives laid down in the EU 2020 Strategy. 
110. The EU 2020 Strategy, under the flagship initiative “Resource efficient Europe”, 
aims at supporting the shift towards a resource efficient and low carbon economy 
through the reduction of CO2 emissions as well as through increased competitiveness 
and energy security. The specific objectives set out in section 3.1 above are clearly in 
line with the aim of the above-mentioned flagship. The objectives of the White Paper 
on Transport Policy are also consistent with other objective defined in priority areas 
of the EU 2020 strategy such as innovation, high employment, social and territorial 
cohesion. 
                                                 
71 See in this respect United Nations General Assembly (March 20, 1987). “Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future”; Chapter 2: Towards 
Sustainable Development; Paragraph 35. http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm#I. 
72 Infrastructure designed in a way to minimise environmental impact. 
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111. The objectives of the White Paper on Transport Policy are also fully in line with the 
ambition to create a stronger, deeper and extended Single Market as set out in the 
Single Market Act73. 
3.3.2. Sustainable Development Strategy  
112. The overall objective of the SDS, regarding sustainable transport is “to ensure that 
our transport systems meet society’s economic, social and environmental needs 
whilst minimising their undesirable impacts on the economy, society and the 
environment”. The related operational objective is to achieve sustainable levels of 
transport energy use and reduce transport’s GHG emissions. 
113. The policy objectives of the White Paper on Transport Policy are in line with the 
renewed SDS by contributing to more sustainable mobility. Making mobility more 
sustainable would facilitate achieving other sustainable development goals. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS 
114. As described above, the current transport system is fundamentally unsustainable and 
major, not just incremental, changes are required to implement next generation 
transport solutions.  
115. In this context, this section will explore alternative policy options aimed at 
transforming the EU transport into a sustainable system by 2050. 
4.1. Preliminary note on methodology 
116. As described in the first section of this report, the identification of these policy areas 
is the result of a long, intense and interactive process of internal and external 
consultation. The input of this consultation process, together with the findings of two 
external studies undertaken by the Commission (one on the evaluation of the 
Common Transport Policy, undertaken by DG Energy and Transport, the other on 
“EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050?”, undertaken by DG Environment), has 
allowed the Commission to identify more precisely the problem to be solved, the 
four main underlying drivers and the corresponding policy areas and instruments that 
would be appropriate to address those issues. 
117. On that basis, the Commission has identified seven policy areas in which concrete 
policy measures could have a key role in stimulating the expected shift of the 
transport system to another paradigm. These policy areas are: pricing, taxation, 
research and innovation, efficiency standards and flanking measures, internal market, 
infrastructure and transport planning. 
118. The policy areas taken into consideration incorporate a broad range of policy 
instruments that can be implemented at EU level from softer instruments to more 
prescriptive ones including communication/awareness raising, research and 
development (innovation), guidelines, governance and co-ordination, market-based 
                                                 
73 Communication from the Commission: “Towards a Single Market Act – for a highly competitive social 
market economy”, COM(2010) 608 final/2 
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instruments, private and EU financing schemes, new regulation and standards. As 
regards transport planning in urban areas, EU action is limited to soft measures for 
subsidiarity reasons. EU action on taxation is also limited by the requirement of 
unanimity among Member States in the decision making process. 
119. These policy instruments are not mutually exclusive. In transport, the existence of 
multiple market failures – as indicated in the analysis of problem drivers – suggests 
the adoption of a combination of individual instruments that complement each other 
and create a comprehensive policy mix. 
120. The table below gives a mapping between the drivers identified in section 2.4 above 
and the policy areas. It also provides in the second column an indication of possible 
policy measures in each of the specified policy areas that would be referred to in the 
White Paper on Transport Policy as component of the overall strategy. The list of 
possible policy measures presented below is not exhaustive and will be finalised by 
the adoption of the White Paper by the Commission.  
121. Given the nature of the White Paper as a strategic document, the individual 
initiatives are broadly defined. The precise specification of the policy measures 
referred to in the White Paper will be done at a later stage, following a more specific 
analysis and an individual Impact Assessment74. Accordingly, it is outside the scope 
of the present Impact Assessment report to evaluate each initiative in detail. 
122. In this context, the Commission has undertaken a modelling exercise to provide a 
stylised quantitative assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of possible 
initiatives in each policy area, giving illustrative evidence on their relative 
importance, on the way they interact and on the required intensity of the intervention. 
The Commission has modelled the impact of the possible policy measures assuming 
a specification – indicated in the third column and in Table 4 – that does not 
necessarily correspond to what would actually be proposed at a later stage.  
                                                 
74 See section 1.4 of the Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC(2009)92). 
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Table 1: Mapping drivers, policy areas, possible policy measures envisaged in the White Paper and modelling hypothesis 
Policy Areas Possible policy measures envisaged in the White Paper Modelling hypothesis 
Driver 1: Cheap for users, expensive to society: prices do not reflect true costs 
Pricing Strategy for the gradual phasing in of a coherent internalisation system for 
local externalities in all transport modes on the whole network 
Internalisation of local externalities for all modes of transport according to 
the values specified in the handbook on internalisation75 
Taxation Establish a link between vehicle fuel taxation and the environmental 
performance and full internalisation of the cost of GHG emissions for all 
modes of transport in a co-ordinated and stepwise manner 
Elimination of distortions in energy taxation by establishing an energy and 
CO2 component in excise duties and abolition of exemptions76,77 
 Establish a link between vehicle taxation and the environmental performance Introduce a CO2-related element in the registration and annual circulation 
taxes78 
 Assess the possibility of introducing VAT on all international passenger 
transport services inside the EU 
Introduction of VAT on all international passenger transport services inside 
the EU79 
 Promote a revision of company car taxation to eliminate distortions or, as a 
second best, to provide incentives for clean vehicles. 
Elimination of favourable taxation regime for company cars80 
                                                 
75 Handbook with estimates of external costs in the transport sector - February 2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sustainable/2008_external_costs_en.htm) 
76 COM(2007) 52 final Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC as regards the adjustment of special tax arrangements for gas oil used as motor fuel 
for commercial purposes and the coordination of taxation of unleaded petrol and gas oil used as motor fuel; and Commission staff working document accompanying the 
proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2003/96 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (forthcoming) 
77 Answer given by the Commission to the question of MEP Nick Griffin (NI), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-
4804&language=EN 
78 Proposal for a Council Directive on passenger car related taxes SEC(2005) 809; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005PC0261:EN:NOT  
79 COM(2010) 695 final, Green Paper on the future of VAT, Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system 
80 DG TAXUD Taxation Papers, 2010, Copenhagen Economics: Company Car Taxation, Subsidies, Welfare and Environment; http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_22_en.pdf 
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Driver 2: Innovation: transport technologies do not achieve low carbon mobility 
Research and 
Innovation 
Conduct a screening to identify key innovative technologies, with a view to 
better target existing resources, define a governance structure for organising 
their development and enhance coordination of European and national 
(private and public) efforts and funding 
Bring together all relevant actors within the transport system, to develop 
research and deployment agendas, to design standards and to build 
demonstration projects, including bilateral cooperation frameworks in 
research and innovation with the main transport partners 
Improvement of the cost of batteries and of other critical technological 
components 





Use standards for controlling energy efficiency as well as air pollution for all 
vehicles which have proven to be an effective way of providing the industry 
with certainty concerning long-term objectives 
Encourage deployment of clean energy carriers by establishing the necessary 
supporting infrastructures 
Improve the effectiveness of fuel efficiency labelling, promote eco-driving 
and support eco-driving dissemination 
Implementation of CO2 standards for all vehicles (cars, vans, trucks, 
locomotives, vessels, barges, aircrafts) 
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Driver 3: Supply of transport services: not sufficiently efficient 
Internal market Railways: develop corridors, strengthen the European Railway Agency and 
ensure convergence of technical standards, reinforce the network of rail 
regulators and further pursue the opening of markets (domestic passengers). 
Aviation: effective implementation of the Single European Sky project - from 
the designation of a network manager, via the integration of national air 
traffic control to the deployment of the next generation of air traffic 
management system (SESAR). 
Maritime transport: simplification of the formalities for ships travelling 
between EU ports; a single electronic environment for all port/maritime 
transport related information exchanges and management; and a review of 
restrictions on provision of port services.  
Road transport: phase out of restrictions in the internal market like cabotage 
and of non-harmonised enforcement of social legislation.  
Promote quality jobs and uniform working conditions 
Increase in the efficiency of all transport modes as a result of the removal 
of regulatory, administrative and technical barriers 
Wide deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems 
Infrastructure Propose a core network consisting of nodes and links relying primarily on the 
efficient use of existing infrastructure via ITS/smart mobility solutions and 
aiming at bridging missing links, facilitating multimodality and creating links 
to third countries. 
Establish a firm long-term infrastructure plan for the completion of the core 
network together with EU Member States detailing the projects to be 
completed as well as the modalities. 
Increase in the capacity and performance of the network resulting from the 
elimination of bottlenecks and addition of missing links 
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Driver 4: Transport planning: not sufficiently integrated from the first to the last mile 
Transport 
planning 
Encourage the establishment of urban mobility plans and implementation of 
related measures to manage demand in non-collective motorised transport 
modes 
Shadow carbon pricing81 as a proxy for locally determined policies 
(pricing, support to public transport and non-motorised modes, integrated 
land planning) 
                                                 
81 The shadow price in this case is the marginal cost of strengthening the constraint on CO2 emissions. 
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4.2. Rationale behind a comprehensive and strategically coordinated EU action 
123. Given the high level of complexity of transport system, the interaction between 
multiple actors, also at international level, and the global relevance of transport and 
of its effect on the economy, society and the environment, the Commission considers 
that – besides the reasons explained in section 2.5 above – EU intervention is fully 
justified to reach the objectives and complement the action of stakeholders and 
Member States. 
124. To determine appropriate EU policy action, in a first step, the Commission has 
considered the possible application of an isolated intervention in each of the seven 
policy areas identified in section 4.1 above. Each of the instruments seems 
particularly suited for addressing some of the raised issues: 
– market-based instruments such as charging and taxation can ensure efficient 
allocation of resources and efficient modal choices; 
– efficiency standards have produced a significant acceleration in the introduction 
of more efficient vehicles, by providing clear targets for the industry and avoiding 
‘wait and see’ strategies of manufacturers;  
– research and development programs appear necessary to solve other types of 
market failures in innovation, as for example, the coexistence of multiple 
technical standards; 
– internal market measures and an effective enforcement of EU competition rules 
are needed to solve instances of regulatory failure and insufficient competition 
and to derive benefit from scale economies; 
– infrastructure policy is required to address coordination failures and the existence 
of network and cross-border externalities; 
– planning policies can take into account the interaction of transport with other 
policy areas, such as housing. 
125. It appears though that none of the categories of instruments alone would be capable 
of tackling at the same time and in a satisfactory way all the various problem drivers 
and all the elements of the specific policy objective. A mix of actions would be 
needed. 
126. For example, while pricing and taxation can bring economic efficiency, on their own 
they are not suited to bring more competition into a market characterised by 
regulatory failures, or to assist in the definition of technical standards. Market-based 
instruments are also relatively ineffective in the presence of ‘split incentives’82, 
                                                 
82 A common example of split incentives is referred to as the landlord-tenant problem. This problem 
occurs when the landlord provides energy-using appliances (such as a refrigerator or lighting systems), 
but the tenant pays the electricity bill. In this situation, there is little incentive for the landlord to choose 
the most energy-efficient appliance. 
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where the party paying for the production of externalities does not have control over 
the investments needed to abate those externalities83. 
127. This is particularly the case for many transport modes, as indicated by McKinsey 
&Company (2009), where it is suggested that transport has negative costs for GHG 
abatement, but can require relatively high investments. In other words, the graph 
below shows that implementing GHG abatement measures in the transport sector 
would demand greater capital intensity than would abatement in any other sector. 
This may be an indicator that the transport sector requires significant upfront capital 
investment, and in case of market failures there is a need for complementary public 
action in addition to the economic instruments. 
 
Source: McKinsey & Company (2009) 
Figure 2: Capital intensity and abatement cost84 
128. A balanced use of several policy instruments can also mitigate the trade-offs and 
exploit the synergies between sustainability goals. For example, technologies that 
improve the fuel efficiency of vehicles can lower the cost of transport and generate 
more travel – inducing thereby a so-called rebound effect85 – and more congestion. 
As shown in the table below, the rebound effect can partially offset the effect of a 
policy measure aimed at improved fuel efficiency. Similar effects exist for improved 
                                                 
83 Individuals decide on the type of vehicle they purchase, but cannot control investments in, for example, 
public transport means or in the recharging facilities needed for alternative power trains. As a result, 
consumers are often restricted in their choices and have low response to prices (inelastic demand).  
84 Capital intensity of an abatement measure is “defined as the additional upfront investment relative to 
the BAU technology, divided by the total amount of avoided emissions over the lifetime of the asset. 
For a more fuel efficient car, for instance, the capital intensity would be calculated as the additional 
upfront investment compared to the BAU technology, divided by the amount of CO2 saved through 
lower fuel consumption during the lifetime of the car. The main difference with abatement cost is the 
capital intensity calculation does not take financial savings through lower energy consumption into 
account.” McKinsey&Company (2009). Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy. Version 2 of the Global 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve. 2009. 
85 Rebound effects are indirect, second order effects of policy instruments, which are often unintended and 
have the potential to undermine the ultimate objective of the primary policy instrument, in this case the 
delivery of reductions in GHG emissions. 
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utilisation of infrastructure capacity. While new technologies or innovation will 
nevertheless provide higher utility for fewer resources, the absolute improvement in 
resource efficiency can be lower unless appropriate measures are applied to manage 
demand. Therefore combining action in several policy areas is all the more 
important. 
Table 2: Estimates of the long-run direct rebound effect for consumer energy services in the OECD86 
End-Use Range of values in 
evidence Base 





5-87% 10-30% 17 High 
Space heating 1.4-60% 10-30% 9 Medium 
Space cooling 1-26% 1-26% 2 Low 
Other consumer 
energy services 
0-49% <20% 3 Low 
 
129. As regards GHG emissions, individual measures or policies that focus exclusively on 
either the technological or the organisational and regulatory aspects would come 
short of the target of setting the EU transport sector on a sustainable path and of 
reducing GHG emissions by close to 60% below 1990 levels by 2050. This 
conclusion is confirmed by other research work: a recent project funded by the 
European Commission showed that for the EU, on tank-to-wheel basis, technical 
options can deliver a 42% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, compared to 1990. 
For OECD Europe, IEA (2010) estimates that technical options can deliver about 
50% over the same time horizon87. The same sources show that the potential of 
organisational and regulatory measures taken in isolation would be lower than that of 
technical options. 
130. In light of the above, the Commission concludes that a holistic approach that 
comprises all elements considered so far is therefore needed.  
                                                 
86 UKERC, 2007, The Rebound Effect: an assessment of the evidence for economy-wide energy savings 
from improved energy efficiency. 
87 Sources: Directorate General Environment (“EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050?”); IEA, 2010 Energy 
Technology Perspectives.  
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Conclusion 
Only a long-term and overarching strategy established for all identified policy areas has a 
reasonable chance of achieving the EU objectives. It should combine policy initiatives 
targeted at enhancing the efficiency of the system through better organisation, infrastructure 
and pricing with those that are more focused on technology development and deployment. It 
should also provide a framework for action at all levels of government. This conclusion is in 
line with the Europe 2020 Strategy which highlights that a resource-efficient agenda implies a 
massive technological improvement and a radical change in the transport system. 
Therefore, taking also into account the fact that the Commission has adopted in June 2009 a 
Communication on “A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-
led and user friendly system”, the Commission is of the opinion that a White Paper is the 
most appropriate sui generis document, in terms of simplicity and coherence with the 
objectives set out in section 3.1 above, to lay down a comprehensive and strategically 
coordinated EU action.  
4.3. Description of policy options 
131. In light of the above, the Commission has identified three policy options – besides 
the baseline scenario – that combine specific EU actions across the seven policy 
areas described above. The design of policy options build on the achievements and 
deficiencies of current policies outlined in section 2 and in Appendix 2. All three 
policy options have been designed to reach the same CO2 emission reduction target, 
i.e. 60%88 over 1990 levels. 
132. All three options envisage action in all seven policy areas and have in common a 
certain number of initiatives. What distinguishes them is the intensity of intervention 
that, depending on the option, is higher in some specific field and lower in others. 
133. Policy Option 3 is designed to show the effect of policies that emphasise the rapid 
deployment of new powertrains, by imposing very stringent CO2 standards on new 
vehicles and by accompanying them with appropriate innovation policies putting in 
place the necessary framework conditions. It is assumed that this approach would be 
the most effective in reducing the costs and the time of introduction of new 
technologies. 
134. Policy Option 2 is designed to show the effect of policies that rely less on 
performance standards and on active technological deployment and more on 
managing mobility and on carbon pricing. It is assumed that the industry will not 
outperform the less stringent CO2 standards for road and rail vehicles and that the 
necessary reduction in emission is achieved – in addition to the full pricing of 
externalities and to the elimination of tax distortions – by letting the carbon price rise 
by the necessary amount. This could be taken to represent the effect of high carbon 
                                                 
88 Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 include the same energy price environment as the “Effective and widely 
accepted technology” scenario from the Impact Assessment on “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. 
In the “Effective and widely accepted technology” scenario, with global climate action, lower energy 
demand is assumed to keep energy prices at lower levels relative to the Reference scenario. Oil price is 
assumed to be 80 $/barrel in 2030 and 70 $/barrel in 2050 (in year 2008-dollars). 
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taxation or of the introduction of a transport specific cap and trade system. In case of 
a very high carbon price, the effect would be equivalent to restrictions in “fossil fuel” 
mobility and forced modal shift to clean modes. 
135. Policy Option 4 represents an intermediate approach. It has values for CO2 standards 
and technology deployment in between those of Option 2 and 3. It has full pricing of 
externalities and elimination of tax distortions as in Option 2, but the additional 
carbon price element is only applied in the urban context in the form of a shadow 
price acting as a proxy for a wide-range of possible demand management measures.  
136. A detailed description of the content of each policy option is presented in Table 4 
below. The policy areas where assumptions are the same are shown in italics. For 
each policy option, an endogenous variable was identified and derived by the model 
to ensure that the reduction target of 60% is achieved. These variables are displayed 
with bold underlined font in Table 4: for Policy Option 2 – the CO2 tax component of 
motor fuel excise duties89; for Option 3 – the stringency of CO2 standards for road 
passenger transport90; and for Option 4 – the CO2 shadow price on urban transport.  
Policy Option 1: No additional EU action 
137. Policy Option 1, which is presented in detail in Appendix 3 of this Impact 
Assessment report, represents the future without any additional policy intervention to 
change current trends. 
Policy Option 2 
138. Policy Option 2 includes policies with a strong focus on the completion of the 
internal market, infrastructure development, pricing and taxation. The 60% CO2 
emission reduction target is achieved largely through improved efficiency within 
each mode, better logistics, modal shift and reduced mobility.  
139. With respect to other options, support for R&D and deployment of technologies is 
more limited. This has been translated into higher cost of batteries and more limited 
range91 for passenger cars and trucks. The range limitations act as a barrier to the 
diffusion of technology. This results in a more modest uptake of new powertrains, 
despite high price signals. Progress in efficiency is realised with conventional 
technologies, but up to a limit: although CO2 standards are put in place for road and 
rail vehicles with targets in place for 2020, they do not become stricter after 2020. 
Only autonomous, pricing-driven efficiency improvement follows in the period of 
2020-2050. In this scenario, as slower developments in clean transport technologies 
is assumed, strong pricing signals are required to alter the mobility patterns to an 
extent sufficient for achieving the required abatement in greenhouse gas emissions.  
                                                 
89 For Policy Options 2, the CO2 tax component of motor fuel excise duties has been chosen as an 
endogenous variable to reflect the high price signals required in the transport sector with limited 
technology deployment. 
90 The stringency of CO2 standards for road passenger transport is adjusting in Policy Option 3 to illustrate 
the efforts required in terms of regulatory measures with more limited action on system improvement 
policy measures. 
91 Range is the distance a vehicle can cover before refuelling/recharging. 
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140. These strong price signals go beyond the full internalisation of externalities and the 
elimination of existing distortions in taxation, which are assumed to be an integral 
part of Policy Option 2 and would be justified by economic theory to improve the 
economic efficiency in the overall economy. In effect, as technology development is 
assumed to be limited due to inadequate policies to address the failures identified in 
Section 2 for research and innovation, the achievement of the 60% CO2 emission 
reduction target requires that the CO2 externality is internalised at a much higher rate 
than in any other sectors of the economy. This will necessarily affect the cost and 
transfer payments resulting from this option set-up. 
141. The system improvement measures are front loaded in this policy option to allow 
gradual changes in the transport system.  
Policy Option 3 
142. Policy Option 3 relies heavily on developing and deploying technologies in particular 
in the long-term (2030-2040) through the universal introduction of rigorous 
standards for all vehicles92. The crucial element of fuel shift is addressed through the 
promotion of R&D policies into the development and subsequent deployment of 
alternative fuel use. This is reflected in the assumption of the lowest battery costs for 
electric vehicles among all policy options.  
143. While transport activities are optimised in the period 2010-2020 to eliminate crucial 
regulatory and market failures, transport demand in the long-term is satisfied through 
technological solutions. Internalisation of externalities is not complete over the EU 
and some distortions in taxation, in particular concerning VAT on international 
passenger transport and company car taxation, remain beyond 2020. In such an 
economy where market and regulatory failures are not fully addressed, the 
achievement of the 60% CO2 emission reduction target is made possible by very 
ambitious technological developments triggered by technology improvement 
measures. 
Policy Option 4 
144. Policy Option 4 also covers all policy areas identified above (see section 4.1 above), 
but the intensity of the measures is intermediate with respect to Policy Options 2 and 
3, thus envisaging a balanced contribution of system improvement and technology 
measures to achieve the objectives set out in Section 3. Measures influencing 
transport activity and modal choice, as well as those improving energy efficiency in a 
given mode and the carbon intensity of transport fuels are applied throughout the 
period gradually, reflecting the tightening constraint on CO2 emissions. 
145. Policy Option 4 assumes full internalisation of externalities and elimination of 
distortions in taxation, in particular concerning VAT on international passenger 
transport, vehicle taxation and company car taxation. Similarly to Policy Option 2, it 
also includes policies with a strong focus on the completion of the internal market, 
infrastructure development. Like Policy Options 2 and 3, this policy option also 
                                                 
92 For aviation and maritime transport, setting standards on fuel efficiency needs to be carried out through 
harmonised EU action in the International Civil Aviation Organisation and International Maritime 
Organisation. 
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relies on locally determined policies (pricing, support to public transport and non-
motorised modes, integrated land planning) in urban areas. The intensity of the 
policy measures in urban transport is derived residually to achieve the 60% reduction 
target. 
146. The main difference in the design of this policy option comes from the assumption 
that vehicles in all modes will be subject to CO2 standards up until 2050. Battery 
costs for electric vehicles are assumed to be half way between Policy Options 2 and 
4, to reflect an intermediate level of intensity of R&D policies. 
147. Policy Option 4 can be described as eliminating distortions through pricing, CO2 
taxation and internalisation measures, but can also be characterised by investment in 
non-road infrastructure, relatively stringent CO2 standards for all vehicles and 
relatively high investment in R&D. 
148. As said above, the Commission has undertaken a modelling exercise to provide a 
stylised quantitative assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the identified 
Policy Options. To this end, the Commission has modelled the impact of the possible 
policy measures assuming a specification that does not necessarily correspond to 
what would actually be proposed at a later stage. Indeed, the precise specification of 
the policy measures referred to in the White Paper will be done at a later stage, 
following a more specific analysis and an individual Impact Assessment93. 
Accordingly, it is outside the scope of the present Impact Assessment report to 
evaluate each initiative in detail. The table 3 displayed below presents an overview 
of the modelling assumptions whereas table 4 provides a detailed description of the 
modelling specifications used for each Policy Option.  
                                                 
93 See section 1.4 of the Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC(2009)92). 
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Table 3: Overview of the modelling assumptions in Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 
Policy measures Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
System improvement policy measures 
Pricing 
 High 
(full internalisation of external costs) 
Low 
(partial internalisation of external costs) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Taxation 
Taxation of fuels High 
Endogenous variable: CO2 tax 
component of motor fuel excise duties 
Low Medium 
VAT on international passenger 
transport services 
High Same as in Policy Option 1 High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Vehicle taxation High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Company car taxation High Same as in Policy Option 1 High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Internal Market 
Opening transport markets and 
removing regulatory, administrative 




(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Wide deployment of intelligent 
transport systems 
High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
 EN 44   EN 
Infrastructure    
Create a core backbone of high 
performing infrastructure in terms of 
environmental impact 
High Same as in Policy Option 1 High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Transport Planning 
Better integrate urban mobility in the 
EU transport policy 
Medium 
(same as in Policy Option 4) 
Medium 
(same as in Policy Option 4) 
Medium 
Endogenous variable: Shadow price on 
urban transport acting as a proxy for a 
wide-range of possible demand 
management measures in urban areas 
Technology improvement policy measures 
Research and Innovation 
Battery costs, power density and speed 
of charge for electric vehicles 
Low High Medium 
Efficiency standards and flanking measures 
CO2 standards Low High 
Endogenous variable: Level of CO2 
standards for road passenger vehicles 
Medium 
Standards for controlling air pollution High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Deployment of less GHG intense 
energy carriers 
High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Eco-driving High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
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Fuel efficiency labelling High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
Internalisation of NOx emissions in 
aviation 
High High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
High 
(same as in Policy Option 2) 
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Table 4: Detailed content of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 
The common features between Policy Options are displayed in italic. 
Policy measures Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
System improvement policy measures 
Pricing 
Internalise local externalities for all 
modes of transport 
100% internalisation of all external 
costs for heavy duty vehicles (HDV), 
passenger cars, motorcycles, passenger 
and freight rail, inland navigation and 
aviation for all Member States by 2050, 
according to the central value from the 
Handbook on estimation of external 
costs in the transport sector94,95. 
100% internalisation of external costs for 
heavy duty vehicles (congestion, air 
pollution, noise, infrastructure wear and 
tear), passenger and freight rail (air 
pollution and noise) by 2020, for Member 
States that currently have in place a 
distance related infrastructure charging 
system or have officially announced their 
intention to introduce such a system in the 
near future, according to the central value 
from the Handbook on estimation of 
external costs in the transport sector. After 
2020, the coverage of charges remains 
unchanged. 
Same as in Policy Option 2 
Taxation 
Taxation of fuels Phase I (2013-2019)96: 
• revised structure of the Energy 
Taxation Directive and of national 
Phase I (2013-2019) as in Policy Option 2. 
After 2020 the taxation level is kept 
unchanged. 
Phase I (2013-2019) same as in Policy 
Option 2. 
 
                                                 
94 Handbook with estimates of external costs in the transport sector - February 2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sustainable/2008_external_costs_en.htm). 
95 The internalisation of external costs means that transport users bear the costs they generate: both private and external. To make transport users pay for these external costs 
Policy Option 2, 3 and 4 envisage a user charge based on the estimation of these external costs. The central values from the ‘Handbook with estimates of external costs in 
the transport sector” have been used for this purpose.  
96 Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2003/96 restructuring the Community framework for the 
taxation of energy products and electricity (forthcoming). 
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taxes and introduction of a CO2 tax 
component; 
• diesel rates based on the 2007 
commercial diesel proposal97, but 
CO2 component included; 
• current exemptions left unchanged; 
• exemption of compressed natural gas 
(CNG), liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) and biofuels from the energy 
component. Taxation of biodiesel 
increased gradually; 
• CO2 tax component: 10 € per tonne 
of CO2. 
Phase II (from 2020 onwards): 
• elimination of exemption for diesel 
use in rail, local public passenger 
transport; 
• commercial and non-commercial 
diesel use is taxed at the same rate; 
• abolition of exemption of kerosene 
for aviation and diesel for navigation. 
For aviation, given that it would be 
covered by the Emission Trading 
Scheme starting with 2012, the 
energy taxation would only consist 
of the energy component, but not the 
CO2 component. The taxation of 
kerosene for aviation only applies to 
intra-EU flights, in line the 
provisions of the Chicago 
Convention. 
• energy component for CNG, LPG 























Phase II (from 2020 onwards): same as 
in Policy Option 2 but the CO2 tax 
component is equal to 20 € per tonne of 
CO2 from 2020 onwards, instead of 
being endogenously derived as in Policy 
Option 2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
97 COM(2007) 52 final Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC as regards the adjustment of special tax arrangements for gas oil used as motor fuel 
for commercial purposes and the coordination of taxation of unleaded petrol and gas oil used as motor fuel. 
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The CO2 tax component is derived 
endogenously to achieve the 60% CO2 
emissions reduction by 2050 
compared to 1990. 
VAT on international passenger 
transport services 
Introduction of a minimum VAT rate of 
19% on all intra-EU international 
passenger transport services98  
Same as in Policy Option 1 (No additional 
EU action) 
Same as in Policy Option 2  
Vehicle taxation Establish a link in vehicle taxation with 
the environmental performance by 
introducing a CO2-related element in the 
annual circulation tax and the 
registration tax99,100. In Member States 
that did not introduce a CO2-related 
element, we assume that at least 25% of 
the total tax revenue from registration 
and annual circulation taxes should 
originate in the CO2-based element of 
each of these taxes starting with 2015. 
From 2017 at least 50% of the total tax 
revenue from both the annual circulation 
tax and the registration tax would 
originate in the CO2 based element101. 
 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
                                                 
98 Currently, the practices applied by Member States differ greatly. While for international passenger transport, sea and air are exempt of VAT in the whole of the EU-27, 
VAT is payable on inland waterways, rail and road transport in Belgium, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. France levies VAT on inland waterways, Greece and Austria 
does so on rail and road transport, while Poland and Slovenia on road transport only. 19% of VAT is applied currently by Germany on international rail transport. Source: 
European Commission, DG TAXUD. 2010. VAT Rates Applied in the Member States of the European Union; http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
resources/documents/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/rates/vat_rates_en.pdf 
99 More than half of Member States have introduced a CO2-related element in their car taxation schemes. Source: ACEA, Overview of CO2 based motor vehicles taxes in the 
EU; http://www.acea.be/images/uploads/files/20100420_CO2_tax_overview.pdf 
100 COM(2005) 261 final Proposal for a Council Directive on passenger car related taxes  
101 For modelling purposes, it is assumed that only the CO2 tax component of fuel taxation is endogenously determined. 
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Company car taxation Elimination of favourable taxation 
regime for company cars, reflected 
through changes in car ownership, 
vehicle size in the fleet and fuel 
consumption102. 
Same as in Policy Option 1 (No additional 
EU action) 
Same as in Policy Option 2 
Internal Market 
Opening transport markets and 
removing regulatory, administrative 
and technical barriers 
Increase in the efficiency of all transport 
modes as a result of the removal of 
regulatory, administrative and technical 
barriers, reflected through decreases in 
the ticket price for passenger rail and 
operation costs and time costs for freight 
(10% to 25%, depending on mode) 103 
and higher load factors for road freight. 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
Wide deployment of intelligent 
transport systems 
Deployment of Intelligent Transport 
Systems reflected through a reduction in 
congestion and improvements in energy 
efficiency, due to more efficient use of 
infrastructure, vehicle capacity and 
mode104. 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
Infrastructure    
Create a core backbone of high 
performing infrastructure in terms of 
environmental impact 
Effects of the increase in the capacity 
and performance of the network 
resulting from the elimination of 
bottlenecks and addition of missing 
links, and increase in the train length (to 
1.5 km) and maximum axle load (to 22.5 
tonnes), reflected through decreases in 
Same as in Policy Option 1 (No additional 
EU action) 
Same as in Policy Option 2  
                                                 
102 Assumptions based on: DG TAXUD Taxation Papers, 2010, Copenhagen Economics: Company Car Taxation, Subsidies, Welfare and Environment; http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_22_en.pdf 
103 FERRMED (2009), Ferrmed Global Study.  
104 Assumptions based on data from the Verband der Automobilindustrie. Source: International Road Transport Union. 
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operation costs and time costs (6% to 
20%, depending on mode) and higher 
load factors for freight105,106,107.  
Transport Planning 
Better integrate urban mobility in the 
EU transport policy 
Same as in Policy Option 4108  Same as in Policy Option 4 Effects of shadow carbon pricing as a 
proxy for locally determined policies 
(pricing, support to public transport and 
non-motorised modes, land planning)  
The value of the CO2 shadow price is 
derived endogenously to achieve the 
60% CO2 emissions reduction by 2050 
compared to 1990 in this Policy 
Option. 
Technology improvement policy measures 
Research and Innovation 
Battery costs, power density and 
speed of charge for electric vehicles 
Assumed specific battery costs per unit 
kWh109 in the long run: 595-640 €/kWh 
for plug-in hybrids and 415-530 €/kWh 
for electric vehicles, depending on range 
and size110, and range limitations for 
passenger cars and trucks. 
Optimistic assumptions on specific battery 
costs per unit kWh in the long run: 240-
260 €/kWh for plug-in hybrids and 160-
210 €/kWh for electric vehicles, depending 
on range and size, and other critical 
technological components111, 112.  
Assumed specific battery costs per unit 
kWh in the long run: 390-420 €/kWh for 
plug-in hybrids and 315-370 €/kWh for 
electric vehicles, depending on range and 
size, and other assumptions on critical 
technological components113. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
105 Zimmer, W., Schmied, M. (2008), Potentials for a modal shift from road to rail and ship - A methodological approach, ETC/ACC Technical Paper 2008/18. European Topic 
Centre on Air and Climate Change. 
106 Wiegmans, B.W., Konings, R. (2007), Strategies and innovations to improve the performance of barge transport, EJTIR 7, no. 2 (2007) pp. 145-162. 
107 FERRMED (2009), Ferrmed Global Study. 
108 The CO2 shadow price has been first derived in the Policy Option 4. Subsequently, the value of the CO2 shadow price in Policy Option 4 has been used as input (exogenous 
variable) in Policy Options 2 and 3. The presentation in the table above does not reflect the order in which the Policy Options had been modelled. 
109 kWh stands for kilowatt hour. 
110 International Energy Agency (2009), Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009 
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Efficiency standards and flanking measures 
CO2 standards Implementation of CO2 standards for 
passenger cars (95 g CO2/km), light 
commercial vehicles (135 g CO2/km), 
heavy duty vehicles (15% compared to 
2005), powered two-wheelers (70 g 
CO2/km) and trains (20% compared to 
2005) by 2020.  
Starting with 2020 assume autonomous 
efficiency improvements as in Policy 
Option 1 (No additional EU action). 
Derived endogenously to achieve the 
60% CO2 emissions reduction by 2050 
compared to 1990, by triggering the 





Implementation of CO2 standards for all 
vehicles (cars, vans, trucks, locomotives, 
vessels, barges, aircrafts). CO2 standards 
by 2020 are the same as in Policy Option 
2. In addition, for cars they go down 
from 95g CO2/km in 2020 to 20 g 
CO2/km in 2050 [for light duty vehicles: 
135g CO2/km in 2020 to 55 g CO2/km in 
2050; for heavy duty vehicles, trains, 
ships and aircrafts 40% , 40%, 45% and 
60% improvement in energy efficiency, 
respectively, by 2050]. 
Standards for controlling air 
pollution 
Starting with 2030 implement standards 
for controlling air pollution. For 
passenger cars: 0.025 g/km for CO; 0.03 
g/km for NOx and 0.0025 g/km for 
particulate matter114. For heavy duty 
vehicles: assumed halving of the EURO 
VI limit values. 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
Deployment of less GHG intense 
energy carriers 
Share of blending of biofuels and carbon 
intensity for electricity in line with the 
Effective and widely accepted 
technology scenario from the Impact 
Assessment on “Low-carbon economy 
2050 roadmap”. 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
111 Nemry F., Leduc G., and Munoz A. (2009). Plug-in hybrid and battery-electric vehicles: State of the research and development and comparative analysis of energy and cost 
efficiency. Technical report, Joint Research Centre: Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Joint Research Centre Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. 
112 Martin Eberhard, Co-founder of Tesla, since early 2009 electric vehicle engineering director at Volkswagen’s Electronics Research Laboratory (ERL) in Palo Alto, 
California. http://electric-vehicles-cars-bikes.blogspot.com/2010/08/eberhard-500-mile-evs-by-2020.html (last accessed 15.11.2010); USABC, 
http://www.uscar.org/guest/teams/11/Electrochemical-Energy-Storage-Tech-Team (last accessed 15.11.2010). 
113 International Energy Agency (2009), Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009 
114 CO stands for carbon monoxide and NOx for nitrogen oxides. 
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Eco-driving Assumptions on reduction in vehicle 
energy consumption (MJ/km) by 2050, 
relative to Policy Option 1: 1.6% for 
cars and motorcycles; 2.1% for buses; 
3.2% for vans; 1.9% for medium and 
heavy trucks; 2.2% for passenger rail 
and 1.3% for freight rail115. For road 
and rail, virtually all drivers are 
assumed to be trained by 2050. 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
Fuel efficiency labelling Fuel efficiency labelling would have 
limited effect with mandatory CO2 
standards enforced, but it would still 
play a role in raising awareness and 
ensuring independent and comparable 
information for consumers116.  
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
Internalisation of NOx emissions in 
aviation 
Inclusion of NOx emissions from 
aviation in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme117 starting with 2020 and apply 
a 2x emissions multiplier to account for 
the impact of NOx (1 tonne NOx= 2 
tonne CO2). 
Same as in Policy Option 2 Same as in Policy Option 2 
                                                 
115 “EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050?” project, funded by the European Commission, Directorate General Environment.  
116 “EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050?” project, funded by the European Commission, Directorate General Environment. 
117 The current EU Emissions Trading Scheme only covers CO2 emissions from aviation, but aviation has larger climate impacts due to other emissions such as stratospheric 
NOx, particulates, contrails and formation of cirrus cloud. 
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5. IMPACT ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS  
149. This section provides an assessment of the economic, social and environmental 
impacts that is proportionate to the nature of the document proposed. The assessment 
of those impacts is supported by modelling results118 and/or by academic research 
where possible. Table 12 presented at the end of this section summarises the results 
of the assessment of impacts119. 
150. At this stage, it is important to underline that modelling results are global and 
tentative, and present the impacts as illustrations rather than as conclusive evidence 
to support the preferred option. 
151. A 40-years outlook is surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty, especially 
for such a complex system as transport. Whereas some parameters such as population 
growth can be projected with a reasonable degree of confidence, the projection of 
other key factors like economic growth, oil prices or technological developments 
over a long period of time incorporates a higher amount of uncertainty. This needs to 
be taken into account for the assessment of impacts presented below. In this respect, 
in addition to undertaking individual Impact Assessments for each single measure 
proposed in the future, regular reviews following the evaluation of policies in place 
are essential to allow for the necessary adjustments and to reduce policy failures. 
152. The nature of the present Impact Assessment report, assessing broad policy measures 
without going into the precise specifications on concrete proposals, the high 
uncertainty surrounding the long time horizon and the inherent modelling limitations, 
requires treating the modelling results with caution. For example, the magnitude of 
transport-related problems differs across Member States and regions, and various 
income groups will be affected to a differing degree. However, without further 
specifying the details of policy measures, assessing the impacts is extremely difficult. 
153. Each policy option assessed below incorporates a set of possible policy interventions 
at EU level, which will be the subject of an individual Impact Assessment report 
when necessary120. 
154. Policy Option 1, namely no additional EU action, is analysed in-depth in Appendix 3 
of the present Impact Assessment report. The impacts of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 
are assessed compared to Policy Option 1 as required by the 2009 Impact 
Assessment Guidelines. 
                                                 
118 Modelling results build on a modelling framework including PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, PRIMES-
TREMOVE transport model, TREMOVE and GEM-E3 models. A short description of each model is 
provided in Appendix 5. 
119 A cost-effectiveness analysis has been used in the present Impact Assessment report, in line with the 
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC(2009)92), provided the each policy option achieves 
the 60% CO2 emission reduction target by 2050 relative to 1990 and the difficulty of valuing all 
benefits in money terms. 
120 See section 1.4 of the Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC(2009)92). 
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5.1. Main modelling results 
155. The tables presented below give an overview of the main modelling results in terms 
of transport activity, CO2 emissions and other external costs. More specific tables 
will be displayed along with the assessment of impacts. 
Transport activity  
Table 5: Change in passenger and freight transport activity of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 relative to Policy 
Option 1 
Policy options
compared to Policy Option 1 
(in %)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Passenger transport activity -3% -9% -18% 0% 0% -2% -1% -2% -7%
Road -3% -12% -23% -1% 0% -2% -1% -3% -9%
Rail 9% 19% 35% 0% 0% 5% 8% 17% 27%
Aviation -12% -12% -22% 1% 3% -8% -11% -9% -17%
Freight transport activity -1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 5% 0% 2% 5%
Road -11% -27% -42% -3% -1% 2% -5% -5% -3%
Rail 9% 34% 58% 2% 3% 3% 7% 15% 18%
IWW 10% 20% 35% 3% 3% 1% 11% 22% 21%
Maritime 1% 3% 5% 1% 3% 6% 1% 3% 6%
Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
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Table 6: Change in passenger and freight transport activity of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 relative to 2005 
Policy options
compared to 2005 (in %) 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Passenger transport activity 17% 22% 24% 21% 34% 49% 19% 32% 41%
Road 14% 13% 7% 17% 27% 37% 17% 24% 27%
Rail 33% 65% 124% 22% 39% 75% 32% 63% 111%
Aviation 36% 75% 105% 56% 105% 142% 37% 82% 119%
Freight transport activity 21% 41% 84% 22% 45% 92% 22% 45% 92%
Road 13% 2% -8% 23% 39% 61% 21% 33% 53%
Rail 38% 87% 148% 30% 44% 62% 36% 60% 87%
IWW 24% 47% 79% 16% 25% 33% 25% 49% 60%
Maritime 22% 47% 100% 22% 47% 101% 22% 47% 101%
Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
CO2 emissions 
Table 7: Main projections regarding CO2 emissions121 
compared to 1990 levels Policy 
Option 1
1990 levels Policy 
Option 1
1990 levels Policy 
Option 1
Policy Option 1 30.8% 0.0% 24.2% 0.0% 24.2% 0.0%
Policy Option 2 18.7% -10.0% -1.9% -22.6% -60.9% -68.6%
Policy Option 3 24.5% -5.7% 12.2% -11.5% -62.0% -69.5%
Policy Option 4 20.7% -8.6% 7.7% -15.0% -60.9% -68.6%
Policy options Resulting CO 2 
emissions 
2020
Resulting CO 2 
emissions 
2030




Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
                                                 
121 As explained above, the modelling results for CO2 emissions reduction do cover aviation, but do not 
cover international maritime. Therefore, CO2 emissions for maritime are reported separately. The 
modelling results reflect the accounting method set out in Commission Decision (2007/589/EC) 
establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council for the use of biofuels. In this 
Decision, biomass is considered as CO2 neutral. 
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External costs of transport 
Table 8: Change in external costs of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 relative to Policy Option 1 
Policy options
compared to Policy Option 1 
(in %)
2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Congestion -6% -16% -26% 0% 1% -3% -3% -4% -11%
Air pollution -6% -23% -84% -2% -15% -79% -3% -18% -78%
Noise -6% -18% -46% -1% -4% -39% -2% -4% -32%
Accidents -4% -14% -27% -1% 0% -2% -2% -3% -9%
Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
5.2. Economic impact 
156. This section analyses in a first step the impact of the various policy options on the 
transport sector itself, in terms of level of activity, modal shift and production costs. 
Given the central role transport plays in the economy and in the everyday life of 
people, this section also assesses in a second step the impact of the transport system’s 
evolution under each Policy Option on a different aspect: economic growth, 
efficiency of the transport system, congestion, households, transport-related sectors, 
innovation and research, administrative burden, EU budget and international 
relations. 
5.2.1. Impact on transport as a business 
Transport activity 
157. Transport activity is expected to continue increasing in all Policy Options, driven by 
growth in economic activity. Modelling results show that between 2005 and 2050 
passenger transport activity would raise by 49% in Policy Option 3, followed by 
Policy Option 4 with 41% and 24% in Policy Option 2 (see Table 6: ).  
158. However, the active policies in place for stimulating change in the transport system 
would put a brake on the expansion of passenger transport activity in all Policy 
Options in comparison with Policy Option 1 (see Table 5). Policy Option 2 shows the 
highest effect on passenger transport activity by 2050 (about -18%) relative to Policy 
Option 1, due to its strong focus on taxation. The large scale uptake of electric 
propulsion vehicles enables the decarbonisation of passenger transport with only 
moderate impact on transport activity in Policy Option 3 (-2%) and Policy Option 4 
(-7%) by 2050.  
159. Freight transport activity is projected to grow at a strong pace between 2005 and 
2050 in Policy Options 3 and 4 (about 92%). The high share of maritime in freight 
transport activity (around 80%) and its similar evolution in Policy Options 3 and 4 is 
responsible for this outcome (see Table 6). In Policy Option 2, strong price signals 
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generate a fall in freight road transport demand by 2050 and, hence, a slower growth 
in freight transports activity (84%) relative to Policy Options 3 and 4. 
Modal shift 
160. As indicated in Table 10 below, the market share of different modes of transport will 
remain relatively stable in Policy Option 3 compared to Policy Option 1. 
161. Under Policy Option 4, modal shift takes place in a number of segments of the 
transport activity: high-speed rail gains further shares (it is projected to undertake 72 
billion more passenger kilometres in 2050), and around 88% of freight is carried by 
rail, inland navigation and maritime in 2050. Passenger rail transport activity is 
projected to grow by 66% in Policy Option 1 and to more than double in Policy 
Option 4 between 2005 and 2050, while freight rail would increase by 58% in Policy 
Option 1 and by 87% in Policy Option 4 over the same period (see Table 6).  
162. The greatest changes occur however in Policy Option 2 due to very intensive policies 
with the objective of managing demand and encouraging a shift in modal choices: 
demand for road passenger transport and aviation drops by over 20% relative to 
Policy Option 1 by 2050, while demand for rail passenger transport increases by 
35%. For freight, rail transport benefits most in terms of increased demand by 2050, 
followed by inland navigation and maritime (see Table 5). 
Unit costs per user 
163. The unit costs per passenger transported would increase in all three Policy Options, 
despite the decline in the fuel costs per km travelled122, 123. Policy Option 2 shows the 
highest increase, 23% compared to Policy Option 1 by 2050, due to the capital costs 
related to public transport and pricing. The cost increase in Policy Option 3 is driven 
to a large extent by the capital costs for the electric propulsion vehicles, while in 
Policy Option 4 (13% increase relative to Policy Option 1 by 2050) both capital costs 
for public transport means and those for electric propulsion vehicles play an 
important role (see Table 9). 
                                                 
122 Passenger transport costs include capital costs, fixed operation costs and variable fuel and non-fuel 
costs (including taxes and charges).  
123 Annualised capital costs include the return necessary on private sector investments in the transport 
sector. No social discount rate is applied which would result in lower costs. 
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Table 9: Unit costs of transport in Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 relative to Policy Option 1 
2020 2030 2050
Unit cost for passenger transport
Policy Option 2 5% 18% 23%
Policy Option 3 1% 0% 2%
Policy Option 4 2% 3% 13%
Unit cost for freight transport 
Policy Option 2 13% 36% 43%
Policy Option 3 3% -1% -4%
Policy Option 4 4% 2% -1%
Unit cost of transport relative to Policy Option 1 (in %)
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
164. The evolution of the unit cost for freight transport shows similar patterns in Policy 
Option 2, increasing however by 43% compared to Policy Option 1 by 2050124. 
Capital costs for rail play a more significant role for freight transport in Policy 
Option 2. In Policy Options 3 the drop in the unit fuel cost outweighs the increase in 
capital costs and the total unit cost for freight transport slightly declines relative to 
Policy Option 1 by 2050. The decrease in the unit fuel cost for freight is the effect of 
tighter efficiency standards and of lower fuel prices in Policy Option 2, 3 and 4, 
relative to Policy Option 1125. In addition, fuel costs play a more important role in 
total costs for freight, relative to passenger transport. In Policy Option 4 unit cost for 
freight transport is similar to that of Policy Option 1 by 2050 (see Table 9). 
                                                 
124 Similarly to passenger transport, freight transport costs include capital costs, fixed operation costs and 
variable fuel and non-fuel costs.  
125 As previously explained Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 include a lower price environment. Oil price is 
assumed to be 80 $/barrel in 2030 and 70 $/barrel in 2050 (in year 2008-dollars). 
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Table 10: Modal shares in Policy Options 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Policy options
modal shares (in %) 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Passenger transport activity 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Road 81.2% 79.2% 76.7% 81.2% 77.2% 72.0% 81.0% 78.9% 77.0% 81.5% 78.6% 75.1%
Rail 7.5% 7.7% 8.1% 8.4% 10.0% 13.4% 7.5% 7.6% 8.7% 8.2% 9.1% 11.1%
Aviation 10.8% 12.6% 14.7% 9.8% 12.1% 14.0% 10.9% 12.9% 13.7% 9.7% 11.7% 13.1%
Inland navigation 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7%
Freight transport activity 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Road 16.1% 15.3% 13.4% 14.5% 11.2% 7.7% 15.6% 14.9% 13.0% 15.3% 14.2% 12.4%
Rail 3.7% 3.5% 3.1% 4.1% 4.7% 4.8% 3.8% 3.5% 3.0% 3.9% 3.9% 3.5%
Inland navigation 2.2% 2.1% 1.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 1.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.0%
Maritime 78.0% 79.1% 81.8% 79.0% 81.6% 85.2% 78.4% 79.5% 82.3% 78.3% 79.4% 82.2%
% of conventional ICE cars in 
passenger transport activity
65.6% 59.0% 48.4% 54.5% 35.7% 12.4% 54.8% 29.7% 2.9% 55.0% 30.3% 3.0%
Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
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5.2.2. Impact of transport dynamics on: 
5.2.2.1. Economic growth 
165. The current report is part of a joint analysis and projection exercise for the 
Commission’s initiatives related to the transition to a low-carbon economy by 2050. 
The transport sector has to contribute to the overall policy goal of designing a path 
towards a low-carbon, competitive economy that meets the long-term requirements 
for limiting climate change to 2°C.  
166. Previous assessment by the Commission shows that the costs by 2020 of putting the 
EU economy on a path that meets the long-term requirements for limiting climate 
change to 2°C would be limited compared to Policy Option 1, at around 0.2%-0.5% 
of GDP126, with access to the carbon market. Using the additional revenues from 
auctioning the CO2 emissions allowances in all the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) sectors and the tax revenues from the non-ETS sectors to decrease the 
labour costs would improve overall macroeconomic results leading to 0.4%-0.6% 
increase in GDP by 2020, relative to Policy Option 1. 
167. The Impact Assessment on a “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap” shows that a 
CO2 emission reduction target for transport of around 60% is consistent with the aim 
of achieving emission reductions for the whole economy in a way that minimises the 
impact on growth. It corresponds to emission reductions in other sectors of around 
80% for the industry, 90% for the residential sector and services and over 90% for 
power generation. 
168. As regards the differentiated impact of the four policy options on economic growth, 
the long-term perspective implies that it is very difficult to go beyond a qualitative 
assessment127. 
169. Policy Option 1 would spare the economy the costs of replacing fossil fuels in the 
transport sector with energy sources that, currently, are less cheap and convenient. 
However, this initial advantage would eventually be eroded by increasing fuel costs. 
Perhaps more importantly, since the technological race for clean transport is a global 
one, remaining a frontrunner is essential for the EU manufacturing industry: other 
regions of the world will face similar constraints while global demand for mobility 
keeps growing. On the other hand, delayed action and timid introduction of new 
technologies as in Policy Option 1 can condemn the EU transport industry to 
irreversible decline. 
170. Policy Options 2 and 4 contain a range of measures aimed at further opening the 
transport markets and at removing regulatory, administrative and physical barriers to 
the transport system. A more integrated and efficient transport system enabling the 
free movement of people and goods across the EU is expected to contribute to 
                                                 
126 SEC(2010) 650, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions - Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage: Background information and analysis. 
127 In addition, modelling limitations do not allow evaluating the macroeconomic effects of measures like 
i.e. CO2 standards. 
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economic growth, as it would allow a more efficient use of resources. In particular, 
measures aimed at getting the transport prices right should be at the core of the 
transport strategy, as they contribute to the efficiency and the sustainability of the 
transport system. In addition, in Policy Option 2 and 4, the EU economy should also 
benefit from the increase in the capacity and performance of the infrastructure 
resulting from the elimination of bottlenecks and addition of missing links. Policy 
Option 4 would have the additional advantage over Policy Option 2 of providing a 
greater stimulus to technological development and of allowing greater levels of 
mobility, to the benefit of trade and economic specialisation.  
171. Policy Option 3 relies to a greater extent on technological advance and innovation in 
the EU. It does, however, bring about more limited improvements on the functioning 
of the markets and it might suffer from higher overall costs of congestion. 
5.2.2.2. Efficiency of the transport system – transport as a service 
172. In Policy Option 1, transport prices would continue increasing in line with rising oil 
prices. 
173. In Policy Option 2, smart pricing for transport services is expected to steer the 
customers towards more efficient and sustainable modal choices. Besides, as 
highlighted above, the achievement of a Single Transport Area supported by an 
efficient transport network will be a key to increase the efficiency of the 
transportation system. While the internalisation of external costs and the taxation is 
expected to increase end-user prices, the greater efficiency of the transportation 
system will be able to partly offset this increase.  
174. Under Policy Option 3, technology is only capable of delivering limited 
improvements in the functioning of the transport system compared to the Policy 
Option 1. The policy intervention that improves the fuel efficiency of vehicles leads 
to less fuel being required to travel the same distance. As the uptake of advanced 
powertrains is accelerated under this policy option, economies of scale enable lower 
costs of production. However, total vehicle purchase costs would still increase by 
about 20% relative to Policy Option 1 by 2050128.  
175. Under Policy Option 4, the overall efficiency of EU transport system improves 
through a balanced combination of system improvement and technology 
improvement measures. 
5.2.2.3. Congestion levels 
176. In Policy Option 1, congestion is projected to pose a huge burden to the society: 
congestion costs would increase by about 50% by 2050, to nearly € 200 billion 
annually. 
177. As highlighted in Table 8 above, in Policy Option 2, the modal shift projected from 
road to rail for passenger transport and from road to rail and inland navigation for 
freight would have a positive effect on congestion levels and would reduce the bill to 
                                                 
128 This statement refers to total vehicle purchase costs and not to unit costs.  
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the society compared to Policy Option 1. Modelling results indicate that congestion 
costs in Policy Option 2 would be 26% below those in Policy Option 1 by 2050. 
178. In Policy Option 3, the pricing signals are not sufficient to shift traffic away from 
road. Congestion continues therefore to pose a large burden on the competitiveness 
of European businesses and on the quality of life, congestion costs being only 3% 
lower than in Policy Option 1 by 2050. 
179. The modal shift in favour of rail induced by Policy Option 4 will have a positive 
effect on congestion levels compared to Policy Option 1 by 2050, although to a lesser 
extent. Modelling results indicate that congestion costs would drop by about 11% in 
Policy Option 4. 
 
Source: TRANSTOOLS 
Figure 3: Congestion levels in 2030 in Policy Option 4 
5.2.2.4. Household transport costs 
180. Prices for private passenger transport would increase in all Policy Options, driven by 
capital costs increases in Policy Options 3 and 4, and to a large extent by pricing in 
Policy Option 2. For road freight transport, the decline in fuel costs per km travelled 
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would outweigh the rise in the capital and operation cost in Policy Options 3 and 4, 
while user price would increase in Policy Option 2.  
181. With respect to transport costs per household, Table 11 shows that the share of 
passenger transport costs in the income of an average EU household would increase 
in all Policy Options relative to Policy Option 1. The costs included are the 
annualised transport equipment costs (i.e. related to vehicle stock), the fuel and 
electricity costs as well as other fixed and variable non-fuel costs, including taxes 
and charges.  
182. In Policy Option 2, the increase in fixed and variable non-fuel costs, among which 
mostly taxation and pricing, outweighs the positive effects in terms of fuel costs but 
also the capital costs. As a result, the share of the transport costs in households 
income increase by 0.3 percentage points in Policy Option 2 relative to Policy Option 
1 by 2050. In Policy Options 3 and 4, capital costs related to the large scale uptake of 
advanced technologies play a more important role relative to Policy Option 2. 
183. The pattern of the additional transport costs as a share of household income is also 
different between Policy Options 2, 3 and 4. This outcome is due to the different 
intensity of policy measure included in each policy option and the time profile of the 
measures. For example, as previously indicated, in Policy Option 2, system 
improvement measures are front loaded to allow gradual changes in the transport 
system, which is reflected through higher additional fixed and variable non-fuel costs 
by 2030. However, all Policy Options show moderate increases in additional 
passenger transport costs as share of household income by 2050 (see Table 11). 
Table 11: Total passenger transport costs in % of households’ income in Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 relative 
to Policy Option 1  
Policy options 2005





2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050
Passenger transport total costs 27.8% 0.4% 1.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 1.3%
of which
Capital costs 11.7% -0.1% -0.7% -0.3% 0.2% 0.6% 1.2% 0.0% 0.5% 1.6%
Fuel costs 4.2% 0.0% -0.8% -1.5% -0.1% -1.0% -1.8% 0.1% -0.7% -1.7%
Fixed and variable non-fuel costs 11.8% 0.5% 3.2% 2.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.9% -0.1% 0.6% 1.4%
Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
5.2.2.5. Transport-related sectors 
184. European manufacturers are currently amongst the most technologically advanced in 
the world in all transport modes. Vehicles, trains and aircrafts produced in Europe 
are highly valued on the non-EU markets. As regards the automotive industry, the 
Commission’s Impact Assessment on CO2 standards for passenger cars suggested 
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that efficiency standards would have positive impacts on the competitiveness of 
European manufacturers129. First of all, vehicles that meet strict CO2 emissions 
requirements in the EU will be globally competitive and compliant with the climate 
change policies being implemented in third countries (especially where fuel economy 
standards exist and are about to be tightened, notably Japan, China, and USA, as well 
as India which is likely to follow). The reduction of CO2 emissions is now a global 
phenomenon and involves all means of transport.  
185. An ambitious EU policy in the environmental field will help maintain the technology 
lead of the EU automotive industry and thus support its competitiveness. While 
European automotive firms are market leaders in some transitional drive-train and 
fuel technologies, they have also been investing heavily in alternative powertrains 
such as hybrid vehicles, electric vehicles and hydrogen. It is clear that in the medium 
and long-term the global competition for market leadership in these technologies will 
intensify. Given the strong position of European manufacturers in the market 
segment of premium vehicles and its high-quality supplier base, the automotive 
industry is well-equipped to take a leading role in this global race driven by stricter 
regulatory standards for environment and safety130In the long term the main areas of 
growth will come from external markets, as rising income levels improve access to 
individual mobility. In this context, Policy Options 3 and 4 would allow maintaining 
to the greatest extent the European manufacturers’ competitive position on the 
external markets. This effect is much less pronounced in Policy Option 2 where 
policies enable slower technological advance and innovation in the EU. 
186. In addition, the wide deployment of ITS technologies foreseen in Policy Options 3 
and 4 is likely to have a positive effect on the developers of key enabling transport 
technologies. This impact is much less prominent in Policy Option 2. 
5.2.2.6. Innovation and Research 
187. The European automotive industry is a world leader in developing clean and energy 
efficient technologies based on combustion engines, consequence of substantial 
investment in the last 15 years in research and development131. About one third of the 
R&D investments are directed towards research efforts that reduce the GHG 
emissions of vehicles, in particular towards the improvement of conventional engine 
technologies and the development of electric powertrains. 
                                                 
129 SEC(2007)1724 “In the global perspective, research and innovation are seen as strengths of the 
European market and it is not likely that the above trends will have a damaging effect on the 
competitive position of EU manufacturers. As regards mature non-EU markets where EU manufacturers 
are already present (e.g. US, Canada) there is a general trend towards the reinforcement of fuel 
efficiency/greenhouse gas emission standards. Because requirements on these markets are so far less 
ambitious than those in the EU, the proposed EU legislation will allow European carmakers to provide 
vehicles that are competitive and meet the reinforced standards to come into force in the coming years.” 
130 SEC(2009) 1111 final. European Industry in a Changing World. Updated Sectoral Overview 2009. 
131 A recent research from the Joint Research Centre of the Commission shows indeed that the EU-based 
automotive industry is the largest private research investor in the EU with a volume of R&D 
investments of more than 30 bln € in 2008. This high R&D effort, that reaches around 5% of the 
turnover, indicates that the sector is research-intensive, especially in comparison to the low R&D 
intensity of companies active in the electricity sector (0.6%) and oil and gas producers (0.2%). See in 
this respect: JRC.2010. Research of the EU automotive industry into low-carbon vehicles and the role 
of public intervention http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC58727_TN.pdf 
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188. In all Policy Options (except Policy Option 1), the decarbonisation of transport relies 
on technology development towards clean and energy efficient vehicles based on 
conventional ICE and the deployment of breakthrough technologies in ultra-low-
carbon vehicles. This will be achieved mainly through setting long term efficiency 
targets for vehicles. 
189. As said above, past experience has shown that setting long term efficiency targets via 
specific regulation can steer environmental innovation within the automotive 
industry in the right direction. Creating appropriate framework conditions for 
steering the automotive sector’s research efforts is therefore of high relevance and 
impact. 
190. As a consequence, all Policy Options are expected to have a favourable impact on 
research and innovation. However, the magnitude of the effect of each Policy Option 
on research and innovation will differ. High intensity of policies accelerating the 
deployment of advanced technologies in Policy Option 3, namely efficiency 
standards, is expected to bring about the largest investments in innovation, followed 
by Policy Option 4. Policy Options 2 will also contribute, but to a lesser extent. 
191. Sending to the market the right signals can contribute to the creation of a lead-market 
and bring long-term benefits to EU-based industry. Companies in the lead-market, 
the so-called first-movers, are better positioned than their competitors when demand 
for ‘their’ technology increases and gains world market shares. They are indeed at 
the forefront of the diffusion of the innovative technology and are the first to 
experience the benefits of ‘technology learning’. As indicated in the Commission 
Communication on Innovation Union132, supporting and facilitating environmental 
innovation is expected to boost the competitiveness of the European industry, 
provide new jobs in the automotive industry and in other sectors in the supply chain 
and support restructuring. 
5.2.2.7. Administrative burden 
192. Compared to the Policy Option 1, Policy Options 2 and 4 are expected to reduce 
administrative burden at EU and at national levels given that they both incorporate 
policy measures that will remove barriers, including administrative obstacles, to a 
Single Transport Area. A more detailed assessment of the impact of specific 
proposals on administrative burden will be performed in the context of individual 
Impact Assessments. 
193. Policy Option 3 is not expected to have a significant impact on administrative burden 
compared to Policy Option 1. 
5.2.2.8. EU budget 
194. In principle, all Policy Options envisaged in this Impact Assessment report have a 
direct impact on the EU budget. However, the impact of individual measures on EU 
budget will be assessed in the context of individual impact assessments. 
                                                 
132 EU 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union SEC(2010) 1161 
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5.2.2.9. International relations 
195. Under Policy Options 2, 3 and 4, the EU is foreseen to substantially reduce its GHG 
emissions. Given the importance of international transport in overall emissions, the 
international aviation and maritime sector will need to make substantial contributions 
to the overall abatement effort. As a consequence, modelling analysis shows an 8% 
to 22% decrease in the overall activity levels of aircrafts by 2050 compared to Policy 
Option 1, while maritime benefits the most in terms of improvements in energy 
efficiency and CO2 intensity. Overall, both modes increase their activity substantially 
over 2005 levels: 100% to 140% in aviation and about 100% in maritime. The share 
of biofuels is projected to reach about 40% in energy consumption by aviation and 
maritime by 2050. 
196. Increases in traffic are made feasible in a sustainable way by the technological and 
operational improvements foreseen to be undertaken in both sectors as a result of 
additional policies. In particular, achieving a Single European Aviation Area 
consisting of the neighbouring countries and accommodating the increased trade 
flows carried on maritime vessels, is accompanied by measures that improve the fuel 
efficiency of both modes and enable better operations through ITS solutions 
(SESAR, e-Maritime, speed optimization). 
197. All Policy Options demonstrate an increased need for global action that ensures a 
level playing field internationally. Therefore, depending on what emission reduction 
policies are adopted in IMO and ICAO, a certain strain on international relations in 
particular with developing countries can be expected at least in the near and medium-
term. In addition, the implementation of taxation policies going beyond the 
internalisation of external costs for international transport under Policy Option 2 may 
require substantial diplomatic efforts. 
5.3. Social impact 
198. As pointed out in the literature133, defining social impacts in transport is not an easy 
task. Defining social impacts as all impacts on people is a too broad definition, but a 
limitation to “demographic changes, job issues, financial security and impacts on 
family life”134 would be too narrow. One of the difficulties of assessing social 
impacts in transport policy is that, often, no clear distinction can be made between 
social, economic and environmental impacts. For instance, a policy that reduces air 
pollution induced by transport activities affects primarily the natural environment, 
but also human health thanks to improved air quality. It has therefore both social and 
environmental impacts. In this context, the Commission will assess social impacts of 
the various policy options in the fields which affect primarily people, namely 
mobility, accessibility and cohesion, equity, employment level and conditions and 
safety. The impacts of variation of air and noise pollution on human health are 
assessed in the section analysing environmental factors. 
                                                 
133 See for instance Karts T. Geurs, Wouter Boon, Bert Van Wee (2009): Social Impacts of Transport: 
Literature Review and the State of the Practice of Transport Appraisal in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, Transport reviews, 29:1, 69-90. 
134 IAIA (2003): Social Impact Assessment: International principles. Special publication Series N°2 
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5.3.1. Impact on the degree of citizens’ mobility135 
199. In comparison with Policy Option 1, all Policy Options will put a brake on the 
mobility for the EU citizens by 2050. However, the degree of mobility reached in 
2050 with respect to 1990 would still be about 58% higher in Policy Option 2, 90% 
in Policy Option 3 and 80% in Policy Options 4. 
200. The strong focus of Policy Option 2 on pricing policies and taxation implies that 
mobility of citizens will be substantially constrained relative to Policy Option 1 (-
18% by 2050). On the contrary, the large scale uptake of electric propulsion vehicles 
in Policy Option 3, would enable the EU citizens keeping about the same degree of 
mobility as in Policy Option 1 by 2050 (-2% by 2050), while also decarbonising the 
passenger transport.  
201. Under Policy Option 4, the combination of demand management measures and 
technology improvement measures allows to limit the reduction in citizens’ mobility 
to 7% by 2050 compared to Policy Option 1 (see Table 5 above). 
202. In terms of choice of transport means, Policy Option 2 and 4 incorporate system 
improvement measures that render rail more efficient and convenient for citizens. It 
can therefore be concluded that both Policy Options offer more choice to citizens 
contrary to Policy Options 1 and 3. 
5.3.2. Impact on accessibility and cohesion 
203. Accessibility in this context is based on the concept of “potential accessibility”, 
which assumes that the attraction of a destination increases with size, and declines 
with distance, travel time or cost136. 
204. In Policy Option 1, the ownership and use of cars would create more bottlenecks and 
congestion. High congestion levels are expected to seriously affect road transport in 
several Member States by 2030 in the absence of effective countervailing measures 
such as road pricing. 
205. The expected rise in fuel costs and congestion levels by 2030 would lead to further 
divergence in accessibility at regional level. Peripheral areas require longer average 
trips using, in most cases, more expensive modes and networks than the central areas 
do. As a result, their situation is expected to worsen, with higher average transport 
cost increases than central areas. With economic activity continuing to demonstrate 
signs of centralisation at EU level, transport may not support sufficiently economic 
growth and job creation in the peripheral regions.  
                                                 
135 The mobility of citizens is defined in terms of passenger kilometres. 
136 More specifically, accessibility is defined in terms of generalized transport costs from zone i to zone j 
for segment r (commodity group or trip purpose) in year t, weighed with the traffic volumes. 
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Source: TRANSTOOLS 
Figure 4: Change in accessibility between 2005 and 2030 in Policy Option 1 
206. Policy Options 2 and 4 will provide better access for more people than is currently 
the case. Traffic congestion and time wasted stuck in jams will decrease. 
Improvements in accessibility under Policy Option 3 are more limited as transport 
demand remains close to levels under Policy Option 1.  
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Source: TRANSTOOLS 
Figure 5: Change in accessibility in Policy Option 4 relative to Policy Option 1 in 2030 
5.3.3. Distributional impacts 
207. In Policy Option 1, the lack of improvement in the field of quality of service 
combined with deteriorating accessibility is likely to worsen social equity as the 
transport system do not adjust to prioritise the needs of those who rely on alternatives 
to cars. The negative impact of high levels of congestion is relevant in Policy Option 
3 as well. 
208. In Policy Options 2 and 4, the improved quality of service combined with enhanced 
accessibility is likely to promote social equity. However the beneficial impact of 
increased transport efficiency and of the wider availability of alternative, collective 
modes of transport is partially offset by the higher private cost of transport. This 
effect is particularly pronounced in Policy Option 2. Data on the share of household 
expenditure on transport across income groups suggest that highest income group 
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spends around 5% more on transport than the lowest one137. However the 
distributional impacts will primarily depend on the exact characteristics of any given 
scheme of internalisation, and in particular the linked method of government revenue 
recycling. As shown in Section 5.3.2 however, accessibility will improve more in the 
peripheral regions of the EU-12 as the EU-15 already has a well-developed multi-
modal transport network. This will improve EU-wide equity among regions. 
5.3.4. Impact on employment level and conditions (including on gender balance) 
Effect on green jobs 
209. The decarbonisation of transport can be expected to have a favorable effect on ‘green 
jobs’. Numerous studies indeed quantify and describe the trend in green job growth 
in Europe. A study from Ecorys outlines the manner in which the combination of 
environmental policy, regulation and public awareness has affected industries such as 
the automotive and transport sectors138. The developments in these sectors have, in 
turn, been strong drivers for employment in eco-industry sub-sectors, notably the 
environmental technology, recycling and renewable energy subsectors. Another 
study pays particular attention to the multiplier effects of environment related 
activities139. The employment multiplier describes the jobs directly and indirectly 
linked to the eco-industry as a ratio to those directly created in the eco-industry. The 
study finds multipliers of between 1.3 and 1.9 across the 27 Member States. 
Effect on total employment 
210. In Policy Option 1, total employment in transport services140 is projected to roughly 
maintain its relative share by 2050141, resulting in a lower level of absolute 
employment by the sector. With growing transport activity demand, the lower 
employment in transport may negatively affect the workload and working conditions. 
A scarcity of labour and skills may arise due to ageing, further aggravating the 
shortage of labour already experienced before the crisis in many segments of the 
transport sector. In absence of innovative alternatives, this may also result in higher 
transport costs for the society. 
211. In light of the conclusions of various economic studies142, total employment in 
transport services is expected to grow under Policy Option 2. Employment effects 
                                                 
137 See for instance European Environment Agency. Factsheet TERM 2005 24 – Expenditures on personal 
mobility; http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/expenditures-on-personal-mobility-1/ 
term_2005_24___expenditure_on_personal_mobility_final_version.pdf  
138 Ecorys (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display& 
doc_id=5416&userservice_id=1&request.id=0 
139 GHK (2007) Links between the environment, economy and jobs; http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
enveco/industry_employment/pdf/ghk_study_wider_links_summary.pdf 
140 This figure does not include own account transport. The construction and maintenance of transport 
infrastructure and of transport means (i.e. road vehicles, ships, trains) is not included either. 
141 Result of the GEM-E3 model. 
142 See for instance, “Climate Change and employment – Impact on employment in the European Union-25 
of climate change and CO2 emission reduction measures by 2030”, European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), Instituto Sindical de Trabajo, Ambiente y Salud (ISTAS), Social Development 
Agency (SDA), Syndex, Wuppertal Institute (2007). 
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from modal shift143 induced in Policy Option 2 on the various modes of transport 
depend on the labour intensity of each mode: road transport, public transport and 
inland waterways are more labour intensive than maritime transport, railways or 
aviation. Amongst the labour-intensive modes, the largest employer is road freight 
transport whose job losses due to modal shift may be compensated by new jobs in 
multimodal transport services, collective modes and in logistics. The use of public 
transport instead of the private car will moreover have immediate effects on 
employment as the self-provision of car mobility is not accounted for in statistics 
even if the negative impact on car servicing businesses may be important. 
Improvements in transport services in Policy Option 2 will require the creation of 
numerous jobs that will in particular enable catering for the needs of various users in 
collective modes. As in the services sector in general, such employment is expected 
to attract a larger female workforce.  
212. Labour shortages in most modes, and particularly in maritime and inland navigation, 
are likely to be compensated by recourse to extra-EU workers, with the risk of losing 
EU know-how. 
213. In Policy Option 3, it is expected that employment in the transport equipment 
manufacturing sector will grow. In economic theory, product innovations have a 
positive impact on employment, since they open the way to the development of 
either entirely new goods or radical differentiation of mature goods. A study 
conducted on behalf of the Commission has shown that the large scale uptake of 
alternative energy carriers should facilitate additional job creation in the renewables 
sector144. The reorientation of activities towards new markets and products will 
generate demand for new skills. The most prominent examples are in the automotive 
sector and in shipbuilding, responding to low-carbon demands for hybrid vehicles 
and offshore investment in wind and tidal energy respectively. Generally, skills 
needs are reflected in demand for additional competences of existing workers. These 
new environmentally-driven competences relate to new technologies as well as to 
new management requirements because of the changes in production methods and 
the adoption of new business models145. 
214. This will happen against the background of an already tight situation in the transport 
labour market due to the ageing of the labour force and to the little attractiveness of 
mobile jobs. Hence, labour shortages are likely to appear in the “low carbon 
marketplace” where existing skills will have to be enhanced and new skills into the 
European workforce will be needed146. 
                                                 
143 The distribution of jobs within the transport sector, as different from its total volume, depends of 
changes in the modal split, which will be in part influenced by the policies that will be adopted at 
European and other levels. 
144 The EmployRES study (2009), funded by the European Commission, showed that achieving a 20% 
share of renewables in final consumption could provide a net effect of about 410,000 additional jobs by 
2020. 
145 CEDEFOP, 2010, Skills for green jobs. European Synthesis report 
146 According to the Commission Staff Working Document “European Industry in a Changing World - 
Updated Sectoral Overview 2009”, the automotive industry employs directly more than 2.3 million 
people (about 6% of manufacturing employment). Most of those employed in the automotive industry 
(60-70%) are engaged in skilled (or semi-skilled) manual work, while 30-40% are trained professionals 
or technicians. 
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215. In Policy Option 4, the combination of system improvement measures and 
technology improvement measures would benefit from the positive impacts of Policy 
Option 2 on employment in transport services and of Policy Option 3 in the sectors 
manufacturing equipment for the transport sector. The latter are expected to demand 
workers with higher skills profile. 
5.3.5. Impact on safety 
216. The projected increase in traffic in Policy Option 1 would induce an increase of 
accidents: the external cost of accidents would be about 60 bn € higher by 2050 
compared to 2010. The external cost of accidents associated to urban transport would 
increase by some 40% over the same period.  
217. In Policy Options 2 and 4, active modal shift policies, which are projected to reduce 
road transport activity levels, would contribute to improved road safety and to the 
reduction of death and injury. In Policy Option 2, external cost of accidents would 
decline by 27% relative to Policy Option 1 by 2050, while in Policy Option 4 by 9% 
(see Table 8). This improvement in road safety will benefit directly low income 
groups and ethnic minorities who experience a higher level of death and injury on 
roads than other groups. The large scale deployment of Intelligent Transport System 
(ITS) is also expected to have positive effects on safety. 
218. The beneficial effects in terms of safety would be more limited in Policy Option 3 
because traffic levels would be similar to those in Policy Option 1. 
5.4. Environmental impact 
219. Transport related activities have many impacts on the environment. The most 
important effects are contribution to climate change, to local air pollution, to noise 
levels, to biodiversity loss and natural resources depletion. 
5.4.1. Impact on climate change  
220. In 2050, CO2 emissions including international aviation and maritime are projected to 
be 35% above 1990 levels under Policy Option 1, owing to the fast rise in the 
transport emissions during the 1990s147. As indicated in Table 7 above, excluding 
international maritime this translates into a 24% increase above 1990 levels.  
221. As indicated in point 131 of the present Impact Assessment report, the three other 
Policy Options will be capable of reducing CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050148. The 
approach followed in each of these policy options is however different as shown in 
the following graph (see Figure 6). CO2 emissions from international maritime 
transport would decrease by about 40% between 2005 and 2050 in Policy Options 3 
and 4 and by about 50% in Policy Option 2.  
                                                 
147 The CO2 emissions from transport include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion 
emissions from pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road 
activities. 
148 The 60% CO2 emissions reduction target does not cover international maritime.  
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222. As shown in Figure 6 below, the profile of the CO2 reduction between 2020 and 2040 
is projected to be different amongst the Policy Options. Policy Option 2 is indeed 
projected to reap the benefits of EU action sooner than Policy Options 3 and 4149. 
  
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 6: Approach followed to reduce transport CO2 emissions by 60% over 1990 levels150 and evolution 
of well to wheel emissions 
223. On well-to-wheel basis, the Policy Options deliver over 65% reduction in CO2 
emissions by 2050 compared to the Policy Option 1151 assuming that power 
generation is decarbonised. Power generation mix plays here an important role: the 
large scale electrification of transport, not accompanied by the decarbonisation of 
power generation, would only shift CO2 emissions from transport to the energy 
sector152.  
5.4.2. Impact on air and noise pollution 
224. As highlighted in Table 8, external costs of transport to the society would continue to 
increase in Policy Option 1. The increase in traffic would lead to roughly 20 bn € 
increase of noise related external costs by 2050. NOx emissions and particulate 
                                                 
149 Urban planning measures are used as residual component in order to reach the 60% targets in Policy 
Option 4. Their importance is moderate, as indicated by a CO2 shadow price of about 200 €’08/ t of 
CO2 by 2050. This shadow price is close to the CO2 price from the “Effective and widely accepted 
technology” scenario from the Impact Assessment of the “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. This 
price signal mimics a combination of measures like: traffic management through congestion charges, 
integrate planning through urban mobility plans and improvements in public transport and soft modes 
infrastructure. Policy Options 2 and 3 use the same price signals for urban as Policy Option 4. 
150 The 60% CO2 emissions reduction target does not cover international maritime and therefore they are 
not reported in this figure. The 60% CO2 emissions reduction target only covers the tank to wheel 
emissions. 
151 The well-to-wheel CO2 emission factors for biofuels and electricity are identical to those applied in the 
“Effective and widely accepted technology” scenario from the Impact Assessment of the “Low-carbon 
economy 2050 Roadmap”. 
152 Such a shift would not result in higher absolute emissions however: the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
effectively caps emissions from power generation. 
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matter would drop by about 40% and 50%, respectively, by 2030 and roughly 
stabilise afterwards (see Figure 7 below). As a result, external costs related to air 
pollutants would decrease by 60% by 2050. 
225. In Policy Option 2, the modal shift induced by a more efficient pricing mechanism 
and the decline in the passenger transport activity is expected to lead to significant 
reduction in air pollutants by 2050. Nitrogen oxides emissions would decline by 
about 50% relative to Policy Option 1, while particulate matter emissions by about 
55% (see Figure 7 below). Moreover, there will be a reduction in vehicle related 
noise pollution due to a decrease in the number of vehicles used and to a limited 
extent due to the gradual substitution of internal combustion engines for electric 
vehicles. External costs related to noise would decrease by as much as 46% relative 
to Policy Option 1 by 2050 (see Table 8 above).  
  
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 7: Evolution of NOx emissions and particulate matter in Policy Options 1, 2, 3 and 4 
226. Under Policy Option 3 and 4, large scale electrification in various modes carries 
significant abatement of pollution. Compared to Policy Option 1, nitrogen oxides 
would drop by around 40% and particulate matter emissions by about 50% by 2050 
in both policy options (see Figure 7 above). Owing to the ‘displacement’ of air 
pollutants from vehicle tailpipes near streets in mostly urban and densely populated 
areas to remote power plant sites considerable population exposure benefits are 
generated153. The electric propulsion system is also characterised by considerably 
lower noise emissions than the conventional ICE powertrain. Therefore, the noise 
level would be particularly lowered in urban driving situations, whereas interurban 
driving is mainly dominated by rolling noise and noise from wind resistance. 
Overall, external costs related to noise would drop by 39% in Policy Option 3 and 
32% in Policy Option 4 by 2050, relative to Policy Option 1 (see Table 8 above). The 
relatively higher decrease in external costs for noise and air pollution in Policy 
                                                 
153 See for instance “Environmental impacts and impact on the electricity market of a large scale 
introduction of electric cars in Europe”, ETC/ACC Technical Paper 2009/4, July 2009 
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Option 3 compared to Policy Option 4 is due to the larger share of electric propulsion 
vehicles in the vehicle fleet in Policy Option 3. 
227. Studies have also shown that co-benefits of policies aiming at mitigating climate 
change can reduce substantially the number of premature deaths from air pollution, 
by lowering the chronic exposure to ambient particulate matter, especially in urban 
areas154. This is especially true in urban areas. 
228. Thanks to the improved quality of air and to the decreased level of noise nuisance 
under Policy Options 2, 3 and 4, the public health and the quality of life in general 
will increase. 
5.4.3. Impact on efficient use of energy and renewable energy sources  
229. Energy demand by transport would decline in Policy Options 2, 3 and 4. Policy 
Option 2 delivers the highest energy savings, in order of 180 Mtoe155, followed by 
Policy Options 3 and 4 with about 160 Mtoe156. Over 60% of these energy savings 
originate from passengers transport.  
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 8: Final energy demand in Policy Options 1, 2, 3 and 4 
                                                 
154 Bob van der Zwaan, Johannes Bollen, and Sebastiaan Hers, “An Integrated Assessment of Climate 
Change, Air Pollution, and Energy Security Policy” (December 1, 2009). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Working Papers. Working Paper 366. 
155 Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent 
156 By 2020, Policy Options 2 and 4 would deliver around 18% reduction in the transport sector energy 
consumption compared to the PRIMES 2007 baseline (pre-crisis baseline). According to the 
forthcoming Impact Assessment report on the European Energy Efficiency Plan (until 2020), and based 
on a study by the Fraunhofer ISI et al. 2009, the cost-effective potential for the transport sector in 2020 
is evaluated at 21%. Policy Options 2 and 4 achieve energy savings close to the cost-effective potential. 
Policy Option 3 also delivers significant energy savings by 2020, although more limited in size 
compared to the other two options. The reason is that Policy Option 3 relies to a larger extent on 
technological solutions, which are rather back loaded in terms of effects. In the study conducted by the 
Fraunhofer ISI the potentials are calculated based on the PRIMES 2007 baseline (pre-crisis baseline). 
Therefore, the same methodology has been followed here (i.e. comparing the energy consumption of the 
Policy Options with those of the PRIMES 2007 baseline).  
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230. In terms of energy intensity, Policy Options 3 and 4 achieve the highest 
improvements for passenger transport due to the enforcement of CO2 standards 
(almost 65% between 2005 and 2050)157. However, other measures like eco-driving 
and fuel efficiency labelling also contribute to energy intensity improvements in 
Policy Options 2, 3 and 4, although to a more limited extent. For freight transport, 
very intensive policies with the objective of managing demand and encouraging a 
shift in modal choices deliver around 50% improvement in energy intensity in Policy 
Option 2 between 2005 and 2050. Overall, Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 achieve an 
improvement in energy intensity of about 70% by 2050 relative to 2005. Policy 
Option 2 provides the highest decrease in energy intensity followed by Policy 
Options 4 and 3158, 159.  
  
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 9: Evolution of energy intensity for passenger and freight transport  
231. Transport activity will remain heavily dependent upon oil in Policy Option 1: oil 
products would still represent 90% of the EU transport sector needs in 2030 and 89% 
in 2050.  
232. Final consumption of oil by transport in Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 is expected to 
decrease by about 70% by 2050, relative to Policy Option 1. This decline is 
compensated to a certain extent by the rise in the electricity demand by the road and 
rail transport and the increased demand for biofuels, especially in aviation, inland 
navigation and long distance road freight, where electrification is not or less an 
                                                 
157 As long as the transport sector is almost completely reliant on fossil fuels, standards on CO2 emissions 
of vehicles correspond to de facto energy efficiency standards. However in a future where alternative 
fuels and energy carriers, such as electricity and hydrogen, play a much larger role than today, energy 
efficiency standards will become more important in encouraging overall resource efficiency in the 
transport sector by driving lower energy use. 
158 Energy intensity for passenger transport is expressed relative to passenger-km, energy intensity for 
freight transport is expressed relative to tonne-km, while the energy intensity for total transport is 
expressed relative to GDP. 
159 The price of electricity is based on the Effective and widely accepted technology scenario from the 
Impact Assessment on “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. 
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option. Biofuels160 would represent around 40% of energy consumption in aviation 
and inland navigation and between 37% and 41% in long distance road freight by 
2050, depending on the Policy Option. The role of biofuels in energy demand by 
passenger cars and light duty vehicles would be more limited, ranging between 15% 
and 25%. The amount of biofuels remains closely in line with the Effective and 
widely accepted technology scenario from the Impact Assessment on “Low-carbon 
economy 2050 roadmap. Electricity would provide some 20% of energy demand by 
passenger cars and light duty vehicles in Policy Option 2 and 60% in Policy Option 
3, while in Policy Option 4 would represent about 50%. Electro-mobility would need 
to be supported by the upgrade of Europe’s networks towards a European supergrid 
and decarbonisation of electricity sector. 
233. As a result of the increased demand for electricity and sustainable biofuels, the share 
of renewables in transport would increase by 2050, especially in Policy Options 3 
and 4. This assumes the decarbonisation of the power generation sector and an 
important share of electricity based on renewable energy sources by 2050, in line 
with the Effective and widely accepted technology scenario from the Impact 
Assessment on “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”161 162. 
  
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 10: Final demand of oil and electricity in Policy Options 1, 2, 3 and 4 
5.4.4. Impact on biodiversity and other environmental resources 
234. The greatest impact on other environmental resources would be caused by an 
increase in land use for infrastructure, generating increased pressure on biodiversity 
and ecosystem services due to direct damage linked to construction, habitat 
fragmentation and degradation and disturbance. In all scenarios, constraints on the 
                                                 
160 Ibid Footnotes 121 and 150. The Impact Assessment does not assess the impact of any possible 
modification in the accounting method set out in Commission Decision (2007/589/EC) for biomass. 
161 The pathways for the decarbonisation of power generation would be analysed in the forthcoming 
Energy Roadmap 2050. 
162 The price of electricity is based on the Effective and widely accepted technology scenario from the 
Impact Assessment on “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. 
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availability of public resources will be a limiting factor for the expansion of 
infrastructure and new built will probably be significant only in cohesion countries. 
235. In a no additional policy scenario, the expansion of infrastructure would remain the 
standard response to increased congestion levels, so, in principle, this would be the 
least favourable option in terms of other environmental aspects. Policy Options 2, 3 
and 4 tackle differently the pressure on infrastructure. Policy Option 2 relies on 
better land planning, on traffic reduction and on modal shift; the latter implying an 
expansion of rail infrastructure. Policy Option 3, would essentially manage high 
traffic volumes with advanced traffic management systems, but would need 
relatively more road infrastructure. Policy Option 4 would have intermediate 
characteristics. 
236. It is difficult to rank the three options in terms of fragmentation of the landscape and 
loss of biodiversity and degradation of eco-system services. A tentative answer 
would be to consider that the levels of congestion in the three scenarios are 
representative of the pressure that transport is likely to put on the territory, which, in 
turn, would suggest that the most favourable scenario is the one described in Policy 
Option 2 followed by Policy Option 4. 
5.5. Conclusions 
237. The results of the previous sections give the following picture of the impacts of the 
various policy options relative to Policy Option 1 by 2050. 
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Table 12: Summary table of impacts 
 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Economic impacts    
Transport as a business 
Transport activity 
Modal shift 













Of transport dynamics on: 
Economic growth 
Efficiency of the transport system 
Congestion 




















Innovation and Research + +++ ++ 
Reduction of administrative burden + = + 
EU budget = = = 
International relations -- - - 
Social impacts    
Mobility of citizens 











Accessibility ++ = ++ 
Distributional impacts = - + 
Employment level and conditions ++ ++ +++ 
Safety ++ = + 
Environmental impacts    
Climate change +++ +++ +++ 
Air pollution +++ ++ ++ 
Noise pollution +++ ++ + 
Energy use/energy efficiency +++ ++ +++ 
Renewable energy use + +++ ++ 
Biodiversity + - = 
Legend:  
= baseline or equivalent to Policy Option 1 
+ to +++ low to high improvement compared to Policy Option 1 
- to - - - low to high worsening compared to Policy Option 1 
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5.6. Sensitivity analysis of policy options 
238. It is clear that the robustness of modelling results is affected by the assumptions 
underlying the modelling scenarios. As outlined in section 2.3.3, sensitivity analysis 
has been carried out on these assumptions concerning GDP growth and oil prices, 
which are used in all policy options163.  
239. Other assumptions are embedded in the design of specific policy options. A critical 
hypothesis is that the performance standards imposed on industry (as in Policy 
Option 3) are more effective than general price instruments (as in Policy Option 2) in 
lowering the cost of new technologies and in accelerating their deployment. This 
assumption is certainly questionable, but is in line with the observed acceleration in 
the introduction of cleaner vehicles following the adoption of CO2 standards in the 
EU and with arguments pointing to the existence of market failures in systems’ 
innovation.  
240. In any event, the three policy options assume different costs and timing of 
technology and can therefore be interpreted as ‘sensitivity analyses’ of the 
hypotheses on R&D. Whereas the assumptions in one of the policy options would 
turn out to be unrealistic, the other policy options would represent a more credible 
alternative. For example, Policy Option 2 highlights a path for decarbonisation where 
barriers to the electrification of transport still persist (i.e. through range limitations 
for passenger cars and trucks). On the contrary, Policy Option 3 illustrates 
achievements under a more favourable technological development.  
241. Another important assumption is the neutrality of the transfer of resources collected 
through pricing and taxes from the transport sector to the public budget. In other 
words no effect is assumed for the recycling of the revenues. The transfer is 
particularly high in Policy Option 2 (2.3% of GDP as opposed to around 0.3% in 
Policy Options 4 and negligible in Policy Option 3). 
242. Whereas the full pricing of externalities and the elimination of tax distortion is very 
likely to improve the efficiency of the entire economic system, it is far more difficult 
to be conclusive on the impact of very large shifts in the burden of taxation across 
sectors, going beyond that point. Much would also depend on the exact use of 
revenues164. The forthcoming Impact Assessment report on the restructuring of the 
Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity found that 
the additional revenue from energy taxation would have a positive impact on GDP 
                                                 
163 Performing sensitivity analysis on GDP growth or oil prices for Policy Option 2, 3 and 4, while keeping 
the assumed intensity of the policy measures unchanged, would lead to higher or lower CO2 emissions 
reductions relative to the 60% target. For example, higher GDP growth without significant structural 
change would lead to less than 60% reduction in CO2 emissions, while higher oil prices would result in 
more than 60% reduction in CO2 emissions. As a consequence, the results of these variants would not 
be comparable with those of Policy Options 2,3 and 4 (which would have different CO2 emissions), nor 
with Policy Option 1 – Reference scenario (which would have different macroeconomic assumptions). 
164 An overview of studies by OECD shows that while employment may increase if the extra revenues 
from environmental market-based instruments are used for reducing taxes on labour and social security 
contributions, especially when aimed at unskilled labour, the employment effects are uncertain when 
the extra revenues are used for lump-sum payments to households or for reducing VAT (Source: 
OECD, 2001. Environmentally related taxes in OECD countries - issues and strategies). 
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and employment when used to reduce the employers’ social security contributions. 
This is due to lower labour costs which boost employment and decrease domestic 
price levels thus increasing private consumption. However, the favourable impacts 
on GDP and employment do not materialize when tax revenues are recycled through 
lump-sum transfers to households or are used for fiscal consolidation165. For this 
reason, together with modelling limitations166, a neutrality assumption is used in the 
analysis. 
6. COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS 
243. The analysis above has shown that the different levels of ambition in system 
improvement and technology improvement have clear implications in terms of the 
related socio-economic and environmental impacts. 
– From an economic point of view, Policy Option 4 seems to be overall preferable. 
In fact, while achieving the CO2 target at higher costs than Policy Option 3, it has 
lower congestion costs and the overall benefits of a less distorted pricing system. 
– Also from a social point of view, Policy Option 4 would be the most desirable. 
Compared to Policy Option 2, it does not affect drastically the present lifestyles 
and organisation of society and is therefore expected to have lower social costs of 
adaptation to new circumstances. Compared to Option 3, it would have the 
benefits of better choice, higher safety and greater accessibility.  
– From an environmental point of view, Policy Option 2 is the most ambitious 
option since it covers the broadest range of environmental impacts. 
244. This section provides for an assessment of how the policy options will contribute to 
the realization of the policy objectives, as set in Section 3, in light of the following 
evaluation criteria: 
• effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the objectives of the proposal; 
• efficiency – the extent to which objectives can be achieved at least cost; 
• coherence – the extent to which policy options are likely to limit trade-offs across 
the economic, social, and environmental domain. 
                                                 
165 Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Council Directive Amending 
Directive 2003/96 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity (forthcoming). 
166 Modelling limitations do not allow at this stage evaluating the impact of different revenue recycling 
schemes quantitatively. More specifically, the current Impact Assessment report builds on models with 
specific focus on the transport and energy sectors. While these models enable the assessment of the 
detailed policy measures proposed in the policy options, they do not cover the overall economy (i.e. 
government sector, households) and therefore do not allow an evaluation of various recycling schemes. 
Other models (i.e. GEM-E3, WorldScan, Quest III) could provide an assessment of the effects of 
different recycling schemes but they would not be able to reflect all the policy measures considered in 
the policy options. Even linking the two modelling approaches would prove challenging and would 
require additional resources for further model development. 
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Effectiveness 
245. The following table gives a synthetic overview of the policy options’ effectiveness 
with regard to the specific policy objectives defined in section 3. From this table, it 
appears that Policy Option 2 scores best on effectiveness. It offers indeed the most 
appropriate pallet of actions to meet the defined objectives. 
246. As regards the resource efficiency objective (CO2 target and oil dependency), since 
all three Policy Options have been designed to reach the 60% target, they are all 
effective. However, it must be noted at this stage that Policy Option 3 is highly 
dependent on the successful uptake on large scale of alternative fuels. Significant 
challenges remain in the area of electrical energy storage (i.e. in terms of cost, 
weight, volume, etc.), while alternative vehicles are likely to remain more expensive 
than the existing conventional ones despite their potential lower operation costs167. In 
addition, the potential GHG emissions reduction from the use of biofuels depends on 
the feedstock and their production methods. The use of biofuels in transport may also 
be constrained by total limits to land availability and by competing demand for 
biomass or for land and water from other sectors. Finally, ensuring that biofuels 
deliver GHG emissions reductions over the lifecycle of the fuel (taking into account 
the effect of direct and indirect land use changes) remains a challenge.168 
247. Therefore, in case the uptake of new technology on a large scale does not occur as 
expected and ambitious policies favouring modal shift are not in place, the only way 
to achieve the 60% target will be to constrain mobility leading to disproportionately 
high negative social impacts. Policy Option 2 is the option which is the least exposed 
to technology risk, and hence can be considered more reliable in achieving the GHG 
emission target. 
248. As regards the objective linked to the limitation of the growth of congestion, Policy 
Option 2 offers the best possibilities thanks to its strong focus on policy measures 
covering demand management and system improvement. In Policy Option 3, which 
has a strong technology focus, congestion still represents a high cost to the society 
whereas Policy option 4 scores better than Policy Option 3. 
                                                 
167 When assessing the barriers for the electrification of transport in the context of the Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan, the Joint Research Centre found that low-energy density of available batteries, which 
limits the range of driving between charges, remains the main challenge. For example, lead-acid 
batteries are cheap (ca. €100 per kWh) but they are too heavy due to the low energy and power density 
and they also lack deep cycling capabilities. Other battery technologies can double the vehicle’s driving 
autonomy but they are still too expensive (NiMh or Li-Ion, ca. 500 – 1500 €/kWh). In addition, other 
social and infrastructural barriers may delay the widespread use of plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles: 
the lack of standardised electric infrastructures, the high cost of vehicles and their batteries (including 
warranty), the unrealistically short times (< 5 months) expected by consumers to recover their 
investment in electric vehicles, the inertia of the current transportation system and the major market 
players, the perceived high infrastructural investment costs, etc. See in this respect JRC(2009), 
Technology Descriptions of the 2009 Update of the Technology Map for the SET Plan. 
168 Skinner I, van Essen H, Smokers R and Hill N (2010), Towards the decarbonisation of EU’s transport 
sector by 2050. Final report produced under the contract ENV.C.3/SER/2008/0053 between European 
Commission Directorate-General Environment and AEA Technology 
(http://www.eutransportghg2050.eu) 
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Table 13: Effectiveness of envisaged policy options in light of objectives 
 Policy option 1 Policy option 2 Policy option 3 Policy option 4 
GHG emissions 
and oil dependency 
reduction 
compared to 1990 
levels 




Limit the growth of 
congestion 
0 high low medium 
Associated 
technology risk 

















249. In terms of efficiency, the model provides an indication of the total costs of transport 
of each Policy Option. These costs include: capital costs related to transport 
equipment, infrastructure costs for the charging and refuelling of electric propulsion 
vehicles169, fixed operation costs, variable operation costs (including fuel costs), 
users’ disutility170, and external costs of congestion, air pollution, noise and 
accidents171. So defined, the concept of total cost covers the costs for the society of 
each Policy Option and, as such, measures the extent to which objectives can be 
achieved at least cost for the society. 
250. The modelling results indicate that, compared to Policy Option 1, the total costs of 
transport so defined would be the highest in Policy Option 2, adding an additional 
1,193 billion € by 2050. Policy Option 4 follows adding 1,012 billion € and Policy 
Option 3 about 640 billion €.  
                                                 
169 The investment required for developing the electric road transport infrastructure is estimated at roughly 
140 billion € in Policy Option 3, followed by Policy Option 4 with about 120 billion and Policy Option 
2 with about 80 billion. These costs cover the recharging infrastructure for cars, trucks, coaches and the 
reinforcement of the Low voltage (LV) and Medium voltage (MV) power grid. Some industry studies 
suggest that the costs of development of a network for refuelling hydrogen fuel cell vehicles would be 
roughly comparable (Cf. McKinsey (2010), A portfolio of power-trains for Europe: a fact-based 
analysis; available at: http://www.iphe.net/docs/Resources/Power_trains_for_Europe.pdf). The present 
value of the electric road transport infrastructure costs is derived using a discount rate of 4%. 
170 The welfare losses due to the limitation in mobility (users’ disutility) are reflected through the 
compensating variation. Compensating variation refers to the amount of additional money an agent 
would need to reach its initial utility after a change in prices, or a change in product quality. 
171 The present value of the additional costs corresponding to each Policy Option has been calculated using 
a discount rate of 4%, in line with the requirement laid down in the 2009 Impact Assessment 
Guidelines. 
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Table 14: Total cost of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 relative to Policy Option 1 
Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
Additional total costs relative to
Policy Option 1 (in billions €)
1,193 640 1,012
Additional average yearly total





Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
251. An element which is common to all Policy Options is the considerable amount of 
savings in fuel costs, which amounts between 300 and 330 bn € in 2050 relative to 
Policy Option 1.  
252. Another way of looking at the net additional costs of Policy Options 2, 3 and 4 with 
respect to Policy Option 1 is by singling out from the total cost the gains from the 
reduction in the external costs and expressing the two elements thus obtained in 
terms of €/ton of CO2. The two components would therefore represent the 
“mitigation costs”172 of achieving the CO2 target (i.e. the cost of each Policy Option 
per tonne of CO2 avoided) and the “co-benefits” (i.e. the benefit of each Policy 
Option per tonne of CO2 avoided) 173. They are summarised in Table 15174, 175, 176.  
                                                 
172 The overall mitigation costs as presented here are a measure of total cost not directly comparable with 
the marginal abatement cost as derived in the Impact Assessment of the “Low-carbon economy 2050 
roadmap”, which evolves in time. Having said this, the 60% target for the reduction of transport GHG 
emissions was derived with the PRIMES model based on the constraint of equal marginal abatement 
costs across sectors. The Policy Options in this impact assessment were developed as alternative ways 
of meeting this 60%.  
173 Policies aiming at reducing CO2 emissions, like taxation, can also bring benefits such as the reduction 
of congestion. 
174 Co-benefits are defined as the difference between the present value of the external costs in each Policy 
Option and those in Policy Option 1, divided by the difference in the cumulative well-to-wheel 
emissions in each Policy Option relative to Policy Option 1. A discount rate of 4% has been used for the 
calculation of the present value. 
175 Mitigation costs are defined as the difference between the present value of transport costs excluding 
external costs in each Policy Option and those of Policy Option 1, divided by the difference between the 
cumulative well-to-wheel emissions in each Policy Option and those in Policy Option 1. The costs also 
cover the electric road transport infrastructure. A discount rate of 4% has been used for the calculation 
of the present value. 
176 As already explained, the Reference scenario does not cover the European Commission CARS 21 
(Competitive Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st century) initiative and the recent initiatives of 
car manufacturers as regards electric vehicles. These initiatives may lead to higher penetration of EVs, 
which is currently negligible in the Reference scenario, and lower oil dependency and CO2 emissions 
for the transport sector. As a consequence of lower CO2 emissions in the Reference scenario, the 
mitigation costs and net costs may be lower for the Policy Options considered. However, their relative 
order of importance will remain the same. 
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Table 15: Mitigation cost and co-benefit of envisaged Policy Options 
Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4
Mitigation cost (€/ton CO2) 172 76 116
Co-benefit  (€/ton CO2) 83 21 35
Net cost  (€/ton CO2) 89 55 81
Policy options
 
Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
253. The calculation of net total costs – and therefore the comparison between options – 
does not include research and development costs and infrastructure costs referred to 
the upgrade and possible extension of the network. Moreover, they exclude transfer 
payments to the budget (i.e. excise duties, value added taxes, registration taxes and 
other ownership taxes, charges, payments for CO2 allowances in aviation under the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme, etc.), which are additional costs for the user, but a 
transfer from the point of view of society.  
254. The reasons for not taken into account R&D costs and network costs in comparing 
options in terms of efficiency are the following: 
– There is a weak link between investment in research and development and 
technology outcomes, which does not allow for an easy quantification of total 
costs associated with the different Policy Options. However this aspect is 
addressed in discussing the risks associated with relying on more favourable 
technological developments. 
– The network infrastructure requirements – and thus the related costs – are 
assumed to be the same in Policy Option 2 and 4 and geared toward a greater use 
of multimodal solutions. Accordingly, they do not affect the choice between these 
two options. Infrastructure costs would however be lower in Policy Option 3 if, as 
assumed, road congestion is not accommodated by significant additional 
investment in the road network. 
255. An estimation of network infrastructure costs will be established by the Commission 
as part of the revision of the TEN-T guidelines and therefore only a rough estimate 
can be offered at this stage. Investment in the network designed to serve the transport 
system up to 2050 would need to be put in place much earlier. The cost of EU 
infrastructure development to match the demand for transport has been estimated at 
over € 1.5 trillion for 2010-2030. The completion of the TEN-T network requires 
about € 550 billion until 2020 out of which some € 215 billion can be referred to the 
removal of the main bottlenecks177. 
                                                 
177 The assessment of the feasibility for each Member State to afford additional infrastructure investment in 
view of current fiscal constraints is outside the scope of the present Impact Assessment report.  
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Coherence 
256. As highlighted in Table 12 above, Policy Option 4 ensures the achievement of the 
objectives with lowest trade-offs across the economic, social, and environmental 
domain. 
Conclusion 
257. In general terms, the modelling exercise shows that several policy instruments need 
to be used to put the transport system on a sustainable path, lowering CO2 emissions, 
oil dependency and congestion. It also shows that policy action has to be very 
ambitious to reach the objective.  
258. The table below summarizes the results of the comparison of policy options in terms 
of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. 
Table 16: Comparison of Policy Options 
 Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence 
Policy Option 1 no no no 
Policy Option 2 high low medium 
Policy Option3 low high low 
Policy Option 4 medium medium high 
 
259. In light of the above, Policy Option 3 is discarded, despite being the less expensive 
and most powerful option to reach the 60% target. This is because it incorporates a 
high degree of uncertainty associated with the technological component. It also 
contemplates delayed or weak action on pricing, which would compromise the 
possibility of bringing about the structural change that undistorted price signals can 
determine. Finally, it is not sufficiently effective in reducing the cost of congestion to 
the society in comparison with Policy Options 2 and 4. 
260. Modelling results do not point to huge differences between Policy Option 2 and 
Policy Option 4, and indeed the two options have many elements in common, as the 
elimination of obstacles to the internal market and the investment in a multimodal 
network. The preference is given to Policy Option 4 since it offers the advantage of 
greater balance between system improvement and technological development. Policy 
Option 4 would avoid the creation of a specific carbon price for the transport sector 
or, else, of a pervasive command and control approach to mobility, but it would not 
refrain from eliminating price distortions by internalising external cost of transport 
and by introducing smarter taxation. Factoring in all these elements, Policy Option 4 
appears to offer the highest benefits at the lowest cost with moderate technology risk, 
and more balanced solution to the trade-offs across the economic, social, and 
environmental domains 
261. However, Policy Option 2 is not formally discarded. Indeed, as said above, all Policy 
Options include a technology component that is low in Policy Option 2, moderate in 
Policy Option 4 and high in Policy Option 3 (see Table 3). In this respect, if the 
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technology does not deliver as it is projected in Policy Option 4, an approach closer 
to that in Policy Option 2 will be necessary in order to achieve the 60% target by 
2050. 
262. In this context, a proper monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the 
White Paper is a key element. 
7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
263. The Commission will properly evaluate and review the White Paper on transport 
policy 5 years after its adoption by the Commission. The policy design and its 
implementation will be in any case continuously fine-tuned on the basis of individual 
impact assessments as mentioned above. 
264. In addition, the Commission will constantly monitor a set of core transport indicators 
which are already available. These indicators will be used to measure to what extent 
Policy Option 4 under the comprehensive and strategically coordinated EU action is 
properly implemented and its objectives achieved. This set of core indicators will be 
updated to trace the development and deployment of new transport technologies.  
265. These indicators are: 
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Table 17: Monitoring indicators 
Key indicators Definition Relevance 
Monitoring the environmental performance of transport 
Share of renewable energy in 
transport 
This indicator is the share of energy 
from renewable sources in gross 
final energy consumption for 
transport 
This indicator monitors the 
progress achieved in reducing oil 
dependency of transport 
GHG emissions from transport Each greenhouse gas (CO2, 
methane, and nitrous oxide) is 
weighted by its global warming 
potential and aggregated to give 
total greenhouse gas emissions 
expressed in terms of CO2 
equivalents. 
This indicator shows trends in the 
greenhouse gas emissions from 
transport by mode of transport. 
Emissions of particulate matter 
from transport 
This indicator is defined as the 
aggregated particulate-forming 
potential of emissions of particulate 
matter (PM10), nitrogen oxides, 
sulphur dioxide and ammonia from 
transport. 
This indicator shows trends in 
emissions of PM10 from transport. 
Fragmentation due to transport 
infrastructure 
This indicator is calculated on basis 
of the mesh size of unfragmented 
areas, related to the construction of 
new or improved transport 
infrastructure  
Indicator shows the state of 
fragmentation of land and 
ecosystems due to transport 
infrastructure 
Average CO2 emissions per km 
from new passenger cars 
This indicator is defined as the 
average emissions of carbon 
dioxide per kilometre by new 
passenger cars sold in a given year. 
This indicator measures the CO2 
efficiency of new fleet 
R&D intensity in transport This indicator is defined as 
business expenditure in R&D in 
transport (manufacturing) as % of 
value added in the transport sector 
This indicator measures R&D 
intensity in transport 
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Monitoring the overall efficiency of EU transport system 
Modal split of passenger transport This indicator is defined as the 
percentage share of each mode of 
transport in total inland 
transport, expressed in passenger-
kilometres. It is based on transport 
by passenger cars, buses 
and coaches, and trains. 
This indicator monitors the 
achievement of a balanced shift 
towards environmentally friendly 
transport modes for passengers 
Modal split of freight transport This indicator is defined as the 
percentage share of each mode of 
transport in total inland 
transport expressed in tonne-
kilometres. It includes transport by 
road, rail and inland waterways. 
 
This indicator monitors the 
achievement of a balanced shift 
towards environmentally friendly 
transport modes for freight 
Investment in transport 
infrastructure to GDP 
This indicator is the ratio between 
total gross investment expenditure 
and GDP. Infrastructure 
expenditures cover new 
construction, extension, 
reconstruction and major repairs of 
selected EU-27 Member States for 
transport infrastructure for road, 
rail, air transport, sea ports and 
inland waterways. 
 
Investments are one way in which 
the objective creating a single 
transport area can be realised 
Road safety This indicator is defined as the 
fatalities caused by road accidents 
include drivers and passengers of 
motorised vehicles and pedal cycles 
as well as pedestrians, killed within 
30 days from the day of the 
accident 
This indicator monitors the trend in 
road safety 
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9. ANNEXES 
Appendix 1: Assessment of the application of the minimum consultation standards 
– Clear content of the consultation process 
1. The objectives of the White Paper and the principles for its design were clearly 
described on the public consultation websites. The public hearings and the public 
consultations have been publicised to relevant stakeholders as well as widely through 
press releases178. The Commission services have made clear how comments received 
would be dealt with and how the process would proceed. 
– Consultation of target groups 
2. Given that the White Paper will affect a broad range of stakeholders, namely EU 
Member States, citizens and companies, the consultation has been open to the 
general public. Representatives of a wide range of stakeholders were invited to both 
conferences179.  
– Publication 
3. The preparation of the White Paper was announced in an earlier Communication. 
Interested parties were aware that there was to be consultation on the issues to be 
addressed in line with the better regulation principles. Special websites were created 
for the public consultations and the public hearings. 
– Time limits for participation 
4. The Commission provided stakeholders with a month or more notice of the public 
hearings. It has given 8 and 15 full weeks for the submissions of written comments to 
the public consultations. Stakeholders have been given adequate time to provide 
written comments to the public consultations, as well as to make a statement in the 
public hearings. Overall, the Commission has been in an ongoing dialogue with 
stakeholders and met with all interested stakeholders requesting to do so. All 
stakeholders should therefore have been able to express their views on the main 
challenges for the EU transport policy, the key objectives for the transport system 
and how to meet them. 
– Acknowledgement and feedback 
                                                 
178 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/936 
 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/365 
179 The lists of participants is available at the following websites: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/ 
strategies/events/doc/2009_03_09_future_of_transport/2009_03_09_participants.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/events/doc/2009_11_20_future_of_transport/participants_list.pdf 
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5. Responses from stakeholders following the public consultations and stakeholder 
meetings have been acknowledged and the stakeholders’ responses are publicly 
available180.  
6. According to the privacy statement, no individual’s contribution can be posted 
therein without their consent. The Commission has not responded to the points raised 
in individual responses given the wide range of issues raised, it was however able to 
identify the main issues. 
– Main results and how these have been taken into account 
7. The Commission has analysed the comments made, and the results of the 
consultation are available on the Commission website181.  
8. Input from stakeholders has been taken into account in assessing the different 
possible actions to improve the sustainability of the EU transportation system. 
External expertise was used to assess the various options available, including aspects 
raised during the public consultation. 
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Appendix 2: Ex-Post Evaluation of Transport Policy 2001-2010182 
1. This appendix puts the White Paper into its historical context and assesses to what 
extent previous political objectives – in particular those of the 2001 White Paper183 
and its mid-term review of 2006184 – have been achieved. The assessment looks at 
the state of the European transport sector at the beginning of the 21st century and 
compares it with today’s situation. It concentrates mainly on the measurable 
objectives and is partly based on the findings of an external study of 2009 that 
evaluated the Common Transport Policy between 2000 and 2008185. 
1. MANAGING TRANSPORT GROWTH IN A MORE SUSTAINABLE WAY 
2. Transport demand has shown strong growth rates in the 1990s. Rapidly rising traffic 
volumes resulted in high levels of congestion, noise and air pollution which were 
considered to be unsustainable. One of the main objectives of the 2001 White Paper 
was therefore to decouple transport growth from GDP growth and hence to limit the 
growth in transport demand. As transport growth in the 1990s had been uneven – 
mainly benefiting road and air, while largely neglecting cleaner and less congested 
modes of transport such as rail and inland waterways, another main objective in 2001 
was rebalancing the modal distribution of transport, away from congested roads and 
airports towards other, less congested and often also more environmentally friendly 
modes. 
1.1. Decoupling transport growth from GDP growth 
3. Decoupling transport growth from growth in GDP, hence reducing the transport 
intensity of the European economy, was one of the core objectives of the 2001 White 
Paper. It was also an objective of the Sustainable Development Strategy which the 
European Council had adopted in June 2001 in Gothenburg. 
4. This objective should be seen in the context186 of the 2001 White Paper: Between 
1970 and 1998, the European economy was characterised by increasing transport 
intensity: both passenger and freight transport had grown faster than GDP. Moreover, 
following the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2000, an enhanced GDP 
growth rate of about 3% was expected for the decade 2000-2010. Even higher GDP 
growth rates (4-5% per annum) were predicted for the then candidate countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. An increase in transport demand that would outpace 
GDP growth was thought not to be sustainable. Apart from the negative 
environmental impact, it would have led to even more congestion which could have 
paralysed the transport system, in particular on roads and in aviation which showed 
signs of capacity shortages. The overall objective was to break the link between 
transport growth and GDP growth, which was to be achieved through the 
implementation of the measures announced in the White Paper, without the need to 
restrict the mobility of people and goods. 
                                                 
182 This ex-post evaluation is based on data up to 2008; where available, more recent data have been used. 
183 COM(2001)370. 
184 COM(2006)314. 
185 The study can be downloaded from the internet under http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/studies/ 
doc/future_of_transport/20090908_common_transport_policy_final_report.pdf 
186 As described, for example, in Section 3 of Chapter II of SEC(2001)502. 
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5. Essentially, this meant eliminating ‘unnecessary’ transport activities – activities that 
do not add any economic value or which are the result of regulatory failures. One 
regulatory failure was seen in the fact that transport users did not pay the full price of 
the external costs which their activities produce. The full internalisation of the 
external costs of transport was believed to be an effective instrument to decouple 
transport growth and GDP growth. As long as external costs were not fully borne by 
transport users, the demand for transport was bound to be artificially high. 
Appropriate pricing and infrastructure policies that applied the “user pays” principle 
and the “polluter pays” principle would largely remove these inefficiencies over 
time. 
6. As part of the greening transport package of 2008, the Commission presented a 
strategy for the internalisation of external costs187 for all modes of transport. It 
proposed a revision of the Eurovignette Directive188 which was to allow the charging 
of heavy goods vehicles for external costs of air pollution, noise and congestion, also 
beyond the amount needed to recover infrastructure costs, which – as a rule – was the 
limit set by the Directive at the time. The revision of the Directive is still being 
debated in the Council and the European Parliament. In rail transport, infrastructure 
charges may be modified to take environmental costs into account. As long as there 
is no comparable level of charging of environmental costs in competing modes, 
however, such charging shall be revenue-neutral for the rail infrastructure 
manager189. The costs of climate change shall be internalised by identifying a carbon 
component in fuel taxes and/or by direct or indirect participation in the European 
emission trading scheme (ETS). Aviation will be included in the ETS from 2012 
onwards190, electrified rail traffic is indirectly included in the ETS through the power 
generating sector. 
7. The policy of internalising all external costs is still far from being fully implemented. 
Consequently, it has so far not contributed much to the decoupling of transport and 
GDP growth. 
8. Another example of regulatory failures that produce more transport than necessary 
would be the different fuel taxation levels in the Member States which give rise to 
the phenomenon of ‘tank tourism’. Attempts to harmonise fuel taxes across the EU 
have so far failed, however. Traffic generated by a lack of efficient intermodal 
connections or state-of-the-art transport information and guidance systems (e.g. to 
help drivers looking for a place to park their vehicles) may also be considered to be 
‘unnecessary’. If this kind of traffic could be eliminated, some congestion could be 
eased. 
9. Even if all proposed measures had been fully implemented, it is however 
questionable whether significant progress in decoupling freight transport from 
economic growth could have been achieved. Freight transport is largely a 
commercial business in which ‘unnecessary’ transport activities are already limited. 
Moreover, logistics practices like ‘just-in-time’ delivery and growing specialisation 
                                                 
187 COM(2008)435. 
188 COM(2008)436. 
189 Cf. Art. 7(5) of Directive 2001/14/EC. 
190 Directive 2008/101/EC. 
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patterns dominate in modern industries. While improving the efficiency of European 
industry, they tend to increase the transport intensity of the economy. 
10. External trade also has a direct impact on freight transport volumes. While in years 
of economic growth trade usually grows by more than GDP, it falls more steeply 
than GDP during recessions. As trade and freight transport are two sides of the same 
coin, this rule also applies to freight transport, which can be seen when looking at EU 
freight transport activity over the last decade. 
11. Between 2000 and 2007, intra-EU freight transport grew on average by 2.6% per 
year while GDP has gone up by 2.2%. International transport has grown faster than 
domestic transport. In the boom years, freight transport activity was boosted by 
deeper market integration inside the EU (following the introduction of the single 
currency and EU enlargement) and outside the EU (through the rise of emerging 
economies such as China and the general globalisation of production patterns). It 
should not be forgotten in this context that deeper market integration and the 
promotion of international trade are crucial ingredients for balanced economic 
growth and economic, social and territorial cohesion. These are key policy objectives 
of the EU.191 
12. In 2008, when the recent economic crisis set in, intra-EU freight transport demand 
fell by 2.1% while GDP was still growing by 0.7%. Preliminary figures for 2009 
show an even greater gap between GDP growth (which dropped by 4.2%) and the 
demand for intra-EU freight transport which in terms of tonne-kilometres is 
estimated to have collapsed by around 11%, wiping out almost all growth in freight 
transport since 2000. While intra-EU freight transport activity is nearly back to 2000 
levels, GDP in the EU27 is still 12% higher than it was in 2000. Seen over the whole 
period 2000-2009, therefore, freight transport appears at first sight to have decoupled 
from GDP growth. This decoupling effect is however largely due to the economic 
crisis and likely to be of a temporary nature. 
13. Intra-EU passenger transport has grown by less than GDP each year since 2000 
(apart from 2009 when it didn’t fall as dramatically as GDP). It increased on average 
by 1.4% per year between 2000 and 2007. In 2008, there was a slight decline in intra-
EU passenger transport activity (-0.1%) followed by a somewhat stronger drop in 
2009 (around -1%). This reduces the average annual growth rate to merely 1% 
between 2000 and 2009. It confirms the trend that motorised passenger transport 
activity in the EU has decoupled from GDP growth, despite an increase in the 
average mobility per person by more than 5% between 2000 and 2009192. The 
mobility of people was boosted by the liberalisation of air traffic within the EU, by 
the construction of high-speed rail lines in a number of countries and by the general 
increase in motorisation levels, above all in the countries which joined the EU in 
2004 and 2007. These developments allowed EU citizens to travel faster and further 
afield in a given time. EU policies have hence contributed to an increase in the 
mobility of its citizens, the objective of decoupling transport and GDP growth 
notwithstanding. The link between personal mobility and economic activity is not as 
strong as that between freight transport and GDP. 
                                                 
191 See Art. 3 (3) TFEU. 
192 As measured by the average amount of passenger-kilometres covered per inhabitant in the EU. 
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Source: Eurostat, DG MOVE 
Figure 1: Evolution of GDP, population, passenger and freight transport in the EU27 between 2000 and 
2009 (2000=100) 
14. Over time, it had become clear that the objective of decoupling, as it was, needed to 
be refined. While the renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy of 2006193 kept 
the operational objective of “decoupling economic growth and the demand for 
transport with the aim of reducing environmental impacts”, the 2006 mid-term 
review of the White Paper modified the original target into one of decoupling the 
growth of transport from its negative effects such as congestion, accidents and the 
emission of pollutants, CO2 and noise.  
15. In view of this revised objective, the outcome has so far been mixed – at least as far 
as gaseous emissions from transport are concerned. CO2 emissions from transport 
have been steadily growing over the last 20 years. Only in 2008 (and presumably 
2009) was there a drop in CO2 emissions from transport, but this was combined with 
a drop in transport activity, so there was no decoupling. New vehicles have become 
more fuel efficient and hence emit less CO2 per km than earlier models did in the 
past, but these efficiency gains have been more than compensated for by rising 
vehicle numbers and increasing traffic volumes. It remains to be seen to what extent 
recently adopted measures to further improve the energy efficiency of passenger 
cars194, to use more renewable fuels or to include aviation in the EU ETS will help in 
the future, given the expected rise in traffic volumes. 
                                                 
193 Council document number 10917/06. 
194 Regulation (EC) No 443/2009. 
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Source: Eurostat, European Environment Agency. 
Figure 2: Evolution of CO2 emissions by sector in the EU27 between 1990 and 2008 (1990=100) 
16. The failure to reduce CO2 emissions from transport is also linked to difficulties to 
switch to cleaner fuels. The high energy density of liquid hydrocarbon fuels 
represents a crucial advantage in all mobile applications and an essential requirement 
for those that are most sensitive to additional weight, namely aircraft. 
17. Gasoline and diesel vehicles make up 97% of all road transport vehicles in the EU. In 
countries with a developed refuelling infrastructure, vehicles running on alternative 
fuels could make some inroads. In Italy, for example, more than 670,000 vehicles run 
on compressed natural gas (CNG), around three quarters of the EU total. Italy has 
725 public refuelling stations for CNG which is around a quarter of the EU total.195 
As regards vehicles running on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), Poland provides a 
similar picture: According to the European LPG Association, it has more than 2 
million LPG cars, 40% of the EU total. A quarter of the roughly 25,000 LPG 
refuelling stations in the EU are in Poland. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of 
LPG vehicles has grown fastest in countries where the network of public refuelling 
stations has seen the biggest expansion. An almost nine-fold increase in the number 
of refuelling stations in Germany, for example, was met by a more than twenty-fold 
increase in the number of LPG vehicles. This proves the more general point that an 
adequate distribution network is essential for the promotion of alternative fuels. 
18. Maritime and aviation continue to rely almost entirely on fossil fuels (in particular 
fuel oil and kerosene). There have however been first successful tests of blending 
                                                 
195 Figures provided by NGVA Europe. 
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some algae-based biofuel into jet fuel. In short-distance waterborne transport, the use 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has also been tested. In rail some further 
electrification has taken place in the last decade, especially with the construction of 
new high-speed rail lines across Western Europe. 
19. In contrast to the evolution of CO2 emissions, the emissions of air pollutants from 
transport vehicles were reduced significantly despite rising traffic volumes: 
transport-related emissions of particulate matter (PM10) and of acidifying substances 
have decreased by about one third between 1990 and 2006, those of ozone-forming 
substances have even halved. Emission reduction has been more successful in road 
transport than in other modes of transport. This success is mainly due to ever more 
stringent Euro emission standards for road vehicles. It should be noted, however, that 
road still accounts for the lion’s share (more than two thirds) of total pollutant 
emissions from transport. 
 
Source: Eurostat, European Environment Agency 
Figure 3: Evolution of pollutant emissions from transport between 1990 and 2007 (1990=100) 
20. Even if the total amount of pollutants and particulates has been significantly reduced, 
their concentration in many urban areas is still often beyond what is considered to be 
healthy196. More needs therefore to be done to reduce the emission of these harmful 
substances, most of which come from transport. A lack of co-ordination across the 
EU regarding local measures to achieve compliance with EU air quality targets has 
induced a patchwork of measures and restrictions. 
                                                 
196 i.e. beyond the limit values of Directive 2008/50/EC. 
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1.2. Shifting the balance between modes of transport 
21. The strong increase in road transport activity during the 1990s had led to high levels 
of congestion and air and noise pollution which were costing the European economy 
dearly197 and which could not be sustained in the long run. Something had to be done 
to contain the increasing share of road transport. The 2001 White Paper therefore 
included a series of measures which were to allow the non-road modes to return by 
2010 to their market shares of 1998 and prepare the ground for a shift in the modal 
balance from then on. Shifting the balance between the modes of transport had 
become one of the main objectives of the White Paper. This was to be achieved by 
regulating the competition between the modes (creating a level playing field between 
them) and by promoting intermodal transport. 
22. The objective of bringing the modal share of road by 2010 back to where it was in 
1998 has not been achieved. In fact, the share of road haulage in total intra-EU 
freight transport increased from close to 43% in 1998 to almost 46% in 2008. This 
was partly due to the quick expansion of road transport in the new Member States 
and their more limited overall access to sea transport. 
 
Source: Eurostat, DG MOVE. 
Figure 4: Modal split in intra-EU27 freight transport in 1998 and in 2008 
23. In passenger transport, the private car is still by far the most dominant mode of 
transport. It accounts for almost three quarters (more than 72%) of all motorised 
intra-EU passenger transport. Compared with 1998, however, its share has gone 
down by almost 1 percentage point. This is mainly due to intra-EU aviation, which 
has grown by more than a third (+37%) between 1998 and 2008. The passenger car is 
however as popular as ever in the EU: The motorisation level has continued to 
increase198, mainly boosted by developments in the 12 new Member States where it 
has grown by almost 60% since 1998199. Except for 2009, more than 4 million cars 
have been added to the vehicle stock in the EU every year since 2005. 
                                                 
197 Congestion alone was estimated to cost the equivalent of around 1% of GDP. 
198 From 396 to 470 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in the EU27 in 1998 and 2008, respectively. 
199 At 352 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants, it is however still only at 70% of the level in the EU15. 
 EN 102   EN 
 
Source: Eurostat, DG MOVE. 
Figure 5: Modal split in intra-EU27 passenger transport in 1998 and in 2008 
1.2.1. Improving quality in the road sector 
24. In road transport, price de-regulation and free access to the international haulage 
market considerably increased efficiency in the 1990s. Shippers enjoyed cheaper and 
more flexible services, which triggered an expansion of road transport activity to the 
detriment of other modes. The opening of the road cabotage market200, albeit only on 
a temporary basis, contributed to the reduction of empty returns from international 
deliveries. The rules had however been rather unclear which made it difficult to 
enforce them. They have recently been somewhat clarified201 but still do not allow a 
completely free movement of heavy goods vehicles within the EU despite the 
advantages which this would bring to the European economy. 
25. For some time, the European road haulage sector has been characterised by intense 
competition. At times, this has led to practices which put safety at risk and which 
distorted competition between modes. In 2001, social rules on driving time and 
working time were deemed to be insufficient and, moreover, they were not properly 
enforced. The 2001 White Paper therefore proposed a number of measures which 
would both improve the working conditions of drivers and also create a level playing 
field between the modes202. 
1.2.2. Revitalising the railways 
26. At the start of the 21st century, all transport modes but the railways were liberalised 
in the EU. The absence of any competitive pressure on rail operators was believed to 
be one of the main reasons why the railways had become relatively uncompetitive 
and lost significant market shares during the 1990s. The three railway packages 
adopted in 2001, 2004 and 2007203 included the most important initiatives at EU 
level through which the sector was to be revitalised. This was to be achieved 
                                                 
200 Through Council Regulation (EEC) No 3118/93; "Cabotage" is the transport of goods within one 
Member State by a haulier from another Member State. 
201 See Art. 8 ff of Regulation (EC) 1072/2009. 
202 See section 3.3 below. 
203 For more information on the three packages see http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/index_en.htm 
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essentially by opening up the rail market in the EU, by introducing common safety 
rules and standards and by improving the interoperability of national railway 
networks. As a result, both national and international rail freight services were 
opened up to competition in 2007 and international passenger services were 
liberalised in early 2010. Safety rules have been strengthened, the European Railway 
Agency has been created and the removal of technical barriers hindering the 
development of rail transport has started. The development and deployment of 
ERTMS offers a common rail traffic management system that can significantly 
improve the performance of cross-border rail connections. 
27. In addition, the EU promoted the construction of high-speed rail (HSR) lines to bring 
citizens closer together and to offer them a viable alternative to planes on distances 
up to 1,000 km. The EU promoted interoperability between HSR infrastructure, 
equipment and rolling stock204 with a view to enabling high-speed trains to run safely 
and seamlessly throughout the trans-European rail network. Moreover, the priority 
projects of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) included a number of HSR 
lines, some of which have been completed by now. HSR already accounts for about a 
quarter of all rail passenger traffic in the EU. Measured in passenger-kilometres, 
HSR traffic has more than doubled between 1998 and 2008. The European HSR 
network currently comprises around 10,000 km of lines. By 2020, it is expected to be 
twice as long. Once completed, it will consist of more than 30,000 km of lines. 
28. One of the priority projects co-funded by the TEN-T budget is the Betuwe line, a rail 
freight dedicated line between Rotterdam and the German border that was opened in 
2007. It will form part of the rail network for competitive freight which is about to be 
created to improve the competitiveness of rail freight transport in the EU, in 
particular along international corridors.205 The network should enhance co-operation 
between infrastructure managers and provide a more integrated service to customers 
along a given corridor (one-stop shop). Moreover, rail freight traffic is to be given 
sufficient priority along corridors shared with passenger traffic. 
29. Revitalising the railways appears to have been successful to some extent: After 
losing one percentage point between 1998 and 2001, the share of railways in intra-
EU freight transport has then remained roughly the same at close to 11%. In intra-EU 
passenger transport, railways could also keep their market share of slightly more than 
6% which they had at the beginning of the decade. 
30. While rail could keep its modal share during the last decade in the EU as a whole, 
this success has not been evenly spread. Between 2000 and 2008, rail freight 
transport activity rose by 54% in the Netherlands, by 40% in Germany and by 37% 
in the United Kingdom while it shrank by 30% in France. There is a positive 
correlation between market opening and increasing volumes. Rail has gained market 
share mostly in those countries which liberalised their rail market early on. Some 
countries which delayed market opening struggled to keep the market share of their 
rail sector at the level at which it was at the start of the century. In 19 EU countries, 
the market share of non-incumbent railway undertakings is still below 15%. This 
relatively low penetration of newcomers is a sign of persisting market entry barriers.  
                                                 
204 Essentially through Directive 96/48/EC, recently repealed and replaced by Directive 2008/57/EC. 
205 Following the rules set out in Regulation (EU) No 913/2010. 
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Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 6: Evolution of rail freight transport activity by country between 2000 and 2008 (in billion tkm) 
31. It may be argued that the rail sector could have performed even better had market 
opening not been postponed in many countries and had the market access directives – 
in particular those of the first railway package – been properly implemented. The 
unsatisfactory level of implementation and application of these Directives has led to 
many complaints by new operators who were facing obstacles where there should 
have been none. Some provisions of the first package left some scope for 
interpretation which resulted in unequal transposition of the directives in the various 
Member States. 
32. The greatest strengths of rail freight lie in longer distance transport. It is therefore 
essential to remove all obstacles that may hinder border-crossing traffic. Operators 
need equal access conditions to the rail network of all Member States. Too many 
rules and restrictions are still in place which make border-crossing transport more 
cumbersome than it needs to be. The full implementation of the provisions of the 
three railway packages is crucial in ensuring a level playing field for all operators. 
More simplification and harmonisation of rules may be needed. The recast of the 
market access directives recently proposed by the Commission206 aims at clarifying, 
simplifying and modernising the existing rules to facilitate their implementation and 
thereby improve the functioning of the market. 
1.2.3. Addressing the challenges from growing air transport  
33. Air transport has shown the strongest growth of all modes of transport in Europe at 
the end of the 20th century. According to figures provided in the 2001 White Paper, 
passenger numbers in the EU15 had increased five-fold between 1970 and 2000. The 
liberalisation of air transport in the EU in the 1990s accelerated this process. It 
                                                 
206 COM(2010)475. 
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significantly increased competition in the sector, lowered air fares and widened the 
range of choices for passengers as the number of intra-EU routes offered by airlines 
more than doubled. The share of air transport in the modal split of intra-EU 
passenger transport was expected to double between 1990 and 2010 (from 4 to 8%) – 
a scenario that has actually come true, despite a temporary slowdown of air traffic 
growth in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2001, the SARS outbreak in 2002/03, 
the economic crisis in 2008/09 and the volcanic ash cloud in 2010. 
34. The increase in air traffic has put some strain on the available capacity, above all in 
the sky. Traffic density resulted in an increasing number of delays. The saturation of 
the skies and shortages in airport capacity needed therefore to be addressed. 
Moreover, air transport needed to become cleaner and less noisy if its growth was not 
to be thwarted by environmental and health concerns. 
35. The creation of a Single European Sky (SES)207 was one of the main measures to 
address the rising density of air traffic and to rationalise air traffic management 
(ATM) in Europe. It was to put an end to the fragmentation of the European airspace 
which was highly inefficient and cost the industry dearly. A single sky would also 
have positive environmental effects as airplanes would be able to fly more direct 
routes and hence consume less fuel per flight. Once established, it is expected to 
triple capacity, increase safety by a factor of ten, halve ATM costs and reduce the 
environmental impact of each flight by 10%. 
36. Slow and insufficient progress in the implementation of the SES prompted the 
Commission to strengthen the existing legislative framework through the adoption of 
the “SES II package” in 2008208, which, among others, introduced a firm deadline 
(December 2012) for the creation of functional airspace blocks (FAB), a crucial 
element of the SES initiative. The FABs will be based on operational requirements 
rather than national borders and contribute to a substantial consolidation of ATM 
activities in Europe. The reluctance of Member States to pool their sovereignty in 
this field needs to be overcome. Some progress appears to have occurred in the wake 
of the ash cloud crisis in spring 2010, when the Council has given the highest priority 
to the acceleration and anticipation of the implementation of the SES.209 
37. The SES II package also foresees the creation of an independent performance review 
body which defines EU-wide targets with a view to improving the performance of 
ATM in the areas of safety, environment, capacity and cost efficiency. The need for 
such a body has become apparent in the last couple of years when airlines 
increasingly complained about the rising costs of, in their view, relatively 
unproductive and inefficient ATM services and when the need to improve the 
environmental performance of air traffic has become more and more urgent. 
38. In 2007, the Commission adopted an Action Plan on airport capacity, efficiency and 
safety in Europe210 to avoid an expected capacity crunch at airports. It called, among 
others, for a better use of existing capacity at airports, a coherent approach to air 
safety operations at aerodromes and the promotion of ‘co-modality’ (stressing the 
                                                 
207 Based on Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 (Framework Regulation) and others. 
208 Cf. COM(2008)389; resulting in Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009. 
209 See Council document 6269/10. 
210 COM(2006)819. 
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need for better air-rail connections). While many of the proposed actions have been 
carried out in the meantime (e.g. the work done by Eurocontrol in the areas of air 
traffic flow management, the creation of an observatory for airport capacity planning 
in 2008 or the extension of EASA’s role in the field of aerodrome safety211), there 
are still some shortcomings as airport-rail connections are still often inadequate or 
completely missing. 
39. The allocation of landing and take-off slots at congested airports in the EU is 
governed by EU legislation dating from 1993.212 An amendment in 2004213 contained 
a number of technical improvements such as provisions with regard to enforcement, 
clearer definitions, better monitoring tools and stricter sanctions against abuse or 
non-compliance with the allocation rules. Nevertheless, experience shows that some 
problems still exist: new entry takes place with difficulty because the turnover of 
slots into the allocation pool is insufficient. At congested airports, pool slots tend 
only to be available at unattractive times or they are not available as series. This is 
impeding the creation of strong competition to the incumbent carriers and hence the 
optimal use of airport capacity. 
1.2.4. Promoting the use of waterborne transport and of intermodal transport 
40. Other measures intended to favour modal shift were targeted at maritime transport 
(in particular short-sea shipping), inland navigation and intermodal transport in 
general. The promotion of short-sea shipping was to shift transport away from road 
onto ships. One major obstacle to this shift has been the complexity of administrative 
procedures and reporting formalities. This obstacle should be reduced through the 
foreseen creation of a European maritime transport space without barriers214 and the 
introduction of electronic documents. Short-sea shipping also benefits from the 
creation of “Motorways of the Sea” (MoS) and from the Marco Polo Programmes.  
41. The MoS were to become a real competitive alternative to road transport. Certain 
shipping links, particularly those providing a way around the bottlenecks in the Alps 
and the Pyrenees were to become part of the trans-European transport network. A 
critical mass of goods was to be concentrated on certain ports to increase the 
economic viability of frequent regular maritime connections between them. In 
addition, the intermodal connections in the ports and the hinterland connections were 
to be strengthened to allow for a smoother transport chain.  
42. The success of the MoS concept has so far been limited. The need to better integrate 
the hinterland connections of the ports into the concept to avoid them becoming 
bottlenecks has not always been understood. Some of the projects funded so far do 
not really contribute to a modal shift as there is no viable land alternative and/or they 
do not contribute to a reduction of harmful emissions. Moreover, any MoS funding is 
bound to raise competition issues between ports. A revision of the MoS policy would 
therefore be appropriate. 
                                                 
211 Through Regulation (EC) No 1108/2009. 
212 Regulation (EEC) No 95/93. 
213 By Regulation (EC) No 793/2004. 
214 COM(2009)10. 
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43. Other initiatives to promote maritime transport, such as those to open up the market 
access to port services215 have however failed. Following fierce demonstrations by 
dockers, the European Parliament rejected the Commission proposal in early 2006 
and called instead for a directive on transparency and fair conditions of competition 
between ports. The Commission issued a Communication on a European Ports 
Policy216 in 2007 which contains an Action Plan that addresses a number of issues 
relevant to ports. The proposed actions are meant to support an improvement in port 
performance, a potential increase in port capacity, the modernisation of port activity, 
the improvement of the environmental credentials of ports and the attractiveness of 
ports both for workers and for the surrounding cities. 
44. After road, maritime freight transport recorded the strongest growth of all modes 
during the last decade. Intra-EU shipping increased by more than 20% between 1998 
and 2008. This is partly due to globalisation which boosted some shipping markets – 
in particular container shipping. Intra-EU shipping benefited from feeder traffic for 
these global connections as well as from the supporting policies mentioned above. 
45. Inland waterways are among the safest and most environmentally friendly modes of 
transport. Moreover, they still have plenty of free capacity to transport goods along 
the extensive inland waterway network in Europe. The Commission has therefore 
been eager to support this mode of transport. In early 2006, it adopted an Action 
Programme for inland waterway transport, called NAIADES217. The Programme 
included a number of legislative (harmonisation of rules), policy (e.g. TEN 
coordinator, market observation) and support instruments (such as the Reserve Fund, 
research and support programmes). Overall, the fruits of this work have not been 
reaped yet. Between 1998 and 2008, inland waterways transport in the EU has grown 
by a total of 9.3% or 0.9% per annum. At 3.5% its share in intra-EU goods transport 
is lower than in the 1990s. 
46. The Marco Polo programmes218 promoted a general shift of transport activities away 
from road (i.e. to short-sea shipping, rail and inland waterways). The idea behind the 
Marco Polo concept is that operators are reimbursed for each tonne-kilometre (tkm) 
moved away from road. The first Programme which went from 2003 to 2006 had the 
objective of moving 12 billion tkm per year off the road. While the contracts 
concluded did meet that target on paper, not all projects succeeded. With altogether 
about 31 billion tkm shifted over four years, the overall target has been missed by 
more than a third. The second Programme has so far been somewhat more active: 
The planned amount of freight to be shifted from projects funded in the first three 
years (2007-2009) is 61.8 billion tkm. 
1.2.5. Modal shift in the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe 
47. The Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 had 
traditionally a higher share of rail transport in the modal split. In 1998, rail still 
accounted for over 40% of inland freight transport in these countries. This relatively 
high share is even more remarkable when considering that it reflected the situation 




218 Regulation (EC) No 1382/2003 (1st programme) and Regulation (EC) No 1692/2006 (2nd programme). 
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after a precipitous drop both in transport volumes – which nearly halved – and in 
market shares during the1990s. The fall in rail activity during the 1990s was mainly 
due to the economic restructuring in these countries away from heavy industries. As 
the Central and Eastern European countries still had an extensive rail network and a 
lot of expertise in rail transport, however, the EU set itself the target of maintaining a 
high share of rail in these countries. By 2010, rail should still account for 35% of all 
inland freight transport in new Member States. 
48. After the sharp decline during the 1990s in rail transport activity in the Central and 
Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, rail freight 
transport in these countries started to increase again in the course of the last decade, 
albeit at a snail’s pace (+2.6% altogether between 2000 and 2008). As road transport 
activity had more than doubled during the same time, however, rail continued to lose 
market share. By 2008, the share of rail in inland freight transport of the new 
Member States had gone down to an estimated 34%219. The share of rail in these 
countries is hence still fairly close to the target value for 2010. This should not hide 
the fact that the rail network in the new Member States is mostly in a bad shape, 
following years of underinvestment. 
49. The accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU and the 
integration of their economies into the wider EU economy had a dramatic effect on 
road transport. Its share in all inland transport activities of the new Member States 
has gone up from around 43% in 1998 to about 55% in 2008220. The international 
transport activities of Central and Eastern European road hauliers showed the most 
spectacular growth rates over the last decade: In terms of tonne-kilometres, they 
almost tripled (+190%) between 2000 and 2008. National and international activities 
of road hauliers from the new Member States more than doubled while those of 
hauliers from the EU15 only increased by 10%. 
50. The success of hauliers from the new Member States can be explained in part by 
their relative cost advantage. Lorry drivers in the new Member States earn a fraction 
of their colleagues’ pay in the EU15. The salary of a lorry driver in Romania, for 
example, is less than a quarter of that of a driver in Germany. This also explains why, 
in terms of tonne-kilometres, more than 90% of all road transport operations between 
EU15 and EU12 countries are carried out by hauliers from the new Member States. 
51. Polish hauliers have in 2008 become the biggest cross traders in the EU, i.e. they 
transport most goods from one foreign country in the EU to another. More growth of 
the activities of road hauliers from Central and Eastern Europe can be expected, in 
particular given that all special restrictions on the cabotage market inside the EU – 
which had been imposed on a temporary basis upon accession on hauliers from most 
of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 – have been lifted on 1 May 2009. 
52. Rapidly rising motorisation levels in the new Member States make it more difficult 
for other modes of transport to keep their market shares. The volume of passenger 
transport by rail in the new Member States, for example, has fallen by 20% between 
                                                 
219 This share has been calculated without taking the transport activities of road hauliers from the EU-12 
into account which took place outside the territory of the EU-12. This step is necessary to be able to 
compare road transport data with data from the other modes. 
220 See previous footnote. 
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2000 and 2008. This is in stark contrast to the evolution in the EU15 where railway 
passenger transport increased by about one sixth (+16%) during the same period. The 
relative success of rail in the old Member States can mainly be attributed to the 
attractiveness of the ever expanding high-speed rail network. The new Member 
States still do not have such a network. 
53. Bus and coach operators in the new Member States are also losing market share to 
the passenger car. Their transport activities have slightly gone down (-4%) since 
2000. In the EU15, by contrast, bus and coach operators were able to increase their 
transport activities by more than 8%. It should be noted, however, that bus and coach 
transport is still about 1.5 times more important (in terms of modal share) in the new 
Member States than it is in the old ones. 
1.2.6. The 2006 mid-term review and the concept of co-modality 
54. The existence of alternative modes is a precondition for shifting transport activities 
from the road to other modes. Often enough, however, there is no economically 
viable alternative to the road. In the mid-term review of the White Paper, it was 
acknowledged that, in an integrated transport system, modes of transport do not 
necessarily compete against each other but rather complement one another. 
Improving the efficiency of each mode of transport on its own and in combination – 
in short: co-modality – was to become the leitmotif of European transport policy 
since then. Modal shift was still an objective – but only where it was most needed, 
such as over long distances, on congested corridors and in urban areas. 
55. In 2007, the Commission adopted a Freight Transport Logistics Action Plan221 which 
aimed at making freight transport in the EU more efficient and more sustainable. It 
contained a number of measures which were to increase the attractiveness of non-
road modes, e.g. through the creation of a European maritime space without barriers, 
the development of a freight-oriented rail network or the definition of green 
corridors. Other measures looked at the whole logistics chain and tried to reduce the 
administrative hurdles in intermodal transport by developing a single transport 
document. In addition, the use of new technologies such as e-freight and intelligent 
transport systems in freight transport was to be promoted. The rules on vehicle 
dimensions and standards in road transport were also to be reviewed. Some of the 
measures have only recently been adopted or are still in the pipeline; it is therefore 
too early to assess any measurable impact from them. 
2. ELIMINATING BOTTLENECKS 
2.1. TEN-T 
56. The TEN-T policy goes back to the Maastricht Treaty which gave the Community 
the powers and instruments to establish and develop the trans-European networks. 
Their main purpose is to contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market 
and the strengthening of economic, social and territorial cohesion. In general terms, 
the TEN policies promote the interconnection and interoperability of national 
networks and support projects of common interest. 
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57. The European Council in Essen in 1994 has adopted a list of 14 transport projects of 
common interest. The selection of the 14 projects was largely based on national 
priorities (bottom-up approach) rather than European ones (top-down approach). The 
TEN-T guidelines adopted in 1996222 included these 14 projects which were to be 
completed by 2010. 
58. By the time of the 2001 White Paper, only 3 of the 14 projects had been completed 
(Malpensa airport in Milan, the Øresund fixed link between Denmark and Sweden 
and the railway axis Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Stranraer). Some other projects had made 
significant progress, but a number of projects were far behind schedule. While the 
EU15 countries struggled to make progress on their own projects, the upcoming 
accession of the then candidate countries called for even greater efforts as their 
infrastructure needs were much bigger. 
59. A revision of the TEN-T guidelines in 2004 took account of EU enlargement: it 
expanded the list of priority projects to 30, with the horizon for completion set to 
2020. At the same time, the original projects were revised and, typically, extended; 
their target date has also been postponed. Moreover, European co-ordinators were 
appointed for the most important priority projects. They were to promote the projects 
and thus speed up their completion. 
60. By 2010, a total of 5 out of 30 TEN-T priority projects have been completed. Only 
two railway projects (the Betuwe line in the Netherlands and the west coast main line 
in the UK) have been finished since 2001. Other projects, while not completed, did 
make significant progress. Out of the nearly 400 billion € of projected costs for the 
30 priority projects, around 164 billion € have been invested until the end of 2009, 
and close to 80 billion € are projected for the period 2010-2013. The remaining 37% 
of the investments are foreseen after 2013. 
61. The opening of high-speed lines in Germany, Italy, Spain, France and the Benelux 
countries has considerably improved accessibility and brought people closer 
together. Rail could capture market shares from aviation and from the passenger car. 
These successes should however not hide some disappointments: a couple of projects 
such as the trans-Alpine rail tunnels on Brenner and Fréjus have been designated as a 
‘priority’ for more than 15 years but construction has not even started yet. These 
points have been critical bottlenecks since then. The elimination of bottlenecks – one 
of the key priorities of the 2001 White Paper – is work in (slow) progress.  
2.2. Infrastructure funding 
62. Infrastructure financing is supported by various financial instruments at EU level, 
including the TEN-T budget, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, and loans 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The Structural Funds and the Cohesion 
Fund have been a major source of finance for the investment needed to reduce 
imbalances in transport endowment in lagging regions across the EU. The TEN-T 
budget currently co-finances projects on the TEN-T network. It contributes up to 
10% of costs of works on the comprehensive TEN-T network, up to 20% of the costs 
of works in priority projects and traffic management systems (except for rail) and up 
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to 30% of the costs of works in cross-border sections of priority projects. Moreover, 
they finance up to 50% of preparatory, feasibility, evaluation and other studies 
related to projects and of costs related to the development and deployment of 
ERTMS.223  
63. Although the TEN-T financing thresholds have been raised in 2007, Community 
financial instruments in their current form have so far not been able to bring about a 
full and timely completion of all projects involved. Insufficient finance – both public 
and private – and insufficient access to long-term finance are among the most 
important obstacles in infrastructure development. This has been identified as one of 
the main reasons for lack in progress in certain TEN-T priority projects.224 Higher 
financing thresholds may have helped for certain projects, but in an overall limited 
(and insufficient) budget this has come at the cost of financing capabilities of other 
projects. 
64. Expanding the financing capacity available for investment in infrastructure in general 
and in the TEN-T in particular has been one of the major tasks in the past and will 
likely remain so in the future. One way to address this issue is to mobilise private 
investment in infrastructure projects. The involvement of private capital in public-
private partnerships (PPP) enabled the completion of a number of projects (e.g. the 
Øresund fixed link). To strengthen the organisational capacity of the public sector to 
engage in PPP, the Commission and EIB set up a European PPP Expertise Centre in 
2008. 
65. The budgetary resources at EU level have grown somewhat over time. At just 8 
billion € between 2007 and 2013, however, the TEN-T budget only covers a fraction 
of the needs. The commitment of the EIB has also been expanded over the years, 
both through the amount of financing provided and through the development of 
specialised financing instruments such as the Loan Guarantee instrument for TEN-T 
projects (LGTT).225 
66. Finding more money to finance transport infrastructure projects in mountainous areas 
was also one of the objectives of the amendment of the Eurovignette Directive in 
2006.226 It allows a mark-up of tolls on specific road sections in mountainous areas to 
finance projects of high European value, including those involving another mode of 
transport along the same corridor. This allows for instance Austria to charge more 
from heavy duty vehicles using the Brenner Pass. The money thus collected is to be 
used to finance a part of the upcoming Brenner base tunnel, a TEN-T priority rail 
project. This allows a kind of pre-financing of important new infrastructure projects 
and has as such been foreseen in the 2001 transport policy White Paper to relieve the 
headache of funding. 
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3. PLACING USERS AT THE HEART OF TRANSPORT POLICY 
3.1. Transport safety 
67. As long as people get accidentally killed or seriously injured while moving from one 
place to another, ensuring and improving transport safety will remain a key theme of 
any transport policy. At EU level, such policies have already been pursued in the 
1970s and 1980s in the context of safety features being included in the type approval 
process of new road vehicles. The breakthrough in the EU policy on transport safety 
came with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, which explicitly gave the EU competence 
in this field. Improving transport safety has become one of the main objectives of EU 
transport policy ever since227. 
3.1.1. Road 
68. Producing the highest number of casualties, road is the main challenge with regard to 
transport safety. The Commission has adopted two Road Safety Action Programmes 
in the 1990s, one going from 1993 to 1997228 and the other from 1997 to 2001229. At 
the beginning of the 21st century, progress in road safety had been somewhat slower 
than planned. The target of 38,000 road fatalities in the then EU15 by 2000 had been 
missed by more than 3,000. In addition to the more than 41,000 people who died on 
EU15 roads at the start of the decade, around 15,000 lost their lives on the roads of 
the countries that were to join the EU in 2004 and 2007. It was clear that more 
ambitious measures had to be taken to reduce the number of people killed on 
European roads. 
69. In the 2001 White Paper, the EU set itself the ambitious target of halving the number 
of road deaths by 2010. In 2003, the Commission adopted the third Road Safety 
Action Programme230 to this end, a document with a list of 62 measures and 
initiatives which were to be adopted and carried out until 2010. Although the 50% 
reduction target initially only covered the EU15, it was extended to the new Member 
States upon their accession. 
70. Improvements in road safety were to be achieved through action at different levels of 
government. The concept of shared responsibility was introduced. Member States 
adopted national road safety plans; some did so for the first time. This helped to 
focus minds and to target policies and hence to reduce the number of road casualties. 
71. There has been significant technological progress in active and passive safety of 
vehicles over the last decade with the introduction by the industry of a wide range of 
technical safety elements, in particular in passenger cars and heavy duty vehicles. 
Often, EU legislation helped spread the improvements to all vehicles. Next to vehicle 
safety, EU legislation also helped to improve infrastructure safety (e.g. road tunnels 
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on the TEN-T network231) and driving behaviour (e.g. recommendation to lower the 
blood alcohol limit to 0.5 mg/ml of blood232). 
72. In 2009, around 34,500 people were killed on the roads of the EU27. While this was 
the lowest figure ever recorded, it was still only 36% below the reference level of 
2001, when about 54,300 people lost their lives on the roads of what is now the 
EU27. Preliminary data for 2010 suggest that the overall target of halving the 
number of road deaths in the EU by 2010 has not been met. 
 
Source: CARE database, DG MOVE. 
Figure 7: Evolution of the number of road deaths in the EU27 compared with the target of the 2001 White 
Paper 
73. There are still big differences in the performance of individual Member States. The 
worst performers (Romania, Greece) have more than three times as many road deaths 
per million inhabitants than the best performers (United Kingdom, Sweden and the 
Netherlands). There should therefore be a huge scope for improvement just by 
applying best practice throughout the Union. If all countries were as ‘safe’ as the best 
performing ones, the annual toll of people killed in road accidents in the EU27 would 
already now be below 20,000. All new Member States except for Malta and the 
Slovak Republic show a worse record than the EU27 average of 69 deaths per 1 
million inhabitants. Adequate and safe road infrastructure that can cope with rising 
motorisation levels is often missing in these countries: their below-average 
performance can partly be attributed to this phenomenon. 
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Source: DG MOVE calculations 
Figure 8: Road deaths per million inhabitants in 2001 and 2009 by country 
74. As road safety is a policy area with shared responsibilities, also involving national, 
regional and local authorities as well as associations, stakeholders and the citizens 
themselves, the failure to reach the 50%-reduction target cannot be blamed on the 
EU alone. The new Member States had little time to improve their road safety 
performance but start showing encouraging results233. Moreover, several EU 
legislative acts adopted towards the end of the period covered by the third road safety 
action programme will only show their full impact during this decade. 
3.1.2. Maritime 
75. In recent years, the EU and its Member States have been at the forefront of actions to 
improve maritime safety legislation and to promote high-quality standards. The aim 
has been to eliminate substandard shipping, to increase the protection of crews and 
passengers, to reduce the risk of environmental pollution, and to ensure that 
operators who follow good practices are not put at commercial disadvantage by 
others who are prepared to take short cuts with vessel safety. 
76. The EU has so far adopted three legislative packages with the aim of improving 
maritime safety: the so-called “Erika I”234 and “Erika II”235 packages, and the third 
maritime safety package236. The Erika I and Erika II packages were a direct result of 
the catastrophic impact which the sinking of the single hull oil tanker Erika had in 
December 1999 off the coast of Brittany. It was felt that the Community needed to 
adopt stricter safety rules than those set by the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) to prevent similar disasters from happening again. The first package (Erika I) 
involved more rigorous inspection of ships at Community ports, stricter monitoring 
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of the classification societies and a ban on single hull tankers. The second package 
(Erika II) established a Community monitoring, control and information system for 
maritime traffic, a fund for the compensation of oil pollution damage and the 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 
77. In general terms, EMSA provides technical and scientific assistance to the 
Commission and the Member States in the fields of maritime safety, maritime 
security, prevention of pollution and response to pollution caused by ships. Its 
assistance is particularly relevant in the continuous process of updating and 
developing new legislation, monitoring its implementation and evaluating the 
effectiveness of the measures in place. In order to monitor the implementation of the 
Community acquis, the specialised staff of the Agency carries out inspections to 
Member States and, in specific areas, to third countries. Such inspections started in 
2004 and intensified over the last years. 
78. Another disaster, the sinking of the oil tanker Prestige off the coast of Galicia in 
November 2002, prompted more legislative action that resulted in the third maritime 
safety package which the Commission adopted in 2005 and which finally was 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2009. It seeks to improve the 
effectiveness of existing measures to prevent accidents and to better manage their 
consequences in case accidents do happen. 
79. Apart from the Prestige accident in 2002, there has been no major catastrophic oil 
spill in European waters over the last ten years. The accelerated phasing-in of double 
hull tankers has significantly reduced the risk arising from the transport of heavy fuel 
oil in single-hull tankers. Moreover, the work done by EMSA and the stronger roles 
of national safety authorities helped improve safety in European waters. 
80. In its Maritime Accident Review 2009, EMSA reports that the total number of 
vessels involved in accidents and the loss of life in and around EU waters were at 
historically low levels in 2009. 52 people on board commercial vessels were killed in 
2009, close to 37% less than in 2007 and 2008.237 It is not clear though what part of 
the positive evolution in 2009 can be attributed to EU action in this area and what 
part is due to the economic crisis: with lower traffic volumes and less pressure on 
crews to meet tight deadlines a reduction in accidents was to be expected. In any 
case, there is room for improvement as there were still hundreds of accidents and 
(minor) oil spills in and around EU waters in 2009. 
3.1.3. Rail 
81. Rail is a relatively safe mode of transport. The number of railway passengers killed 
per year in the EU is usually counted in dozens, not in thousands as in road transport. 
There were two main reasons for the EU to become involved in railway safety: first 
of all, safety rules across Member States had been so different that it was very 
cumbersome for a railway operator from one country to be granted a safety 
certificate from another one which is a prerequisite for market access. For the 
opening of the market, it was essential to harmonise safety rules and to ensure 
interoperability between different safety regimes in the Member States. 
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82. Later, with the opening of the railway market, it was feared that safety would suffer 
under the pressures of a competitive environment. In the 2001 White Paper, the EU 
therefore set itself the target of guaranteeing a level of safety that is at least equal to, 
if not higher than, that achieved in the national context. So far, this objective has 
been met: figures provided by the International Union of Railways (UIC) suggest 
that the number of railway passengers killed in the EU15 has even fallen slightly: 
while between 2001 and 2004, an average of 91 rail passengers died every year in the 
EU15, this figure went down to 43 in the period 2005 to 2008 (when on average 91 
passengers died in the whole EU27, not just the EU15). 
83. Generally, rail is considered to be a relatively safe mode also when it comes to the 
transportation of dangerous goods. In an integrated European rail market, both 
infrastructure and rolling stock, in particular those carrying dangerous goods, have to 
meet high and comparable safety standards across the EU. The tragic accident in 
Viareggio in June 2009238 showed a number of shortcomings in existing rules. 
Distance-based controls for train wagons and a stronger role for the European 
Railway Agency (ERA) in accident investigations appear necessary. 
84. ERA has been created as part of the second railway package239. It supports the 
Commission in setting up and enforcing common safety standards and in improving 
the interoperability of the European railway system. At Member State level, it is 
supported by independent national rail safety authorities. 
85. The certification and authorisation process is still managed by the national rail safety 
authorities. However, the cost and duration of the related procedures are significant. 
Moreover, the procedures differ from one country to another, and they lack 
transparency and predictability. 
3.1.4. Air 
86. Europe has a relatively good track record when it comes to safety in air transport. 
The number of air crashes and related casualties is lower than on most other 
continents. The White Paper of 2001 saw the need to establish a European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) which was to work on all aspects of air transport activities, 
from aircraft certification to the operational rules. The co-operation within the Joint 
Aviation Authorities, which had been dealing with these issues before, had reached 
its limits. EASA was created in 2003240 and became fully operational in 2008. It 
supports the Commission among others in the implementation and monitoring of 
safety rules through inspections in the Member States, in the type certification of 
aircraft and in the authorisation of third-country operators. 
87. To protect European citizens from potentially unsafe aircraft originating from third 
countries, the procedures for ramp inspections for third-country aircraft landing at 
EU airports have been harmonised,241 as announced in the White Paper. Moreover, 
the Commission has created a black list where all airlines with some safety concern 
                                                 
238 On 29 June 2009, a couple of wagons of a freight train carrying LPG derailed and exploded at 
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239 In fact, by Regulation (EC) No 881/2004. 
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are listed.242 These airlines are banned from European airspace. The list is regularly 
being updated. 
88. Given the relatively good level of air safety, there have been only very few major air 
crashes by EU carriers and over EU territory. Individual crashes often dominate the 
casualty statistics of a given year. Based on figures provided by EASA, the annual 
number of lives lost by any airline over EU27 territory has fluctuated between 0 and 
154 in the last 20 years, those lost on board an EU carrier anywhere in the world has 
been somewhere between 0 and 278 since 1990. Compared with the 1970s and the 
1980s, air transport has become significantly safer, especially in relation to the 
volume of air traffic: air traffic in the EU has more than doubled during the last two 
decades while the number of people getting killed remained at very low levels. 
3.2. Transport security 
89. While transport safety deals with the prevention of accidents, the protection of 
passengers and workers from unlawful interference or intentional attacks is being 
subsumed under the term transport security. Transport security is not mentioned in 
the White Paper of 2001. It has however become a great concern in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Soon thereafter, the EU 
has established common rules and common basic standards in the field of civil 
aviation security243. Harmonised rules across the EU created a ‘one-stop security’ 
regime where passengers arriving from one EU airport do not have to be re-screened 
when transferring at another EU airport. Unannounced Commission inspections at 
EU airports help ensure the implementation of the security measures. 
90. The absence of any terrorist attack in European air transport may be attributed to EU 
action in this area. Actions taken so far may therefore be considered to have been 
effective to date. It should be noted however that several attempted attacks since 9/11 
were committed by passengers boarding an aircraft in the EU244. New security rules 
usually followed attempted or successful attacks which exposed shortcomings in 
existing rules. The ban of liquids in containers larger than 100 ml on planes, for 
example, followed a terrorist plot in 2006 involving explosive liquids245. As the ban 
was rather costly and caused a lot of misery to ordinary travellers, its proportionality 
has been called into question246. The ‘Christmas Day bomber’ in 2009 is another 
example: his failed attempt has stirred up the debate on the use of security scanners 
at airports. 
91. In maritime transport, the EU has been active in enhancing ship and port facility 
security247. The Commission carries out inspections to monitor the correct 
                                                 
242 Based on Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005. 
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flying from Paris Charles de Gaulle to Miami. The “Christmas Day bomber” in 2009, who had some 
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246 In view of the upcoming installation of new screening technology at airports, it has been decided to lift 
that ban in April 2013. See Commission Regulation (EU) No 297/2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 
272/2009. 
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application of the legislation. The fight against piracy is another EU activity in the 
field of maritime security. The EU is currently involved in the operation Atalanta off 
the coast of Somalia to protect vessels sailing in the area and to end acts of piracy 
and armed robbery, if needed. While the effect of EU action in this field may be 
considered as overall positive, the pressing problem of piracy is far from solved. 
92. In addition to legislation in air and maritime security, the Commission also proposed 
some measures to improve the security of surface freight transport in order to have 
unified security rules across the supply chain248. They included the concept of a 
‘secure operator’ who would benefit from fast-track treatment at security checks. The 
European Parliament was however of the opinion that the revision of the Community 
Customs Code which was going on at the same time and which foresaw a similar 
certification for secure operators was sufficient. 
93. There appears to be a clear need in increasing the security of surface freight transport 
in general and of road freight transport in particular. Lorry drivers are frequently 
attacked, often while staying at unsecured parking spots. The lack of secure parking 
areas is a growing problem which the EU is trying to address through a number of 
projects such as SETPOS249 and LABEL250. In November 2010, the Council adopted 
a resolution on preventing and combating road freight crime and providing secure 
truck parks.251 
94. Next to surface freight transport, surface passenger transport is another area without 
existing security rules at European level. The devastating terrorist attacks on the 
public transport systems in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 killed almost 250 
people altogether and exposed the vulnerability of these networks. With the gradual 
integration of the European transport system, common security rules also in inland 
transport may be warranted. 
95. In many cities, public transport suffers from a lack of security due to some anti-social 
behaviour. That goes from spraying graffiti via damaging carriages to attacking 
ordinary passengers. Pickpockets are another common threat in a number of public 
transport networks. It should be ensured that public transport is a no-go zone for 
thugs and criminals. Public transport must be perceived to be safe and secure if it is 
to succeed in convincing more people to leave the car at home and use public 
transport instead. 
3.3. Working conditions and social dialogue 
96. One of the fundamental objectives of the EU is the promotion of employment as well 
as the improvement of living and working conditions. The EU may to this end adopt 
Directives which set minimum requirements regarding several aspects of working 
conditions (e.g. health and safety at work, social protection, information and 
consultation of workers). The European social partners play an important role in the 
formulation of EU social legislation, as agreements between them at EU level on 
matters covered by the Treaty may become binding EU law. The Commission 




251 See Council document 12083/4/10. 
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encourages the social partners to find solutions at EU level and consults them on 
policy measures.252 
97. In the transport field, sectoral dialogue committees were set up in 1999 for road, rail, 
inland waterway and maritime transport, and in 2000 for civil aviation.253 In sea 
ports, however, no such committee has so far been established despite the 
Commission explicitly encouraging such a step.254 The committees dealing with 
maritime, civil aviation and rail transport have since found agreements on the 
working conditions of (at least some of) the employees in their specific sectors. 
These agreements have been transposed into EU law.255 In the areas covered by such 
agreements, the general working time rules256 do not apply. 
98. In road transport, however, no such agreement could be found. The EU social 
dialogue in the road transport sector was deadlocked among others over the question 
whether self-employed drivers should be covered or not. Here, the EU has come up 
with its own rules on the working time of persons performing mobile road transport 
activities257 which – in a compromise fashion – temporarily exempted self-employed 
drivers during the first seven years after the Directive entered into force (i.e. until 
March 2009).  
99. In 2008, the Commission proposed to amend the Directive in order to maintain the 
exclusion of genuine self-employed drivers from the scope of the Directive while 
strengthening its enforcement in the case of so-called “false self-employed”258 
drivers in addition to employed professional drivers.259 Among the reasons for not 
covering self-employed drivers were the difficulties and costs involved in enforcing 
such rules, particularly among this group. The European Parliament was however of 
the opinion that the rules on working time should uniformly apply to all drivers, 
including the self-employed ones. The Commission then withdrew its proposal and is 
now faced with the challenge of ensuring a proper enforcement of the existing rules. 
100. The road transport sector is highly fragmented and the bulk of the operators are very 
small undertakings or even one-man companies. To make their production capacity 
more flexible and demand-responsive and to save costs, larger undertakings often 
subcontract the work to drivers who were previously employees. Such drivers are 
then however socially vulnerable as they occupy a ‘grey area’ between labour law 
and commercial law. E.g. current rules forbid payments by transport undertakings to 
employed drivers on the basis of distance travelled and/or the amount of goods 
carried if that payment endangers road safety.260 Any circumvention of this rule, for 
                                                 
252 Cf. Art. 151 to 155 TFEU. 
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254 See, for example, COM(2007)616. 
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instance by declaring (false) self-employment, should be prevented. According to the 
social partners, however, the phenomenon of ‘false’ self-employed drivers has 
become increasingly frequent. 
101. Next to the overall working time, EU legislation also regulates maximum driving 
time and minimum rest periods in road transport. These rules are meant to avoid 
driver fatigue and hence to contribute not only to better working conditions but also 
to road safety. In 2006, the rules have been substantially updated.261 Moreover, the 
enforcement of the rules has been strengthened by an increase in the number of 
inspections, by more co-ordination and co-operation between national enforcement 
bodies and by introducing the digital tachograph in road vehicles, a device which 
automatically records the driving time of a driver and which cannot be manipulated 
as easily as traditional recording equipment. 
102. Right now, virtually all goods transport vehicles and buses have to be equipped with 
the digital tachograph if they are used to cover distances longer than 50 km. For 
regionally operating small and medium-sized craft businesses, however, this 
produces an enormous amount of red tape. Their administrative burden could be 
substantially reduced if the installation of the tachograph was not required in vehicles 
that are used by them on distances up to 150 km.262 
103. There is still an important gap between the remuneration of lorry drivers from the 
new Member States and those from the old ones which is also one of the reasons of 
the current limitation of cabotage263. This difference in labour costs decreases, but it 
will for a number of years continue to put pressure on road haulage undertakings 
established in the old Member States, unless they diversify their activity in logistics 
activities with higher value added. 
104. Differences between Member States in applying and enforcing existing social rules 
in road transport (e.g. there is a huge variance in penalties for breaching the rules264) 
may distort competition in the sector and lead to a potential exploitation of workers. 
A more harmonised control and sanctioning system would allow the legislation to 
deploy its full benefit in particular for drivers and undertakings. The new possibilities 
offered by the Lisbon Treaty should be used in this context. Generally low levels of 
compliance with the social rules by both employers and by workers (e.g. undeclared 
work, incorrect records) add to the enforcement challenge. 
105. In some areas, such as maritime transport, there is a growing shortage of qualified 
staff of European origin. The problem has already been identified in 2001265 and the 
situation has not improved since. The ageing of existing crews is bound to further 
increase the scarcity of European officers in the near future. More actions to improve 
the working conditions at sea and to emphasise the attractiveness of the maritime 
profession appear necessary to attract more young Europeans and thus ensure the 
competitiveness of the European shipping sector. This requires better perspectives 
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for a life-long career that includes assignments on board and on the ground. The 
inland navigation sector faces similar problems which the NAIADES Action 
Programme266 tries to address. 
106. The European Commission has actively supported the negotiations on the 2006 
Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) of the International Labour Organisation. The 
MLC, also called the seafarers’ “bill of rights”, provides for minimum social 
standards for seafarers worldwide. An Agreement concluded by the European 
Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) and the European Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ETF) on the MLC has meanwhile been implemented267 and 
will enter into force together with the MLC.268 
3.4. Passenger rights 
107. There was a risk that the increasing competitive pressure in the wake of the opening 
of the transport market would at times lead to practices that were not in the interest 
of the passengers. Such practices had above all been observed in air transport where 
cases of denied boarding, flight cancellations and considerable delays had become 
frequent. The EU has therefore extended the rights of air passengers in these cases. 
They have now a right to care, to reimbursement and to compensation if needed. The 
enforcement of the rules is to be carried out by national designated bodies. The air 
passenger rights269 entered into force in 2005. The rights of passengers using other 
modes followed: those of rail passengers entered into force in 2009,270 those of ferry 
passengers will apply from late 2012271 and those of bus and coach passengers from 
March 2013.272 
108. There is no doubt that air passengers enjoy better protection today than they did 
before EU legislation in this area entered into force. An evaluation of the air 
passenger rights regulation carried out in 2009-2010273 came however to the 
conclusion that there were some shortcomings in the application and enforcement of 
the rules. Differences in length and duration of the national sanction schemes in case 
of non-compliance reduce the effectiveness of the legislation. Moreover, sometimes 
the interpretation of the rules also differs between Member States so that there is no 
level playing field. Further measures to improve enforcement and a more harmonised 
application of the rules appear necessary. 
109. Some rules in the Regulation would need to be clarified so that there is less room for 
interpretation. The Court of Justice of the EU has been called to interpret already a 
                                                 
266 COM(2006)6. 
267 Through Council Directive 2009/13/EC. 
268 The MLC enters into force once it has been ratified by at least 30 countries representing at least 33% of 
world gross tonnage. While the tonnage requirement has been exceeded in 2009, the number of 
countries having ratified the MLC was still only at 11 in late 2010. Although the Council urged 
Member States in 2007 to make efforts to ratify the MLC by the end of 2010 (see Council Decision 
2007/431/EC), only two EU countries have done so by that time. 
269 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004. 
270 Regulation (EC) No 1071/2007. 
271 Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010. 
272 Regulation (EU) No 181/2011. 
273 “Evaluation of Regulation 261/2004” Final report, February 2010; the study may be downloaded from 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/passengers/studies/doc/2010_02_evaluation_of_regulation_2612004.pdf 
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number of key issues, such as the rights in case of long delays274 or the notion of 
“extraordinary circumstances” under which airlines are not obliged to pay 
compensation when cancelling a flight. 
110. The air passenger rights legislation was put to a test in spring 2010 when a volcanic 
ash cloud led to air space closures in most of Europe which left millions of 
passengers stranded. The European Commission reminded the passengers of their 
rights. It made clear that passengers had a right to care (i.e. provision of meals and 
accommodation, if necessary) even in extraordinary circumstances like these. 
Airlines however were opposed to having to pay for something which was outside 
their control. A more balanced approach, which takes both the needs of stranded 
passengers and the interests of airlines into account, is needed. 
111. Air passengers’ rights already start while booking a ticket: Passengers are entitled to 
know the final price to be paid from the start of the booking process. Some airlines 
had advertised much lower ticket prices only to add taxes and charges later on. This 
was thought to be misleading and hence it has been outlawed275. Joint EU ‘sweep’ 
exercises have revealed that compliance has greatly improved and that the legislation 
is effective. 
112. It is probably too early to assess the effectiveness of the rail passenger rights that 
entered into force in December 2009. Eurostar passengers who were affected by train 
breakdowns due to technical problems during the cold winter 2009/2010 were among 
the first to benefit from them. In general, the implementation of this new legislation 
does not seem to have given rise to major problems. Some experience from Germany 
suggests though that the number of delays officially lasting 59 minutes has gone up 
considerably276. In case of delays lasting 1 hour or more, passengers are entitled to 
get a part of the ticket price reimbursed. Proper monitoring and enforcement will be 
key in all areas where passengers have been given rights. 
113. Passengers with reduced mobility also benefit from extended rights. It is no longer 
possible to discriminate against them. Equal access to transport services is a 
necessary prerequisite to a full participation in the modern society. Rules for the 
protection of and provision of assistance to disabled persons and persons with 
reduced mobility travelling by air have been adopted in 2006 and took full effect in 
July 2008.277 A recent study278 found out that the implementation of the regulation is 
generally good. There is however a big variation in the quality of services provided 
and in the severity of sanctions in case of non-compliance. The very similar rights of 
disabled passengers and of passengers with reduced mobility using other modes of 
transport have been or are about to be granted in the corresponding passenger rights 
legislation. It is too early to assess any impact at this stage. 
                                                 
274 Joined cases C 402/07 (Sturgeon vs. Condor Flugdienst GmbH) and C 432/07 (Böck/Lepuschitz vs. Air 
France SA); http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007J0402:EN:HTML 
275 By Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008. 
276 Cf. the following article on Zeit Online: http://www.zeit.de/2010/25/Bahnverspaetungen 
277 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006. 
278 “Evaluation of Regulation 1107/2006”. Final Report, June 2010; the study may be downloaded from 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/passengers/studies/doc/2010_06_evaluation_regulation_1107-2006.pdf 
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4. URBAN TRANSPORT  
114. Traditionally, EU transport policy has aimed at simplifying and enabling cross-
border traffic within the EU. National borders have increasingly ceased to be 
obstacles to the free movement of people and goods. Similarly, however, free 
movement should not be unduly hindered at city borders. As the majority of people 
live in urban areas and as economic activities are concentrated there, most journeys, 
including international ones, start or end in urban areas. In an integrated transport 
system, there is a need to look at the whole transport chain – including the ‘last 
mile’.  
115. Competence for urban mobility is shared between authorities at local, regional, 
national and European level. The subsidiarity principle279 exposes any EU action in 
this field to close scrutiny. A lot of issues and challenges in urban transport are 
however common in many towns and cities across Europe and have a direct link to 
key EU policy objectives. Increasing road congestion, air pollution and noise are just 
a few examples. The EU can help to solve such issues and add value, e.g. by 
providing a framework for action, by supporting initiatives that improve local 
transport systems and by promoting the exchange of ideas and examples of best 
practice. 
116. EU action in urban and regional transport goes back to the Green Paper “The 
Citizens’ Network” of 1995280 which focused on the issue of public passenger 
transport in general and public transport in urban areas in particular. It resulted in the 
launch of a series of initiatives based upon a ‘best practice’ approach. The CIVITAS 
initiative281 about cleaner and better transport in cities, launched in 2000 and 
financed by the EU research budget, is one of the more prominent activities in this 
respect. It has brought together a number of cities and supported them in 
implementing and evaluating technology- and policy-based measures to achieve a 
more sustainable, clean and energy-efficient urban transport system. 
117. Most road transport vehicles purchased by public authorities mainly run in an urban 
environment. The promotion of green public procurement was hence thought to also 
contribute to a cleaner urban environment – something badly needed given the fact 
that the air in many cities still is not sufficiently healthy. The EU has recently 
adopted new rules which stipulate that energy consumption, CO2 and pollutant 
emissions linked to the operation of vehicles over their whole lifetime will have to be 
taken into account in all public purchases of road transport vehicles282. The market 
for clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles is thus to be stimulated. 
118. These new rules were one of the outcomes of a broad debate in the wake of the 
adoption of another Green Paper on urban mobility in 2007283 and a thorough 
consultation of stakeholders. Another one was an Action Plan on Urban Mobility 
which the Commission adopted in 2009284. It contains a list of 20 actions which 
                                                 
279 Art. 5(3) TEU. 
280 COM(95)601. 
281 http://www.civitas-initiative.org/ 
282 Directive 2009/33/EC. 
283 COM(2007)551. 
284 COM(2009)490. 
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together form a comprehensive support package for local, regional and national 
authorities in their efforts to make urban mobility more sustainable. The actions will 
be launched until 2012. They include initiatives to increase the knowledge about 
urban mobility issues and how to share it. It is still too early to assess any effects of 
the actions. 
5. PROMOTION OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSPORT 
119. Technological innovation plays a key role in ensuring sustainable, efficient and 
competitive mobility in Europe. It has the potential of speeding up the achievement 
of the objectives of the Common Transport Policy. The EU has therefore been active 
throughout the last decades in promoting research and technological innovation in 
the area of transport. 
120. One of the areas where EU promotion has been particularly intense is the 
development and deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), i.e. the 
application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in transport. The 
2006 mid-term review of the White Paper acknowledged the role of ITS in making 
transport more efficient, safer and greener. EU action in this field avoids the 
emergence of a patchwork of ITS applications and services and ensures 
interoperability across borders and, possibly, systems. 
121. ICT are crucial elements in all kinds of traffic management systems. Technological 
innovations such as satellite and radio navigation and identification systems are 
available today and allow improved monitoring and management of flows of goods, 
passengers and vehicles. The EU supports the development and deployment of pan-
European traffic management systems in all modes and also between modes. A better 
management of transport flows helps to avoid congestion and to make better use of 
existing infrastructure capacity. 
122. In air transport, a new generation European air traffic management system is being 
developed within the SESAR project.285 It is the technological pillar of the Single 
European Sky initiative (see above). SESAR is currently in the development phase 
(until the end of 2013) which will be followed by the deployment phase. It should be 
fully deployed by 2020. 
123. In maritime transport, the development and deployment of Vessel Traffic Monitoring 
and Information Systems (VTMIS)286 such as the Community maritime information 
exchange system SafeSeaNet make it possible to locate at source and communicate 
to any authority accurate and up-to-date information on ships in European waters, 
their movements and their dangerous or polluting cargoes, as well as marine 
incidents. Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and the establishment of the Long-
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of ships will further improve maritime 
safety and efficiency in Europe. 
                                                 
285 SESAR = Single European Sky ATM Research; Regulation (EC) No 219/2007 established a Joint 
Undertaking to this effect. 
286 In the wake of Directive 2002/59/EC. 
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124. In inland waterways, the introduction of harmonised River Information Services 
(RIS)287 and their implementation along all the main inland waterways helps improve 
safety and efficiency of transport by inland waterways. RIS comprise services such 
as fairway information, traffic information, traffic management and calamity 
abatement support. They provide information for transport management, statistics 
and customs services as well as waterway charges and port dues. 
125. In rail transport, the development and deployment of the European Railway Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS) across the rail network in the EU, starting with six 
priority corridors, is expected to improve safety and significantly enhance the 
efficiency of cross-border traffic. Cross-border trains will in future only need to be 
equipped with ERTMS instead of a range of mutually incompatible national systems. 
ERTMS will gradually replace the currently over 20 train control systems in the EU. 
126. In road transport, the deployment of ITS has been relatively slow and fragmented. 
Many safety-enhancing features such as lane keeping support, emergency braking 
system or the pan-European in-vehicle emergency call system eCall288, for example, 
are available but not in widespread use. The development of electronic tolling 
systems is another field where the EU can add value by ensuring that the various 
national schemes are co-ordinated and, possibly, integrated. A better link up of 
information flows across intermodal logistics chains and a better integration with 
systems used in other modes also needs to be promoted. 
127. To speed up and to co-ordinate the deployment of ITS in road transport and its 
interfaces with other transport modes, the Commission adopted an Action Plan in 
2008.289 It contained 24 initiatives related to the optimal use of road, traffic and 
travel data, the continuity of ITS services along major corridors, ITS applications to 
improve road safety and security, the integration of various vehicle-based 
applications in one platform, data protection issues and the co-ordination of ITS 
deployment across the EU. The Action Plan was accompanied by a Directive that 
provides a framework in support of a co-ordinated and coherent deployment and use 
of ITS within the Union.290 
128. Many ITS use satellite-based radio navigation and positioning services currently 
provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) run by the US military and by the 
Russian GLONASS system. In 1999, the EU decided to set up its own global 
positioning system, Galileo291. In 2004, Galileo has become one of the 30 TEN-T 
priority projects. Funding and governance issues have delayed the project which 
originally should have become operational in 2008 but which is now expected to be 
operational by 2014.  
129. Technological solutions are essential for cleaning up the transport system. Vehicles 
and vessels have become cleaner by using new technologies. Many EU-funded 
projects have contributed and continue to contribute to this objective. A prominent 
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example is the Clean Sky Joint Technology Initiative292, a PPP research project that 
aims at improving the environmental performance of the air transport system. The 
budget of around 1.6 billion € is equally shared between the public (EU FP7 research 
funding) and the private sector (aeronautics industry). Another noteworthy example 
is the European Green Cars Initiative293, a PPP that supports research in greening 
road transport vehicles. A total of 1 billion € is jointly funded by the EU FP7 
research budget, the Member States and the vehicle manufacturing industry. The 
Ocean of tomorrow is another FP7 joint research initiative, following the adoption in 
2008 of the "European Strategy for Marine and Maritime Research", which 
highlights the importance of integration between established marine and maritime 
research disciplines in order to reinforce excellence in science and to reconcile the 
growth of sea-based activities with environmental sustainability. 
130. Numerous ex-post evaluations of past research projects (i.e. AGAPE, AIMS, 
MEFISTO, METRONOME, SITPRO PLUS) have confirmed the European added 
value in transport research: it is often only at European level that a critical mass in 
terms of both scale and scope of a project can be reached. Moreover, research at 
European level avoids duplication of efforts and fosters the exchange of ideas and 
knowledge across Europe. 
6. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF TRANSPORT  
131. Transport connects Europe with the outside world. The external dimension of 
transport is obvious in particular in maritime and air transport. With the exception of 
the immediate neighbours in Europe, almost all transport activities between the EU 
and the rest of the world are either by air or by sea. 
132. The EU has developed an external transport policy distinguishing between 
neighbouring countries on the one hand and other important partners – such as the 
United States – on the other. In line with the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
neighbouring countries are to be better connected and integrated in the internal 
transport market of the EU.  
133. In 2007, the Commission adopted Guidelines for transport in Europe and 
neighbouring regions which extended the major trans-European transport axes to the 
neighbouring countries.294 It identified five transnational axes to connect the EU with 
its neighbours, four of which are land-based: a Northern axis connecting the northern 
EU with Norway, Russia and Belarus; a central axis linking central Europe to 
Ukraine and the Black Sea; a South-Eastern axis linking the EU with the Western 
Balkans and Turkey and with the countries of the Southern Caucasus, the Caspian 
Sea and the Middle East, including Egypt and the Red Sea; and a South-Western axis 
linking the EU with Switzerland and the Maghreb countries. The fifth axis deals with 
“Motorways of the Sea”, i.e. efficient maritime transport links between the 
neighbouring countries and the EU. In addition, the Guidelines included horizontal 
measures to approximate the neighbouring countries’ standards, legislation and 
policies to the EU and hence promote interoperability. In its dealings with the 
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neighbouring countries, the Commission was to follow a two-step approach: 
exploratory talks first which, if successful, may later be followed by concrete 
recommendations. 
134. A progress report of 2008295 found that the exploratory talks with the neighbouring 
countries were progressing well. There was a general approval of the approach taken 
by the EU. Progress in the co-operation and adoption of the Community acquis had 
been most advanced in the Western Balkan countries – mainly due to the fact that 
these countries are all actual or potential candidate countries.  
135. In mid-2008, the Commission started negotiations on a treaty establishing a 
Transport Community with the Western Balkans. It aims to better integrate the 
respective transport systems and to create an integrated market for land, inland 
waterway and maritime transport by aligning the relevant legislation in the Western 
Balkan countries with EU legislation. The negotiations are still ongoing. 
136. In aviation, the EU has created a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) with the 
Western Balkan countries as well as with Norway and Iceland. The ECAA 
Agreement296 has been signed in May 2006. It aims at integrating these countries into 
the EU’s internal aviation market. The EU has set itself the target of developing a 
wider Common Aviation Area (CAA) by 2010 that covers also other neighbouring 
countries from Morocco in the West to Kazakhstan in the East. Some agreements 
with third countries have already been signed – notably the Euro-Mediterranean air 
transport agreement with Morocco which provides for a high degree of regulatory 
convergence and should serve as a blueprint for similar agreements with other 
countries in that region. 
137. In 2008, the Commission published a progress report on the Common Aviation Area 
with neighbouring countries.297 It recognised the progress that had been made but 
acknowledged that the completion of the wider CAA will probably be delayed. 
Moreover, it found that the implementation of the agreements would require more 
efforts. Being “mixed agreements”, they have to be ratified by all EU Member States 
as well as by the partner countries. Ratification in some EU Member States is 
however progressing only slowly. 
138. The CAA is one of altogether three pillars of the EU’s external aviation policy. The 
other two pillars are bringing existing bilateral air service agreements (ASA) 
concluded between EU Member States and third countries in line with EU law and 
negotiating comprehensive air transport agreements with important third countries. 
139. The need for bringing bilateral ASA in line with EU law followed directly from the 
“open skies” judgement of the European Court of Justice in November 2002.298 Up 
to then, ASA had been governed by bilateral agreements between states. These 
bilateral agreements however regularly breached EC law, especially as regards the 
principle of non-discrimination. Every EU Member State is required to grant equal 
market access for routes to destinations outside the EU to any EU carrier with an 
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establishment on its territory (so-called “EU designation clause”), not just to 
companies owned and controlled by nationals of that Member State. 
140. The existing ASA between the Member States and third countries had thus to be 
brought in line with Community law. This could be done either by bilateral 
negotiations between each Member State concerned and its partners, amending each 
bilateral ASA separately, or the negotiation of single “horizontal” agreements, with 
the Commission acting on a mandate of the EU Member States. To date, over 900 
bilateral agreements have been modified accordingly. Moreover, 45 horizontal 
agreements have been signed with partner countries worldwide. 
141. A comprehensive so-called “Open Skies” agreement has been signed with the USA 
in 2007. It allows open market access for air services between all 27 Member States 
and the US. Some leftovers of this first agreement, above all in the area of airline 
ownership and control, have been addressed in second-stage negotiations which 
resulted in a draft agreement in March 2010. A similarly wide-ranging air transport 
agreement with Canada has been signed in December 2009. Negotiations with 
Australia, New Zealand and Brazil are currently ongoing. 
142. Good external relations in maritime transport are essential in ensuring the stability of 
the global seaborne trade system. The Commission is in regular contact with key 
shipping and trading partners around the world and participates in talks in 
international organisations related to issues of safety, the protection of the marine 
environment or labour standards. Moreover, bilateral working groups with the US, 
Japan, Russia, China and Korea meet regularly to discuss issues related to maritime 
transport security. 
143. As the world’s leading commercial power, the EU needs to play a strong role in the 
adoption of international rules which govern a large part of international transport. 
Moreover, the internal transport market requires an effective and co-ordinated 
representation towards the outside world, also to promote and effectively defend 
European interests and standards worldwide. It is important for Europe to speak with 
one voice in international transport fora. The increasing EU competence in defining 
also the external dimension of European transport policy should be better reflected in 
the Commission’s role in representing the EU in bodies such as the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in Montreal and the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) in London. At their meetings, the Commission has so far merely 
played the role of observer with the right to speak. A recommendation to the Council 
of April 2002 to authorise the Commission to negotiate with ICAO and with IMO the 
conditions and arrangements for the accession of the EU to these organisations299 has 
so far been blocked by the Member States. 
144. In the absence of further action on the mandate for membership at ICAO, the 
Commission has taken a more pragmatic approach along the following three lines: It 
opened an EU office in Montreal in 2005 to provide permanent representation of the 
Commission at ICAO and to develop a closer co-operation with the UN body. In 
matters of EU competence, it co-ordinates the EU position in the Council and on the 
spot in Montreal. Moreover, a Memorandum of Co-operation between the EU and 
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ICAO has been initialled during the 37th ICAO Assembly in autumn 2010. The 
Memorandum provides a framework for strengthening the co-operation between both 
organisations and should enhance the influence of the EU in ICAO decision making. 
7. CONCLUSION 
145. Looking back over the last ten years, it is fair to say that a lot has been achieved and 
even more has been done to make the European transport system more efficient, 
more integrated and more sustainable. Not all that has been done has so far had a 
measurable impact. This is mostly due to the fact that in some cases more time is 
needed for any impact to become visible (because a number of measures have only 
recently been adopted) or to the fact that, in some other cases, implementation has 
been insufficient and slow. 
146. Progress has been slow in areas such as the opening of the rail market, the creation of 
the SES or the completion of the TEN-T priority projects. Moreover, the 
development, deployment and application of technological innovations such as 
intelligent transport systems have also been rather slow and are in some cases behind 
schedule (e.g. Galileo). The internalisation of the external costs of transport is 
another area where there has not been much progress to date. 
147. Some objectives have not been fully achieved because European transport policy had 
only a limited influence on them (e.g. decoupling transport growth and GDP growth) 
or because of the general inertia of the transport system (e.g. modal shift). But things 
are generally moving in the right direction: passenger transport is now growing more 
slowly than GDP (in a context of still growing mobility) and the relative fall of rail 
transport could be stopped. 
148. While some ambitious targets have not been fully achieved (e.g. halving the number 
of road deaths by 2010), significant progress has been made: transport in the EU has 
become a lot safer than it was 10 years ago, despite growing traffic volumes. 
Transport has also become more secure, in particular in aviation. Moreover, 
passengers in air and rail transport now benefit from new and extended rights, those 
using ferries or coaches will have similar rights soon. Proper monitoring and 
enforcement of the existing rules is important, in particular when it comes to 
passenger rights and to social legislation. 
149. Transport is still producing too many negative side effects for the environment. The 
emission of air pollutants could be reduced significantly, but in many cities, the 
concentrations are still at unhealthy levels. Moreover, when it comes to CO2 
emissions, transport is the black sheep in the family as its emissions have almost 
continuously increased over the last 20 years while those of other sectors have been 
falling. In the light of growing concerns, among others about climate change, the 
objective of a (relative) decoupling of the negative effects of transport from the 
growth in transport activity, as expressed in the 2006 mid-term review of the White 
Paper, appears not to be sufficient. 
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Appendix 3: Reference scenario (2010-2050) 
1. In the EU, transport services contribute 4.6% of gross value added and account for 
4.5% (10.2 million people) of total employment300, 301. Road and rail together employ 
around 60% of all persons in the transport services sector and provide more than 
50% of gross value added. Around two thirds of the people working in road transport 
enterprises are active in moving freight around, one third in moving passengers302. 
2. Transport is closely interrelated with the rest of the economy: around 30% of the 
total output of the transport services sector is bought by the manufacturing sector and 
18% by retail and wholesale trade303. By enabling trade, transport allows competition 
and thus fosters competitiveness and innovation and facilitates economic growth. 
3. In formulating the future EU transport policy, it is necessary to conduct a thorough 
analysis of possible developments in the EU transport sector in a “no-policy change” 
scenario, also called the baseline or “Reference scenario”. This appendix examines 
the challenges which Europe’s transport sector will likely face in the future, covering 
the economic, social and environmental dimension. The appendix first presents the 
Reference scenario assumptions, followed by a discussion of the main results.  
Box 1 - The Reference scenario 
The Reference scenario is a projection of developments in absence of new policies beyond 
those adopted by March 2010. The transport-specific policies adopted by March 2010 as well 
as the 2008 Climate and Energy Package are included in this scenario304.  
The Reference scenario is a benchmark for evaluating new policy measures against 
developments under current trends and policies. It builds on a modelling framework including 
PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, the PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model, TREMOVE and GEM-
E3 models305. This framework allows exploring developments in the transport sector from two 
different angles: 
• A top-down perspective, which looks at the relative contribution of transport to economy-
wide energy consumption and CO2 emissions using the PRIMES model and employment 
developments using the GEM-E3 model; 
• A bottom-up perspective, which enables the analysis of transport-specific issues using 
TRANSTOOLS, the PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model and TREMOVE. 
                                                 
300 Source: Eurostat. This figure does not include own account transport (transport services that firms in all 
sectors provide for themselves, i.e. with their own vehicles). The construction and maintenance of 
transport infrastructure and of transport means (i.e. road vehicles, ships, trains) is not included either. 
301 According to Eurostat, the manufacturing of transport equipment provides an additional 1.7% to value 
added and 1.5% to employment. 
302 European Commission, DG Mobility and Transport: The future of transport - Focus groups’ report, 
2009. 
303 Source: Eurostat Input-Output tables. 
304 A list of policy measures is provided in Appendix 4. 
305 A short description of these models is provided in Appendix 5. 
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1. REFERENCE SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS 
4. The Reference scenario builds on assumptions related to population growth, macro-
economic projections and developments in the oil price, which are presented in the 
following sections. 
1.1. The demographic challenge 
5. Demographic change is transforming the EU with inevitable consequences also for 
the transport sector. In the Reference case, the population projections draw on the 
EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario (EUROpean POPulation Projections, base 
year 2008) from Eurostat, which is also the basis for the 2009 Ageing Report 
(European Economy, April 2009)306,307. The key drivers for demographic change are: 
higher life expectancy, low fertility and inward migration. 
1.1.1. Ageing 
6. The EU-27 population is expected to grow by 0.2% per year by 2035 and slightly 
decline afterwards, remaining fairly stable in number at around 500 million in the 
next 40 years. Elderly people, aged 65 or more, would account for 24% of total 
population by 2020 and 29% by 2050 as opposed to 17% today. 
7. Around a sixth of EU population has a disability. More than 20% of elderly people 
aged over 75 are severely restricted. Ageing and the extended longevity of people 
can be expected to lead to increasing numbers of elderly people with severe 
disabilities308. 
                                                 
306 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and 
budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf. The “baseline” scenario of 
this report has been established by the DG Economic and Financial Affairs, the Economic Policy 
Committee, with the support of Member States experts, and has been endorsed by the ECOFIN Council 
307 Demographic projections in the Reference scenario are common in PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, 
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model, TREMOVE and GEM-E3. 
308 European Commission, DG Employment: People with disabilities have equal rights - The European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=591&type=2&furtherPubs=no 
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Figure 11: Changes in the structure of the population by main age groups, EU27 (in %) 
8. Age-related public expenditures are projected to increase by about 4 percentage 
points of GDP by 2050 due to the higher ratio of older people which require more 
public resources for pension payments, health care and long-term care309. As a 
consequence, through its effect on public finance, ageing will put a strain on the 
funds available to finance the construction and maintenance of transport 
infrastructure and the provision of public transport. 
9. The provision of transport services with a high level of perceived security and 
reliability will gain a prominent role in an ageing society. Appropriate solutions for 
users with reduced mobility will also require increased focus because frailty and 
disability rise sharply at older age, especially amongst the 80+ which will be the 
fastest growing segment of the population in the decades to come. 
1.1.2. Migration and internal mobility 
10. Migration already plays the predominant role in population growth today: in many 
Member States, the size of net migration determines whether the population still 
grows or has entered a stage of decline. Net migration might add 30 million people to 
the EU population by 2030 and an additional 20 million by 2050310. 
11. Migrants will further intensify Europe’s ties with neighbouring regions by creating 
cultural and economic links with their country of origin. These links could entail 
more movement of people and goods. However, the inward net migration would not 
be able to sustain the EU population growth after 2035, due to its assumed 
decelerating trend. 
                                                 
309 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and 
budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009. 
310 Net migration is accounted in the projections on population growth. 
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12. In 2008, only about 2.3% of the total EU population (11.3 million EU citizens) were 
living on the territory of another EU Member State311. Nevertheless, mobility of 
workers within the Union is expected to increase with the gradual removal of 
administrative and legal barriers and further deepening of the internal market. 
1.1.3. Shortage of skills 
13. Increasing labour force participation rates in most EU Member States and rising net 
immigration levels in some can only moderate the fall in employment caused by the 
ageing of the population and the negative population growth after 2035. Overall 
employment in the EU is projected to shrink by 12 million by 2050. 
14. The share of transport services in total employment in the EU is projected to roughly 
maintain its current levels by 2050312, resulting in fewer people working in the 
sector. With growing transport activity demand, the lower employment level may 
negatively affect the workload and working conditions. A scarcity of labour and 
skills may arise, further aggravating the shortage of skilled labour already 
experienced in some segments of the transport sector. In absence of innovative 
alternatives, this may result in higher transport costs for the society. 
1.2. Macro-economic projections 
15. The macro-economic projections reflect the recent economic downturn, followed by 
sustained economic growth resuming after 2010. The medium and long-term growth 
projections follow the “baseline” scenario of the 2009 Ageing Report (European 
Economy, April 2009)313. 
16. The Reference scenario assumes that the recent economic crisis has long-lasting 
effects, leading to a permanent loss in GDP314. The recovery from the crisis is not 
expected to be sufficiently vigorous to compensate for the current GDP losses. In this 
scenario, growth prospects for 2011 and 2012 are subdued. However, the economic 
recovery enables higher productivity gains, leading to somewhat faster growth from 
2013 to 2015. After 2015, GDP growth rates mirror those of the 2009 Ageing Report. 
Hence the pattern of the Reference scenario is consistent with the intermediate 
scenario 2 “sluggish recovery” presented in the Europe 2020 strategy315.  
17. The average annual GDP growth rate for the EU-27 has been estimated at only 1.2% 
for 2000-2010, while the projected rate for 2010-2020 is expected to recover to 
2.2%, similar to the historical average growth rate between 1990 and 2000. In the 
medium run the higher expected growth rate is due to the higher productivity growth 
assumed in Member States that are catching up. The average annual GDP growth 
rate in the EU-27 is projected to fall to 1.6% during 2020-2050 because demographic 
                                                 
311 Eurostat (population and social conditions), Statistics in Focus No 94/2009. 
312 Result of the GEM-E3 model. 
313 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and 
budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf 
314 GDP projections in the Reference scenario are common in PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, PRIMES 
transport model, TREMOVE and GEM-E3. 
315 Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth. COM(2010)2020, Brussels, 3.3.2010. 
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ageing, with a reduction in the working-age population, is expected to act as a drag 
on growth. Over time, labour productivity will become the only driver of growth in 
the EU316. Nonetheless, there is considerable uncertainty concerning the medium-
term economic outlook.  
18. The recent economic crisis has added to the challenges regarding the sustainability of 
public finances. Overall, as an effect of both the economic crisis and the ageing 
population, without fiscal consolidation the gross debt-to-GDP ratio for the EU as a 
whole could reach 100% as early as 2014 and 140% by 2020317,318. The recent 
economic crisis will therefore limit further, in addition to age-related public 
expenditures, the funding available for the construction and maintenance of transport 
infrastructure and for public transport. 
1.3. Increasing scarcity of fossil fuels 
19. Transport depends heavily on oil and oil products: for more than 95% of its needs 
worldwide and 96% in EU-27319. At the same time, more than 60% of the petroleum 
products used in OECD countries and about half of those used in non-OECD 
countries are used as transport fuels320.  
20. The high oil dependence of the transport sector can be explained by the high energy 
density and relatively easy handling/transportation characteristics of oil products, the 
low oil prices compared to available alternatives over the past 20 years and the 
extensive oil-based infrastructure and vehicle stock already in place. By contrast, 
most alternative fuels require extensive investments in infrastructure and fuel 
delivery systems as well as new types of vehicles, which make it difficult for 
alternative fuels to compete with oil products. 
21. The high oil dependence of the transport sector constitutes a risk to a low-cost, 
uninterrupted and large-scale fuel supply due to the concentration of proven reserves 
in politically less stable regions, the depletion of reserves and growing global 
demand. This leads to a high uncertainty surrounding oil price developments. 
Reserves in the Middle East alone account for 57% of the world’s proven reserves 
while the EU merely contributes 0.5%321. Security of supply is particularly important 
because oil products would still cover 90% of the EU transport sector's energy needs 
in 2030 and 89% in 2050 in a “no-policy change” scenario. 
                                                 
316 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and 
budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf. 
317 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: Sustainability Report 2009. EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY 9|2009, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15998_en.pdf. 
318 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: Public Finances in EMU 2010. 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 4|2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-4_en.pdf. 
319 European Commission, EU Energy and Transport in Figures, 2010 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/publications/statistics/statistics_en.htm. 
320 International Energy Agency, Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009. 
321 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, 
http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 
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22. The Reference scenario assumes a relatively high oil price environment compared 
with previous projections. The assumptions are however similar to recent projections 
by the International Energy Agency (IEA)322: From 59 $/barrel in 2005, the oil price 
is expected to rise to 106 $/barrel in 2030 and to 127 $/barrel in 2050 (in year 2008-
dollars)323,324. In this scenario, total fuel costs for the transport sector would be about 
300 bn € higher in 2050 relative to 2010. 
23. However, there is uncertainty related to the oil price projections due to the timing 
and pace of economic recovery and the rebound in oil demand, the investments in oil 
productive and refining capacity and the expansion of non-conventional production. 








































EU-27 + CH&NO Rest of OECD China India  
Source: Prometheus, National Technical University of Athens (E3MLab)  
Figure 12: Oil price and car ownership projections in the Reference scenario 
24. Similarly to IEA estimates, the oil price projections are based on only a moderate 
increase in the passenger light duty vehicles ownership in the emerging economies. 
For example, by 2050 the car ownership in China is assumed to reach 394 cars per 
thousand inhabitants, similar to levels in the EU-15 in the 1990s. The relatively 
moderate increase in car ownership could be explained by limits on infrastructure, 
greater income disparities and greater urbanisation combined with lower 
suburbanisation than in OECD countries326. Higher motorisation levels in the 
emerging economies than assumed for the projections constitutes an upside risk to 
the current oil price projections and thus to the transport cost projections. 
                                                 
322 The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 assumes 115 $/barrel in 2008 prices for 2030 and 120 
$/barrel for 2050. The IEA 2010 World Energy Outlook assumes an oil price around 110 $/barrel for 
2030 in the “New Policies Scenario”. 
323 The oil price projections are the result of world energy modelling with the PROMETHEUS stochastic 
world energy model, developed by the National Technical University of Athens (E3MLab). The oil 
price assumptions are common in PRIMES, TRANSTOOLS, the PRIMES-TREMOVE transport 
model, TREMOVE and GEM-E3 models. 
324 This would translate into an oil price of 91 €/barrel in 2030 and 118 €/barrel in 2050. 
325 Result of the PROMETHEUS stochastic world energy model. 
326 International Energy Agency, Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009. 
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1.4. Technological improvements 
25. Battery costs for plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles are assumed to remain high by 
2050, at about 560-780 €/kWh327, but further improvements in the efficiency of both 
spark-ignition gasoline and compression-ignition diesel are assumed to take place. In 
addition, the market share of internal combustion engine (ICE) electric hybrids is 
expected to go up due to their lower fuel consumption compared with conventional 
ICE vehicles. However, there is high uncertainty related to technological 
developments. 
2. REFERENCE SCENARIO MAIN RESULTS 
2.1. Overall transport developments and accessibility 
26. Total transport activity continues to grow in line with economic activity in the 
Reference scenario. Even though a decrease is visible for 2008-2009 as a result of the 
recent economic crisis, the recovery foreseen starting with 2010 is reflected by 
transport activity returning to its long-term trends. Road transport is expected to 
maintain its dominant role in both passenger and freight transport within the EU. 
Passenger transport by rail would grow slightly faster than passenger transport by 
road, while the growth rates in road and rail freight transport are expected to be 
similar. Air transport would grow significantly and increase its share of overall 
transport demand.  
27. Total passenger transport activity is expected to grow by 34% between 2005 and 
2030 in a “no-policy change” scenario, equivalent to an average growth of 1.2% per 
year. However, growth is not distributed proportionally among transport modes, with 
air transport activity almost doubling by 2030. The weaker growth in passenger 
transport compared to GDP per capita (1.4% per year) is explained by the 
assumption that passenger car activity in some EU-15 Members States is close to 
saturation levels and by national and EU policies to reduce the transport intensity of 
the economy.  
28. Rail competes with both road and air, but the results on its performance differ 
considerably between the EU-15 and the EU-12. In the EU-15, given the expected 
saturation of passenger car demand, a large share of potential additional demand 
could be covered by (in most cases high-speed) rail, at least in the Member States 
where investments in (high-speed) rail are foreseen. At the same time, high-speed 
rail attracts traffic from air transport. In the EU-12, the competitive situation of rail 
relative to air and road is expected to worsen,328 resulting in slower growth than the 
other two main modes. After 2030 the slight decline in population combined with a 
                                                 
327 The Reference scenario does not cover the European Commission CARS 21 (Competitive Automotive 
Regulatory System for the 21st century) initiative. In addition, the Reference scenario was finalised in 
2009/early 2010 and does not capture the recent initiatives of car manufacturers as regards electric 
vehicles (hereinafter “EV”). 
328 Whereas most EU-15 Member States seem to reach a saturation level for growth in passenger car 
activity, the results of faster economic growth and rising car ownership levels would translate into 
higher growth in passenger car activity in the EU-12. 
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slowdown in GDP growth and the saturation of passenger car demand leads to 
somewhat lower growth rates in passenger transport activity.  
29. The various modes are in general expected to maintain their relative importance at 
EU level. Passenger cars would represent almost 70% of total passenger activity in 
2030 and 67% in 2050, although this would correspond to a decrease of 6 percentage 
points in modal share by 2050 compared to 2005329. Air transport on the contrary is 
expected to increase its share, reaching almost 15% of total activity in 2050 and 
consolidating its position as the second most important passenger mode330. The 
increase in air transport demand is a result of the expected increase in: the number of 
trips per person and year and the average distance per trip. Rail would improve its 

























Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 13: Passenger and freight transport projections (average growth rate per year) 
30. Several factors influencing the freight transport sector, including the restructuring of 
logistics systems, the realignment of supply chains and the rescheduling of product 
flows, are expected to change gradually during the period 2005-2050 but without 
affecting much the overall trends. The developments in production and consumption 
patterns would lead to an increase in the average transport distances and a larger 
share of unitized /non-bulk goods. 
31. Total freight transport volumes are expected to grow by about 38% by 2030, with 
road and rail growing at comparable rates. The developments in rail freight are 
sustained by a slower increase in fuel costs and the positive impacts of the opening of 
the rail markets. Road transport would maintain its dominant role in inland freight 
transport, contributing 73% in 2030, followed by rail (with 17%). Both road and rail 
                                                 
329 The share of total road transport (including buses and coaches and powered 2-wheelers besides 
passenger cars) in total passenger transport would be about 79% in 2030 and 77% in 2050. 
330 The shares are expressed in passenger-kilometres. 
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slightly increase their shares between 2005 and 2030 to the expense of inland 
navigation, which is expected to grow at a lower pace. 
32. The geographic distribution of freight transport growth is not uniform. In absolute 
terms, road transport in the EU-15 will attract most of the growth in demand. 
However, in relative terms, the transport volumes in the EU-12 will increase much 
faster. Growth is expected to be high for all modes in the new Member States, with 
road being the fastest growing one. Inland waterways traffic, especially on the 























Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model  
Note: Bubble size corresponds to relative GDP growth between 2005 and 2030 (in %) 
Figure 14: Growth in passenger and freight transport activity and GDP growth per Member State (2005-
2030) 
33. Beyond 2030, a certain weakening in freight transport activity is expected relative to 
2005-2030. Several factors contribute to this outcome: weaker growth prospects after 
2030, shifts in GDP composition towards service and information activities331, shifts 
in value-to-weight ratios and limits to distant sourcing and off-shoring. 
34. The international shipping industry carries about 90% of world trade. In recent years, 
international maritime activity has grown significantly, driven in particular by the 
growth in globalisation. Maritime trade is expected to continue growing with rising 
demand for oil, coal, steel and other primary resources – which will be more 
distantly sourced. For example, with the plateauing of iron ore production in 
Australia, China has started to source iron ore from Brazil and Africa332.  
                                                 
331 Result of the GEM-E3 model. 
332 International Energy Agency, Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009. 
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35. The growth projections regarding international shipping are highly uncertain because 
they depend heavily on the growth in the production and consumption of raw 
materials and manufactured goods, and the location of these activities. At global 
level, growth projections vary by up to 300% in 2050 depending on the specific 
assumptions used. The IEA assumes slightly more than a doubling of shipping tonne-
kilometres between 2005 and 2050333, based on growth projections from the 
International Maritime Organisation. 
 
Source: IEA, 2010 Energy technology perspectives 
Figure 15: Trends in maritime transport volumes and related CO2-equivalent emissions 
36. Almost 90% of the EU external trade is seaborne. In 2008, Europe accounted for 
about 15% of the global goods loaded and 24% of all goods unloaded at ports 
globally334. In the Reference scenario maritime and road freight transport activity are 
projected to grow at comparable rates up to 2030. Maritime transport activity is 
expected to almost double by 2050 relative to 2005335. 
37. Recent evidence on agglomeration economies suggests that economic growth, labour 
migration and accessibility are closely interrelated336. High accessibility to raw 
materials, suppliers and markets is positive for the competitiveness of regions337. 
Accessibility is however a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite for the positive 
economic development of regions.  
                                                 
333 International Energy Agency, Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009. 
334 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of maritime transport 
2009. 
335 An increase in the consumption of biofuels may also trigger higher demand for the transport of 
agricultural bulks to supply bio-refineries. 
336 World Bank, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping economic geography. 
337 ESPON project, Territorial Dynamics in Europe: Trends in Accessibility, Territorial Observation No. 2, 
2009. 
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38. The current situation in terms of accessibility338 in the EU suggests that there is a 
marked division between central and peripheral areas as regards their transport 
connectivity and costs as a result of geography and patterns of economic activity. 
Peripheral areas require longer average trips to reach the rest of the EU using, in 
most cases, more expensive modes and networks than those available in central 
areas. As a result, their average transport costs are higher. 
39. Fuel costs and congestion levels are expected to rise significantly by 2030, leading to 
further divergences in accessibility. The situation of peripheral areas with a high 
share of road transport is expected to worsen as they face higher average transport 
cost increases than central areas.  
 
Source: TRANSTOOLS 
Figure 16: Change in accessibility between 2005 and 2030 in the Reference scenario 
                                                 
338 Accessibility here is based on the concept of “potential accessibility”, which assumes that the attraction 
of a destination increases with size, and declines with distance, travel time or cost. More specifically, 
accessibility is defined as the generalised transport costs from zone i to zone j for segment r 
(commodity group or trip purpose) in year t, weighed with the traffic volumes. 
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2.2. Urbanisation and congestion  
40. There are around 5,000 towns with a population between 5,000 and 50,000 and 
almost 1,000 cities with a population above 50,000 in the EU. Economic, social and 
cultural activity is concentrated in these places339. Urbanisation has followed a clear 
trend in the past decades, which is expected to continue: the proportion of the EU 
population residing in urban areas is expected to increase from 74% in 2009 to about 
80% in 2030 and 85% in 2050340. 
41. Economic activity in the EU is far more concentrated than the population. In a 
knowledge-based economy, knowledge spillovers, which require proximity, become 
important. Services are also spatially concentrated because they tend to use less land 
per employee and because of external economies341. Services already represent about 
72% of the EU gross value added and their share is projected to increase in the 
Reference scenario to 76% by 2050. Therefore, proximity of people and activities as 
well as the shift towards a knowledge-based and services-oriented economy are 
major sources of advantages that will continue to drive urbanisation in the EU. 
42. Urban sprawl is the main challenge for urban transport, as it brings about a greater 
need for individual transport modes, thereby generating congestion, environmental 
problems and land take for roads and parking areas. After 2035, due to the projected 
decline in the European population, many cities may have to cope with the problems 
of low-density settlements342. 
43. Transport demand and modal choice differ widely between European cities, and 
depend to a large extent on urban design and infrastructure343 (i.e. the location of 
facilities necessary on a daily basis and their accessibility by different transport 
modes influences the travel patterns). However, other factors such as income, family 
size and structure, employment, speed, culture and behaviour also affect transport 
demand344. 
                                                 
339 European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy (2009), Promoting Sustainable Urban 
Development in Europe: Achievements and Opportunities, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/urban2009/urban2009_en.pdf. 
340 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division (2009), World 
urbanisation prospects - The 2009 revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm 
341 World Bank, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping economic geography. 
342 EEA, 2010. The European environment — state and outlook 2010: urban environment. European 
Environment Agency, Copenhagen. 
343 EEA, 2010. The European environment — state and outlook 2010: urban environment. European 
Environment Agency, Copenhagen. 
344 Clifton, K., Ewing, R., Knaap, G. and Song, Y., 2008. Quantitative analysis of urban form: a 
multidisciplinary review. Journal of Urbanism. Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2008. 
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Source: EEA (2010) based on Urban Audit database (Eurostat, 2010). 
Figure 17: Proportion of cycle trips to work in a selection of European cities, 2004 
44. At EU level, urban transport is responsible for about 23% of total CO2 emissions 
from transport345,346. About 70% of the CO2 emissions in urban transport come from 
passenger cars, followed by goods transport vehicles which provide another 27%. 
The Reference scenario shows diverging trends for passenger and freight CO2 
emissions at urban level: while the emissions from passenger transport decrease by 
about 22% by 2050, mainly due to the Regulation setting emission performance 
standards for new passenger cars347, CO2 emissions from road freight transport 
would increase by some 16%. Overall, urban transport CO2 emissions would shrink 
by about 9% by 2030 and another 3% between 2030 and 2050. 
45. An important share of EU’s urban population is exposed to air pollution 
concentration exceeding the EU air quality limits. Sensitive groups, including people 
with respiratory diseases or heart conditions and older adults suffer from air 
pollutants even at moderate concentrations. In many European urban studies air 
pollution, especially particulate matter and O3, has been associated with increases in 
morbidity and mortality. Transport is a main source of PM10 and NOx emissions 
(which contributes to ozone creation) together with industry, commercial and 
residential sources).348 In the Reference scenario, the NOx and particulate matter 
emissions attributed to urban transport would decrease by about 60% by 2030 and 
roughly stabilize afterwards. 
                                                 
345 Total CO2 emissions include international bunkers (aviation and maritime) but exclude combustion 
emissions from pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road 
activities. 
346 No statistics are available for the share of CO2 emissions from urban transport. The current estimates 
are based on the PRIMES transport model and TREMOVE results.  
347 Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting 
emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated approach 
to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 1–15. 
348 EEA, 2010. The European environment — state and outlook 2010: urban environment. European 
Environment Agency, Copenhagen. 
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Table 18: The 10 most polluted cities in 2008 for daily PM10, O3 concentrations and NO2 annual mean 
concentration in the urban area 
 
Source: EEA and AirBase, 2010 
46. About half of the citizens in the EU-15 are estimated to live in areas which do not 
ensure acoustical comfort for residents: 40% of the population is exposed to road 
traffic noise exceeding 55 dB(A) during daytime, and 20% to levels exceeding 65 
dB(A). At night, more than 30% are exposed to sound levels that disturb sleep (>55 
dB(A)). The WHO Night Noise Guidelines for Europe349 describe levels above 55 
dB Lnight as ‘increasingly dangerous to public health. However, for the primary 
prevention of sub-clinical adverse health effects related to night noise, the guidelines 
recommend that the population should not be exposed to night noise levels greater 
than 40 dB Lnight outside. This can thus be considered a health-based limit. The 
target of 55 dB Lnight outside is not a health-based limit, being equivalent to the 
lowest observed adverse effect level, and should be considered only as an interim 
target for situations where the achievement of the guidelines is not feasible in the 
short run. Existing studies show that noise exposure increases the risk for high blood 
pressure and heart attacks. Surveys also show that (environmental) noise is a relevant 
reason for people moving out of cities into the suburban area (e.g. for every third 
household moving out of Cologne, noise and air pollution in the city was a crucial 
reason)350. In the Reference scenario, increasing traffic volumes in absence of 
additional policies may exacerbate the existing problems351. 
47. Congestion that is prevalent in agglomerations and in their access routes is the source 
of large costs in terms of delays and higher fuel consumption. Denser cities are better 
served by collective modes of transport but the availability of land and public 
acceptability to construct new infrastructures for public or alternative means of 
transport remains a great challenge. Urban congestion also negatively impacts on 
inter-urban and cross-border travel because most freight and passenger transport 
starts or ends in urban areas. 
                                                 
349 http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/43316/E92845.pdf 
350 SILENCE project (Integrated Project co-funded by the European Commission under the 6th Framework 
Programme for R&D): SILENCE Practitioner Handbook for Local Noise Action Plans, 
2008,http://www.silence-ip.org/site/fileadmin/SP_J/E-
learning/Planners/SILENCE_Handbook_Local_noise_action_plans.pdf 
351 EEA, 2010. The European environment — state and outlook 2010: urban environment. European 
Environment Agency, Copenhagen. 
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48. High congestion levels are expected to seriously affect road transport in several 
Member States by 2030 in the absence of effective countervailing measures such as 
road pricing. While urban congestion will mainly depend on car ownership levels, 
urban sprawl and the availability of public transport alternatives, congestion on the 
inter-urban network will be the result of growing freight demand across specific 
corridors at their points of intersection with links serving local traffic.  
49. The largest part of congestion will be concentrated near densely populated zones 
with high economic activity such as Belgium and the Netherlands – to a certain 
extent as a result of port and transhipment operations – and in large parts of 
Germany, the United Kingdom and northern Italy. Congestion patterns differ 
significantly among Member States though, since their hourly, daily and seasonal 
variation depends on local conditions.  
50. Estimating the costs of congestion is not straightforward, because it occurs mostly 
during certain times of the day, often caused by specific bottlenecks in the network. 
In the Reference scenario, congestion costs are projected to increase by about 50% 
by 2050, to nearly € 200 billion annually. 
 
Source: TRANSTOOLS 
Figure 18: Congestion levels for inter-urban road traffic in 2030 
 EN 145   EN 
2.3. Environmental impacts and other externalities 
2.3.1. CO2 emissions 
51. Transport accounts for over 30% of final energy consumption and about one fourth 
of CO2 emissions352,353. In the Reference scenario, the final energy demand of 
transport is projected to increase by 5% by 2030 and an additional 1% by 2050, 
driven mainly by aviation and road freight transport. By contrast, the energy use of 
passenger cars would drop by 11% between 2005 and 2030 due to the 
implementation of the Regulation setting emission performance standards for new 
passenger cars354. 
52. CO2 emissions from transport are projected to be 1% below their 2005 level by 2030 
and roughly stabilise afterwards. This outcome is sustained by the implementation of 
the Regulation setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars, the 
penetration of biofuels in road transport and the further electrification of rail. 
Renewable energy sources would cover 10% of the energy needs of transport by 
2020, reflecting the implementation of the Renewables Directive355. Their share 
would gradually increase to 13% by 2050356. However, the pace of the electrification 
in the sector is projected to remain slow in the Reference scenario: electric 
propulsion in road transport would not make significant inroads by 2050357. 
                                                 
352 The CO2 emissions include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion emissions from 
pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road activities. 
353 There is also concern regarding aviation’s total climate impact which has been estimated by the IPCC as 
being two to four times higher than the effect of CO2 emissions alone due to releases of nitrogen 
oxides, water vapour, sulphate and soot particles (excluding cirrus cloud effects). 
354 Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting 
emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated approach 
to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 1–15. 
355 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 16–62. 
356 The share of renewables in transport reported here follows the definition from the Directive 
2009/28/EC.  
357 The Reference scenario does not cover the European Commission CARS 21 (Competitive Automotive 
Regulatory System for the 21st century) initiative. This initiative may trigger a higher uptake of electric 
propulsion vehicles by 2050 in the Reference scenario which is currently negligible. In addition, the 
Reference scenario was finalised in early 2010 and does not capture the recent initiatives of car 
manufacturers as regards electric vehicles. As a result, the penetration of EVs might be higher and 
transport sector oil dependency might be lower in the Reference scenario. 













Final energy consumption (Mtoe)

















CO2 emissions (Mt of CO2)
Transport Energy industries Industry Residential Tertiary  
Source: PRIMES and projections based on TRANSTOOLS for maritime 
Figure 19: Final energy consumption and CO2 emissions projections358 
53. The share of CO2 emissions from transport would continue increasing, to 38% of the 
total by 2030 and almost 50% by 2050. This is due to a relatively lower reduction of 
CO2 emissions from transport compared to other sectors such as power generation 
over the projection period. Overall, CO2 emissions from transport would still be 31% 
higher than their 1990 level by 2030 and 35% higher by 2050, owing to the fast rise 
in the transport emissions during the 1990s. Aviation and maritime transport would 
contribute an increasing share of emissions over time. 
54. The overall trend in transport emissions is determined by three broad components: 
transport activity levels, the energy intensity of transport and the carbon intensity of 
the energy used. Following this approach, it has been evaluated how much the 
projected transport emissions359 will increase/decrease (in percentage terms or Mt of 
CO2) between 2005 and 2050 due to transport activity growth, improvements in 
energy intensity and carbon intensity360,361. 
55. Overall, CO2 emissions from passenger transport decrease by 8% (60 Mt of CO2) 
between 2005 and 2050 in the Reference scenario. 
56. Transport activity growth results in a 47% (345 Mt of CO2) increase in passenger 
transport emissions, with demand for interurban and intercontinental transport being 
responsible for most of these additional emissions.  
                                                 
358 The CO2 emissions from transport include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion 
emissions from pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road 
activities.  
359 The CO2 emissions from transport include international maritime and aviation but exclude combustion 
emissions from pipeline transportation, ground activities in airports and harbours, and off-road 
activities. 
360 The proposed method is the Montgomery decomposition. For a recent application of the method see: De 
Boer, P.M.C. (2008) Additive Structural Decomposition Analysis and Index Number Theory: An 
Empirical Application of the Montgomery Decomposition, Economic Systems Research, 20(1), pp. 97-
109. 
361 The decomposition analysis only takes into account the tank-to-wheel emissions, under the assumption 
that biofuels are carbon neutral. 
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57. Improved energy intensity reduces passenger transport emissions by 46% (342 Mt of 
CO2), compensating the expansion of emissions due to transport activity growth. 
Efficiency improvements are triggered by the implementation of the Regulation 
setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars and by efficiency 
gains in aviation. For rail passenger transport, efficiency gains play a limited role due 
to the uptake of high-speed rail on larger scale.  
58. The improvement in carbon intensity through the use of less GHG_intensive fuels 
has a more limited impact on passenger transport emissions, with CO2 emissions 
decreasing by 9% on a tank-to-wheel basis (63 Mt of CO2) between 2005 and 2050. 
The penetration of renewables in road transport (mostly biofuels) contributes to a 
large extent to the carbon intensity gains on a tank-to-wheel basis, followed by rail 
transport electrification. However, the GHG emissions for the production of biofuels 
are not included in this analysis. 
59. Summing up, the 8% decrease in CO2 emissions from passenger transport is due to 
transport activity growth (+47%), improvements in energy intensity (-46%) and in 
carbon intensity (-9%). The trend for the three components and their contribution to 
emissions is different in the various transport modes. Efficiency gains play a decisive 
role in reducing emissions in road transport, while in aviation they would not offset 
the activity growth leading to higher fuel use and emissions. The use of less GHG 
intensive fuels contributes to a reduction of emissions for road and rail passenger 
transport with no effect on aviation in the Reference scenario. 
60. For freight transport, the 18% (88 Mt of CO2) increase in CO2 emissions between 
2005 and 2050 is the result of transport activity growth (+55%, equivalent to 269 Mt 
of CO2), improvements in energy intensity (-28%, equivalent to 136 Mt of CO2) and 
in carbon intensity (-9%, equivalent to 45 Mt of CO2).  
61. The trends in projected emissions of different freight transport modes are also 
diverging. On one hand, the efficiency gains and the uptake of alternative fuels for 
road transport and the efficiency gains in maritime transport are not sufficient to 
offset the effects of activity growth, resulting in growing emissions. In the Reference 
scenario the pace in the electrification of the transport sector is slow: electric 
propulsion vehicles do not make significant inroads by 2050. On the other hand, the 
electrification in rail has positive effects on emissions, despite the growth in traffic 
volumes.  
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Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Note: The figures report the changes in CO2 emissions due to the three broad components (transport activity levels, energy intensity of 
transport and carbon intensity of the energy used) in two ways: in levels and in relative terms compared to 2005. The size of each column 
bar, read on the left axis, represents the change in terms of CO2 emissions compared to 2005, expressed in Mt of CO2. The percentage 
changes reported above the column bars represent relative changes in these emissions compared to their respective 2005 levels. Provided that 
CO2 levels for 2005 corresponding to each transport mode are not comparable in size, the percentage changes reported in the figures are not 
directly comparable. The figures above include only tank-to-wheel emissions.  
Figure 20: Decomposition of CO2 emissions in the Reference scenario (2005-2050) 
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2.3.2. Air pollution and other externalities 
62. Emissions of air pollutants result in risks to human health and the natural 
environment. For example, exposure to particulate matter is linked with respiratory 
problems such as asthma, impaired lung development and lower lung function in 
children, acute and chronic cardiovascular effects, reduced birth weight and 
premature death362,363, while emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) contribute to 
acidification and eutrophication of ecosystems as well as to the formation of ground 
level ozone. There have also been numerous articles showing the linkages between 
air pollutants and climate change and how short-term climate change mitigation can 
be achieved by tackling some of the most potent air pollutants: ground level ozone 
(including methane as an important precursor) and particulate matter (including 
“black carbon”) are particularly relevant. 
63. Air quality standards and targets exist in the EU for a range of pollutants, with the 
aim of protecting human health. However, the limits and targets for particulate 
matter (РМ10), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and ozone (O3) are or are expected to be 
widely exceeded. In 2008, 296 (out of 821) zones in 21 Member States did not 
comply with daily limits for particulate matter (РМ10) and most of the Member States 
have made use of the possibility to notify a time extension for compliance, as 
provided in the Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality364. A similar situation is 
expected to emerge for NO2, where 188 (out of 822) zones have reported 
exceedances of the legally binding annual limit value laid down in that Directive. 
64. About 12 Member States are also expected to exceed their limit under Directive 
2001/81/EC on national emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants, which 
applies from 2010365, some by as much as 50%366.  
65. Road transport contributes significantly to the difficulties many Member States have 
in attaining their NOx ceilings, through higher than anticipated emissions. Around 
40% of total NOx emissions in EU-27 come from road transport, and their reduction 
has not met the original expectations although overall emissions have decreased 
compared to 1990. The main reasons were the higher than expected growth in road 
transport activity and the fact that those vehicle emission standards have not always 
delivered the foreseen level of NOx reductions (i.e. higher real world emissions than 
the limits in the type approval)367. In the Reference scenario, the implementation of 
the current vehicle emission standards (up until Euro VI) is expected to lead to a 
                                                 
362 WHO, 2005. Air Quality Guideline. Global update 2005. World Health Organisation Regional Office 
for Europe. 
363 WHO, 2007. Health relevance of particulate matter from various sources. Report on a WHO Workshop 
Bonn, Germany, 26–27 March 2007. World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 
364 Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air 
quality and cleaner air for Europe, OJ L 152, 11.6.2008, p. 1–44. 
365 Directive 2001/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2001 on national 
emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants, OJ L 309, 27.11.2001, p. 22–30. 
366 EEA, 2010. The European environment — state and outlook 2010: air pollution. European Environment 
Agency, Copenhagen. 
367 EEA, 2010. NEC Directive status report 2009: Reporting by the Member States under Directive 
2001/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2001 on national emission 
ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants, No 10/2010. 
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further decline in the emissions of air pollutants by 2030, and a stabilisation 
afterwards assuming a full fleet renewal. However, the expected magnitude of the 
decline may be reduced by higher real world emissions and slower turn-over rates of 
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Source: PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Figure 21: Evolution nitrogen oxides and particulate matter and external costs in the Reference scenario 
66. Transport infrastructure, along with energy infrastructure, and land use changes such 
as uptake by urban sprawl and agricultural intensification contributes to the 
fragmentation of ecosystems. The EU is the most fragmented continent in the world: 
nearly 30% of land in the EU is moderately, highly or very highly fragmented. This 
has a significant impact on habitats and ecosystems. If ecosystems become too small 
or isolated, they might not deliver their services to people anymore, such as water 
and air purification and flood water retention, climate change adaptation and 
mitigation, nutrient cycling, tourist values etc.368 This depletion of ecosystems is 
exacerbated by climate change impacts. Fragmentation and land consumption by 
transport infrastructure also leads to the loss of significant areas of fertile soil and 
useful agricultural land due to soil sealing. 
                                                 
368 More in TEEB (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity): http://www.teebweb.org/ and 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/economics/index_en.htm 
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Figure 22: Fragmentation as percentage of total EU terrestrial area shows that nearly 30 % of EU land is 
moderately-high to very high, mostly due to urban sprawl and infrastructure development369 
67. In the Reference scenario external costs of transport will continue increasing. The 
increase in traffic would lead to a roughly 20 bn € increase of noise-related external 
costs by 2050 and external cost of accidents would be about 60 bn € higher370. The 
external cost of accidents associated with urban transport would increase by some 
40%. Only the external costs related to air pollutants would decrease by 60% by 
2050 assuming a full implementation of current EURO standards. 
2.4. Global trends affecting the European transport sector 
68. Global GDP is projected to increase more than threefold between 2006 and 2050371. 
Faster economic growth can be expected in industrialising and developing countries 
than in the developed economies. This higher growth will lead to an increased 
importance in world trade of emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil. 
The tangible result will be a change in trade flows and volumes. 
69. A doubling of global traffic is projected for both motorised passenger travel and for 
surface freight transport by 2050, mainly driven by the developing economies. 
International shipping activity would follow a similar trend372. 
70. Global maritime transport will be influenced by the increasing size of vessels, by the 
expansion of the Panama Canal (completion foreseen in 2014) and by the 
development of new transhipment hubs, e.g. in North Africa. Projections for aviation 
show an increase by a factor of four for passenger and freight transport between 2005 
and 2050373. While the biggest growth in both air and maritime traffic will occur 
                                                 
369 http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eu-2010-biodiversity-baseline/eu-2010-biodiversity-baseline 
370 The costs are expressed in year 2005-€. 
371 See e.g. PWC (2008), The world in 2050. 
 http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/world_in_2050_carbon_emissions_08_2.pdf 
372 International Energy Agency 2010, Energy Technology Perspectives: 2010. Please note that the IEA 
MoMo model currently does not enable a projection for shipping and air cargo transport. Therefore, 
international shipping activity in the Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 is based on growth 
projections from the International Maritime Organisation. 
373 International Energy Agency, Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, 2009. 
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outside Europe, the EU’s main gateways for international traffic – airports and ports 
– will be seriously affected, and increasingly short of capacity. Traffic on the 
hinterland connections to these entry points will also be affected, leading to possible 
additional congestion and pollution. In addition, the possible melting of the Arctic 
permafrost during the summer may temporarily open up new routes and possibilities. 
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Appendix 4: Inventory of policy measures relevant for the transport sector included in the 2050 Reference scenario  
 Measures  How the measure is reflected in PRIMES and TRANSTOOLS 
1 Biofuels directive Directive 2003/30/EC  Support to biofuels is reflected in the model  
2 RES directive Directive 2009/28/EC 10% target for RES in transport is achieved for EU27; sustainability criteria for biomass 
and biofuels are respected 
3 GHG Effort Sharing Decision Decision 406/2009/EC National targets for non-ETS sectors are achieved in 2020, taking full account of the 
flexibility provisions such as transfers between Member States. After 2020, stability of the 
provided policy impulse but no strengthening of targets is assumed. 
4 EU ETS directive Directive 2009/29/EC Inclusion of aviation in EU ETS starting with 2012  
5 Fuel Quality Directive Directive 2009/30/EC 
 
Modelling parameters reflect the Directive, taking into account the uncertainty related to 
the scope of the Directive addressing also parts of the energy chain outside the area of 
PRIMES modelling (e.g. oil production outside EU). 
6 Energy Taxation Directive Directive 2003/96/EC Tax rates (EU minimal rates or higher national ones) are kept constant in real term. The 
modelling reflects the practice of Member States to increase tax rates above the minimum 
rate due to i.a. inflation. 
7  Regulation on CO2 from cars  Regulation No 443/2009 Limits on emissions from new cars: 135 gCO2/km in 2015, 115 in 2020, 95 in 2025 – in 
test cycle 
8 Regulation on CO2 from vans374 Part of the Integrated 
Approach to reduce CO2 
emissions from cars and 
light commercial vehicles. 
Limits on emissions from new LDV: 181 gCO2/km in 2012, 175 in 2016, 135 in 2025 – in 
test cycle 
                                                 
374 On 28 October 2009 the European Commission adopted a new legislative proposal to reduce CO2 emissions from light commercial vehicles (vans). The draft legislation is 
closely modelled on the legislation on the CO2 emissions from passenger cars (Regulation 443/2009) and it is part of the Integrated Approach taken by the Commission in 
its revised strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from cars and light commercial vehicles (COM(2007) 19 final).  
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9 Labelling regulation for tyres Regulation No 1222/2009 Decrease of perceived costs by consumers for labelling (which reflects transparency and 
the effectiveness of price signals for consumer decisions) 
10 Regulation EURO 5 and 6 Regulation No 715/2007 Emissions limits introduced for new cars and light commercial vehicles 
11 Regulation Euro VI for heavy duty 
vehicles  
Regulation No 595/2009 Emissions limits introduced for new heavy duty vehicles 
12 Directive on national emissions’ 
ceilings for certain pollutants 
Directive 2001/81/EC Checked with RAINS/GAINS modelling regarding classical pollutants (SO2, NOx) 
13 Implementation of MARPOL 
Convention ANNEX VI  
2008 amendments - 
revised Annex VI 
Amendment of Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention reduce sulphur content in marine 
fuels which is reflected in the model by a change in refineries output  
 Additional measures 
implemented in TRANSTOOLS 
 How the measure is reflected in TRANSTOOLS 
14 Eurovignette Directive on road 
infrastructure charging 
Directive 2006/38/EC No additional link based charges. Assumed current level of internalisation through fuel 
taxes and existing infrastructure charges (tolls or vignettes) where applicable 
15 TEN-T guidelines Decision 884/2004/EC Priority projects introduced in TRANSTOOLS network according to expected completion 
date 
16 Directive on the Promotion of 
Clean and Energy Efficient Road 
Transport Vehicles 
Directive 2009/33/EC Emission factors, impact on costs per km 
17 Emission standards for diesel trains 
(UIC Stage IIIA) 
 Emission factors, impact on costs per km 
18 ICAO Chapters 3 (emissions)  NOx and CO emission standards for airplanes built after 2007. Updated emission factors 
from EXTREMIS database (http://www.ex-tremis.eu) applied on TRANSTOOLS demand 
projections 
19 Single European Sky II COM(2008) 389 final Decrease in fuel consumption, emissions and ticket prices 
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20 Directive on inland transport of 
dangerous goods 
Directive 2008/68/EC No significant impact 
21 Third railway package Directive 2007/58/EC Assumed discount on user prices and decrease in rail passenger costs after 2010 
22 Port state control Directive  Directive 2009/16/EC Decrease in transhipment costs 
23 Regulation on common rules for 
access to the international road 
haulage market 
Regulation No 1072/2009 More efficient international road freight transport (reduced empty returns) reflected 
through a decrease in international transport costs  
24 Directive concerning social 
legislation relating to road 
transport activities 
Directive 2009/5/EC Exclusion of self-employed drivers from the working time directive, simplification of the 
tachograph rules, use of targeted electronic controls; reflected through a decrease in inter-
urban road transport  
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Appendix 5: Short description of the models used in the Impact Assessment 
GEM-E3 
1. The GEM-E3 (World and Europe) model is an applied general equilibrium model, 
simultaneously representing World regions and European countries, linked through 
endogenous bilateral trade flows and environmental flows. The European model is 
including the EU countries, the Accession Countries and Switzerland. The world 
model version includes 18 regions among which a grouping of European Union 
states. GEM-E3 aims at covering the interactions between the economy, the energy 
system and the environment. It is a comprehensive model of the economy, the 
productive sectors, consumption, price formation of commodities, labour and capital, 
investment and dynamic growth. The model is dynamic, recursive over time, driven 
by accumulation of capital and equipment. Technology progress is explicitly 
represented in the production function, either exogenous or endogenous, depending 
on R&D expenditure by private and public sector and taking into account spillovers 
effects. The current GEM-E3 version has been updated to the GTAP7 database (base 
year 2004). 
TRANSTOOLS model 
2. TRANSTOOLS is a European Transport Network model covering all modes of 
transport for passenger and freight. The model is used to assess the level of 
congestion and of accessibility and the impact of (the pricing of) transport 
infrastructure. TRANSTOOLS estimates transport costs generated by policy 
measures and simulates impacts on demand for transport services by mode, on 
network links and corridors, for origin-destination pairs, commodity type, on 
emissions and other externalities, regional GDP and welfare. 
3. TRANSTOOLS estimates transport demand for each NUTS 3 zone and distributes it 
on the networks of the various modes available. The main steps of the approach 
include the estimation of: the trip generation, the trip distribution, the mode choice 
and the route assignment. 
4. The trip generation represents the transport demand that each zone generates or 
attracts and depends on the socio-economic characteristics of each zone, as well as 
on the economic and industrial structure. The trip distribution reflects the demand for 
transport between each pair of zones in the system and depends on trade and travel 
patterns, as well as on the availability and costs of transport between the zones. The 
mode choice provides the part of the demand for each pair of zones that will use each 
available mode and depends on the relative costs, speed and capacities of the various 
alternatives. The route assignment gives within each mode, the links of the network 
where transport demand will be distributed and depends on costs, speed and 
capacities of the available route options. 
TREMOVE model  
5. TREMOVE is a policy assessment model for the emissions and environmental 
impact of transport. The model is used to estimate the effects of various policy 
measures on transport demand, the resulting modal shifts, the vehicle stock renewal, 
the emissions of air pollutants and the effects on welfare. The model can be applied 
for the analysis of different policies such as road pricing, public transport pricing, 
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emission standards, subsidies for cleaner cars, etc. TREMOVE models both 
passenger and freight transport. 
6. The model consists of 31 parallel country models, each of them consisting of three 
inter-linked modules: a transport demand module, a vehicle turnover module and an 
emission and fuel consumption module. The transport demand module describes 
transport flows and the users’ decision-making process in terms of modal choice. The 
vehicle stock turnover module describes how changes in demand for transport or 
changes in vehicle price structure influence the share in the stock by age and vehicle 
type. The fuel consumption and emissions module calculates fuel consumption and 
emissions (greenhouse gas and air pollutants emissions), based on the structure of the 
vehicle stock, the number of km driven by each vehicle type, and the driving 
conditions using the COPERT methodology. In addition to the three core modules, 
the TREMOVE model includes a well-to-tank emissions and a welfare cost module. 
The well-to-tank emissions module calculates the emissions during the production of 
fuels and electricity. The time horizon of the model is 2030. 
PRIMES model375  
7. PRIMES simulates the response of energy consumers and the energy supply systems 
to different pathways of economic development and exogenous constraints. It is a 
modelling system that simulates a market equilibrium solution in the European 
Union and its member states. The model determines the equilibrium by finding the 
prices of each energy form such that the quantity producers find best to supply match 
the quantity consumers wish to use. The equilibrium is static (within each time 
period) but repeated in a time-forward path, under dynamic relationships. The model 
is behavioural but also represent in an explicit and detailed way the available energy 
demand and supply technologies and pollution abatement technologies. The system 
reflects considerations about market economics, industry structure, energy 
/environmental policies and regulation. These are conceived so as to influence 
market behaviour of energy system agents. The modular structure of PRIMES 
reflects a distribution of decision making among agents that decide individually 
about their supply, demand, combined supply and demand, and prices. The market 
integrating part of PRIMES then simulates market clearing. 
PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model376 
8. The PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model projects the evolution of demand for 
passengers and freight transport by transport mode and transport mean, based on 
economic, utility and technology choices of transportation consumers. Operation 
costs, investment costs, emission costs, taxes and other public policies, utility and 
congestion influence the choice of transportation modes and means. The model 
further projects the derived fuel consumption and emissions of pollutants. 
9. It is essentially a dynamic system of multi-agent choices under several constraints, 
which are not necessarily binding simultaneously. Various policies and energy and 
environment related topics may be studied including: 
                                                 
375 The model has been developed by the Energy-Economy-Environment modelling laboratory of National 
Technical University of Athens. 
376 Ibid Footnote 381. 
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• Pricing policies, e.g. charges, subsidies and taxes 
• Technology diffusion 
• Development of new transport fuels (e.g. bio-fuels, hydrogen etc) 
• Climate change policies (e.g. carbon tax, ETS) 
10. The model can either be used as a stand-alone model or may be coupled with the rest 
of the PRIMES energy systems model. Linkage with PRIMES core model and the 
biomass supply model allow for consistency in scenario building and well to wheel 
analysis. The model covers EU27 by Member State with a 2050 time horizon. 
Model structure 
11. The model consists of two main modules, the transport demand allocation module 
and the technology choice and equipment operation module. The two modules 
interact with each other and are solved simultaneously.  
12. The transport demand module simulates decisions regarding allocation of transport 
activity to the various modes, identifying transport service by mode of transport for 
both individuals and firms. The decision process is simulated as a utility 
maximisation problem in the case of the individual private passenger and as a cost 
minimisation problem in the case of firms. 
13. The technology choice module determines the vehicle technologies (generally the 
transportation means) that will be used in order to satisfy each modal transport 
demand. It also enables the computation of energy consumption and emissions of 
pollutants from the use of the transportation means. The choice of technology is 
generally the result of a discrete choice problem in which consideration of both cost 
and utility is taken into account. 
 
 EN 159   EN 
14. Both modules are dynamic over time, simulate capital turnover with possibility of 
premature replacement of equipment and keep track of equipment technology 
vintages. 
15. The simulation of the transport market is formulated as a simplified Equilibrium 
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) transformed into a single Mixed 
Complementarity Problem (MCP). The transport demand module and the technology 
choice module are solved simultaneously in one single mathematical model, using 
the MCP algorithm PATH. As the model is a single complementarity problem, it can 
handle overall constraints, for example to reflect environmental restrictions, the dual 
variable of which influence the endogenous choices of individuals and firms 
simulated by the model. 
The transport demand module 
16. The transport demand module simulates the decision process of the representative 
agent regarding the choice of transport activity. There is a distinction between private 
passenger transport and transport related to direct economic activity, such as 
transportation of commercial products and business trips. This distinction is triggered 
by the differences in the decision process between the individual passenger deciding 
on his/her own way of transport and the decision of a firm regarding budget 
allocation on logistics expenditures.  
17. In passenger transport the representative individual, i.e. the passenger, is seeking to 
maximise a general utility function subject to a budget constraint that represents the 
total income. The cardinal expression of the individual’s utility is assumed to be 
determined by modal transport cost, a individual’s income and expenditure 
characteristics as well as historical behavioural features. The decision process of the 
private passenger is represented by a nested utility CES function377. 
                                                 
377 PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model uses mathematical formulations which are not based on single 
price elasticity, as reduced-form models do. Price elasticities are quantified ex-post based on the results 
of the whole model, and their ex-post value changes with the policy and technology assumptions that 
are included in each scenario. In other words the modeling approach is based on variable (not fixed) 
price elasticities. 
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Figure 23: Private passenger primary decision tree 
 
 
Figure 24: Private passenger secondary decision tree on urban transport 
 
 
Figure 25: Private passenger secondary decision tree on non-urban transport 
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18. Initially the individual is deciding between the modal transport choices, i.e. whether 
to make a trip or not, the geographical and temporal identification of the trip etc. 
Each branch of the initial decision tree is further subdivided into several branches 
representing various modal choices. Two general decision processes of this type are 
identified depending on the geographical identity of the initial modal choice, namely 
urban and non-urban decision trees. The result of this secondary decision process is a 
more detailed modal identification of the agent’s decision up to the level of the 
choice of general vehicle (mean) category.  
19. In a similar way the representative firm seeks to minimise total cost of satisfying its 
transport needs either regarding transportation of goods or business trips. The overall 
decision process of the firm is modelled as a nested CES cost function. The 
secondary decision process regarding the modal choice of business trips is similar to 
the decision process of the private passenger therefore they are not shown separately. 
As regards freight transport a representative secondary decision process is 
represented including all relevant modes of freight transportation. 
 
Figure 26: Firm’s primary decision tree 
 
Figure 27: Firm’s secondary decision tree on non-urban freight transport 
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Figure 28: Firm’s secondary decision tree on urban freight transport 
Generalised Price of Transportation 
20. The decision of the each individual or firm depends on preference characteristics, 
described by the elasticities of the CES functions, as well as on the endogenously 
defined “generalised price of transportation”, which differs among the various modes 
of transportation.  
21. In the case of private transportation, (i.e. personal cars and motorcycles for 
individual passenger and business trips as well as road vehicles for freight transport) 
the generalised price of transportation corresponds to total perceived costs of 
satisfying transportation demand at the level of each transport mode. These costs 
depend on actual cost of transportation as well as on the cost of time (travel time and 
congestion). Actual transport cost consists of: 
• the capital cost of the vehicles 
• fixed cost that include annual maintenance, insurance, registration, etc. 
• cost of fuel 
• taxes and subsidies 
22. Given that the endogenously defined vehicle stock satisfies the relevant modal 
transport demand (i.e. private cars satisfy all geographical and temporal modes of 
road transport) based on fixed annual utilisation indices, the aforementioned costs 
refer to the effective vehicle technology mix that serves each transport mode, which 
is endogenously determined by the model.  
23. In the case of public transport (both for private passengers and for firms) the 
generalised price of transportation currently represents the sum of the average 
operational cost of the representative public transportation supplying firm and the 
cost of time. Average cost pricing of public transportation services is chosen because 
of the increasing returns to scale prevailing in this sector and because often public 
transportation forms incur budget deficits. Average operational costs include the cost 
of the purchase and maintenance of the transport vehicle fleet, fuel cost, labour, 
taxation etc. Public transportation ticket prices are determined by using a Ramsey-
Boiteux formulation which defines ticket prices by consumer type so as to recover 
total cost of the transportation service. 
24. The technology choice model uses data reflecting the technical-economic 
characteristics of various vehicle technology and transportation means. The 
technology mix is endogenous to the model; hence the generalised price of 
transportation results from an interaction between the demand and the technology 
choice modules. 
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25. Cost of time represents the value of travel time which differs between the individual 
passenger and the firm, and depends on temporally and geographically differences 
between transport modes. Travelling time for non-road transport is exogenously 
defined taking into account average mileage and speed. In the case of road transport 
a congestion function is used in order to calculate travelling time. 
The technology choice module 
26. The technology choice model defines the structure of the vehicle fleet that is 
optimum to deliver the transportation service as demanded for by the transport 
demand module. The technology mix and its operation is determined and so the 
model computes actual transport costs, energy consumption and pollutant emissions. 
The technology choice model is very detailed for road and rail transport, and less 
detailed for inland navigation and air transport. 
Road transport 
27. For road transport the actual vehicle stock is split into several vehicle types, and 
categories including passenger cars, motorcycles and mopeds, busses and coaches, 
light and heavy duty trucks. Different vehicle technologies and vintages depending 
on consumption, fuel type and emission standards are identified.  
28. In general, the choice of new vehicles is simulated using a nested logit utility 
function. The optimal share of each vehicle type for new registration depends on 
total lifetime cost of vehicle, vehicles characteristics (e.g. acceleration, safety, speed, 
luxury etc.), preferences indicators and expected operation costs. Turnover of vehicle 
fleet is represented as a detailed vintage model with premature scrapping. The model 
takes into account existing fleet structure and exogenously defined scrapping rates of 
vehicles based on calibrated Weibull distributions, expressing the probability that a 
vehicle of certain type is still in service at a certain point in time.  
29. The choice about whether to satisfy activity with existing or with new vehicles is not 
exogenously predetermined but is endogenous depending on relative costs and 
utilities.  
Rail transport 
30. A similar discrete choice methodology is formulated for determining the structure of 
the train fleet, which distinguishes between metro, tram, urban and non-urban trains. 
Choice of new types of rail transport is simulated through a logistic share function 
that depends mainly on total operational costs, taken into account capital costs, fuel 
consumption, emissions, etc. The pre-existing rail infrastructure is taken into account 
through an aggregate indicator and influences the degree of renewal of the train fleet. 
Energy consumption and emissions 
31. Consumption of transport fuels is endogenously determined by the model and is 
subject to environmental policy constraints.  
32. For road transport, fuel consumption and emissions of non-CO2 pollutants are 
calculated by using the COPERT methodology. The computation covers a wide 
range of pollutants including NOx, CO, PM, CH4, Non-Methane VOCs, N2O, NH3, 
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PAHs (Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons), POPs (Persistent Organic Pollutants), 
Dioxins, Furans and heavy metals. 
33. The COPERT methodology enables calculation of fuel consumption of road vehicles 
as a function of their speed, which is determined as function of the endogenously 
determined travelling time and the average mileage of trips per type of road transport 
mode. The complete COPERT methodology has been integrated into the model 
providing a strong analytical tool for the calculation of the consumption of various 
fuels and consequent calculations of costs. For the technology choices not included 
in COPERT other data sources have been used such as results of the SAPIENTIA 
project.  
34. For non road transport modes, i.e. rail, inland navigation and air transport, average 
mileage and specific fuel consumption factors are used for calculating fuel 
consumption and CO2 emissions. 
Source of Data 
35. Historical data on vehicle stock for road and rail transport are taken from the 
TREMOVE database. Vehicle stock data for road transport have been updated in the 
framework of the FLEETS program. Data on vehicle costs, occupancy factors and 
average mileages are taken from the TREMOVE and SAPIENTIA databases. All 
other statistics are taken from EUROSTAT and DG MOVE publications.  
Table 19: Classifications in the PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model (road and rail) 
Vehicle Category Vehicle Type Vehicle Technology 
Gasoline Pre ECE, ECE, Conventional, Euro I-V 
Pure Bio-ethanol Pure Bio-ethanol technology 
Hybrid Gasoline Euro III-IV 
Plug-in hybrid Gasoline Plug-in hybrid technology 
Diesel Pre ECE, ECE, Conventional, Euro I-V 
Pure Bio-diesel Pure Bio-diesel technology 
Hybrid Diesel Euro III-IV 
Plug-in hybrid Diesel Plug-in hybrid technology 
LPG Conventional, Euro I-V 
CNG CNG thermal, CNG fuel cell 
Small cars (<1.4 l) 
Hydrogen Hydrogen thermal, Hydrogen fuel cell 
Gasoline Pre ECE, ECE, Conventional, Euro I-V 
Pure Bio-ethanol Pure Bio-ethanol technology 
Hybrid Gasoline Euro III-IV 
Plug-in hybrid Gasoline Plug-in hybrid technology 
Diesel Pre ECE, ECE, Conventional, Euro I-V 
Pure Bio-diesel Pure Bio-diesel technology 
Hybrid Diesel Euro III-IV 
Plug-in hybrid Diesel Plug-in hybrid technology 
Medium Cars (1.4 - 2.0 l) 
LPG Conventional, Euro I-V 
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Vehicle Category Vehicle Type Vehicle Technology 
CNG CNG thermal, CNG fuel cell 
Hydrogen Hydrogen thermal, Hydrogen fuel cell 
Gasoline Pre ECE, ECE, Conventional, Euro I-V 
Pure Bio-ethanol Pure Bio-ethanol technology 
Hybrid Gasoline Euro III-IV 
Plug-in hybrid Gasoline Plug-in hybrid technology 
Diesel Pre ECE, ECE, Conventional, Euro I-V 
Pure Bio-diesel Pure Bio-diesel technology 
Hybrid Diesel Euro III-IV 
Plug-in hybrid Diesel Plug-in hybrid technology 
LPG Conventional, Euro I-V 
CNG CNG thermal, CNG fuel cell 
Big Cars (>2.0 l) 
Hydrogen Hydrogen thermal, Hydrogen fuel cell 
Capacity <50cc 
Capacity 50-250 cc 
Capacity 250-750 cc 
Motorcycles 
Capacity 750cc 
Conventional, Euro I-V 
Mopeds Moped Conventional Conventional, Euro I-III 
Gasoline Conventional, Euro I-V 
Diesel Conventional, Euro I-V 
CNG CNG thermal, CNG fuel cell 
Light Duty Vehicles  
(<3.5 ton) 
Hydrogen Hydrogen thermal, Hydrogen fuel cell 
Capacity 3.5-7.5 ton 
Capacity 7.5-16 ton  
Capacity 16-32 ton 
Heavy Duty Trucks  
(> 3.5 ton) 
Capacity >32 ton 
Conventional, Euro I-V 
Diesel Conventional, Euro I-V 
CNG CNG thermal 
Busses-Coaches 
Hydrogen Hydrogen thermal 
Metro Metro Type Metro Technology 
Tram Tram Type Tram Technology 
Locomotive diesel Locomotive 
Locomotive electric 
Railcar diesel Railcar 
Railcar electric 
Passenger Train 
High speed train type High speed train technology 
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Table 20: Energy carriers in PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model 
Energy Carriers for Transport 
Gasoline Diesel LPG 
CNG Bio-ethanol Bio-diesel (RME, Fischer Tropsch,etc) 
Bio-methanol Hydrogen Electricity 
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Appendix 6: Detailed analysis of the lack of efficiency of today’s EU mobility system 
1. The achievement of a single, interconnected and efficient transport system has been 
delayed by a number of remaining regulatory and market failures which hamper the 
competitiveness of multimodal transport. 
Market access is still restricted 
2. Transport infrastructure has been historically designed to serve national rather than 
European goals and cross-border links constitute bottlenecks that are likely to 
become increasingly costly as the EU economy continues integrating. Cross-border 
transport is additionally hindered by protectionist regulations, which refuse or restrict 
access to national markets by foreign operators. 
3. Some transport market segments are not yet fully and de facto liberalised. This is the 
case for instance for the port services market (such as technical-nautical or cargo 
handling) which typically remain in the hands of local monopolies and for the rail 
domestic passenger transport, the access to which is restricted to national operators in 
most Member States and in practice to incumbent companies. In road transport, 
access to the national markets of Member States by hauliers established in another 
Member State (‘cabotage’) may only be carried out “on a temporary basis”. 
4. In markets which have already been opened up to competition by EU legislation, 
inherited national regulations and market structure create obstacles to the entrance of 
new players.  
5. In some liberalised market segments, a complete and correct implementation and 
enforcement of EU legislation by Member States is still missing. This is particularly 
the case for rail freight transport, which has been open to competition since January 
2007. The principal problematic issues in rail stem from the relations between 
infrastructure managers and operators, which in many cases are still not fully 
independent, and the effectiveness of the regulatory oversight of market functioning. 
For instance, new rail freight operators often face discrimination in access to 
infrastructure or rail related services, due to the historic integration of the providers 
of such services and infrastructure managers with incumbent operators. 
6. Market functioning is also hampered by a number of regulatory barriers, which have 
a protectionist effect. For example, relevant national rail authorities are reported to 
be reluctant to accept rolling stock certificates issued by other Member States, with 
the effect of hindering the free flow of trains across Europe and increasing red tape 
linked to the certification process. Market integration both within and between 
transport modes is still far from being achieved. Intermodal infrastructure – 
multimodal transhipment platforms for freight and integrated rail-air-public transport 
nodes for passengers – is not sufficiently developed. Exchanging data between the 
modes is difficult because of the co-existence of non-compatible modal IT systems. 
7. As a result, the EU transport system fails to exploit the full network benefits and 
economies of scale that a completed continent-wide transport grid would offer. At 
the same time, national transport markets are hindered in their optimisation by the 
often state-led protection of inefficient incumbent monopolies against the 
competition from new market entrants. The functioning of the transport system is 
suboptimal in the routing (due to missing infrastructure links), modal choices 
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(because of the barriers to multimodality) and organisational efficiency (as 
inefficient incumbent operators – notably in rail transport – are protected from 
international and national competition). 
8. Besides, the lack of universally approved standards on traffic management and data 
exchange systems, vehicle weights and dimensions, power supplies and educational 
requirements for transport workers are further obstacles to cross-border traffic. For 
example in the rail sector, the most striking evidence of such barriers is different 
track gauges, electricity supply and signalling systems. The deployment of ERTMS, 
the European signalling system, is progressing slowly; so far, only discontinued 
sections of lines are equipped, and locomotives still need to be additionally equipped 
with national systems. Also, the length and weight of trains is not harmonised across 
Europe whereas the weights and dimensions of road vehicles could be optimised, 
reflecting the progress in ITS and infrastructure design and considering opportunities 
for reducing GHG emissions of heavy duty vehicles. 
9. All these regulatory and technical barriers contribute to higher than necessary 
transport costs, in particular in rail which is considered a relatively environmentally 
friendly land transport mode, particularly when transporting passengers on high-
occupancy lines, or bulk goods. 
Efficient cross-border network not yet completed 
10. The EU transport network is fragmented, with a general lack of efficient and 
effective intermodal terminals, different service levels across modes, a lack of 
standards, particularly for rail freight transport and missing infrastructure links, 
especially across borders.  
11. The missing links in the European transport network and its inefficient functioning 
can be attributed firstly to the lack of coordination of policies and investment 
decisions between Member States and to the absence of a comprehensive funding 
strategy with sufficient leverage and conditionality to provide support for the 
completion of the TEN-T core network as well as other infrastructure programmes. 
12. As indicated in the Monti report dated 9 April 2010, there is a need for a clear and 
transparent legal framework in the field of State aid as regards infrastructure 
investment and financing. 
The supply of transport services is not sufficiently quality-driven 
13. Whereas quality services for passengers and businesses have been promoted over the 
years, a number of market and regulatory failures prevent transport services to be 
consistently of high quality, hampering thereby the efficiency of the transport 
system. It is therefore no surprise that the Consumer Markets Scoreboard of October 
2010, identified railways as one of the top four services markets where consumers 
experienced most problems378. 
                                                 
378 The others were internet access, real estate services and investments, pensions and securities. 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/4th_edition_scoreboard_en.pdf 
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14. “Changes in commerce and personal travel patterns have increased the importance of 
a reliable transport system. Reliable transport networks and services are required 
because of more complex and inter-related supply chains and increasingly complex 
scheduled activities. The physical way that the economy operates has changed, 
facilitated by – and demanding – transport system enhancements. […] The 
importance of scheduling in personal and freight activities has grown, so that 
transport unreliability has an increasingly-marked effect on downstream activities. 
The expectation from these demand trends is increasingly that transport should 
provide high levels of reliability.“379 
15. Poor reliability of today’s transport services is linked to the lack of a common vision 
for the provision of services across transport modes and Member States. Transfers 
between different transport modes often result in duplicated information efforts, loss 
of comfort and time, and higher costs. Information systems for the end user are also 
very often conceived in such a way that details are provided for the single transport 
mode, but not for the overall multimodal door-to-door travel. “Where performance is 
inconsistent, network users may simply have to accept the consequences of the delay, 
albeit it may have ripple-effects or, worse, snowballing (compounding, or growing) 
effects, affecting other activities or stages in the personal or logistics chain, 
constituting a cost to those involved.”380 
16. In addition, transport safety remains an issue, particularly so for road transport. 
Notwithstanding the progress made in terms of reducing the number of road 
casualties since the adoption of the third European action programme for road safety 
in 2003, around 35,000 citizens were killed on the roads of the EU in 2009. 
17. Transport security has become a great concern in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001. In addition to air and maritime security, there appears to be a 
clear need in increasing the security of surface freight transport, in particular on the 
road. The devastating terrorist attacks on the public transport systems in Madrid in 
2004 and in London in 2005, which killed almost 250 people, exposed the 
vulnerability of surface passenger transport. In many cities, public transport suffers 
from a lack of security due to some anti-social behaviour. Public transport must be 
perceived to be safe and secure if it is to succeed in convincing more people to move 
away from the car and use public transport instead. 
18. The existing acquis concentrates on aviation and maritime transport security. 
Security measures have been developed for managing both passengers and cargo 
transport in these fields. Security measures in Europe reflect the international nature 
of both terrorist threats and transport. In relation to land transport security, efforts 
have been made to spread best practices, for example in emergency planning, 
through regular contacts with Member State officials. 
19. At the EU level, transport security translates into two main strategies: policy 
formulation and regulation, and monitoring (inspection) activities, covering national 
competent authorities, airports, port facilities and ships, to ensure correct 
implementation of the acquis. A comprehensive and harmonised policy approach on 
                                                 
379 OECD, 2009. Improving Reliability on Surface Transport Networks 
380 idem. 
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security for all transport sectors is needed which addresses the question of financing 
of transport security at EU level and assesses and if necessary modifies the scope of 
current inspection regimes. Consideration should be given to the application of 
Article 222 TFEU, which envisages the Union and its Member States acting jointly 
in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the subject of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster. 
Transport labour market is not completely integrated 
20. Diverging national health, social, safety and security standards in transport hamper 
the harmonised social development of Europe and of the sector itself. The variety of 
rules increases the vulnerability of certain categories of transport workers, encumbers 
heavy bureaucracy on transport operators, distorts competition by basing it on 
differences in working conditions, raises the unpredictability and insecurity risks 
related to performing transport activities and finally renders some pieces of EU law 
unenforceable in practice. 
21. In addition, barriers due to gender, age, nationality and training hamper the 
availability of an appropriate labour force. In an ageing society where the labour 
force will soon start shrinking, the transport labour force is ageing more than the 
average in the EU (26% aged over 50 versus 22%). A higher participation rate of 
women may help fill the gap left by ageing male workers, but in transport their share 
has traditionally been much lower than on average (21% versus 35%, while in land 
transport only 13%). The attractiveness of transport professions is also hampered by 
a relatively high rate of accidents and by often difficult working conditions. 
22. The availability of a skilled and highly motivated labour force in the transport sector 
is essential for the supply of efficient and competitive transport services. Without 
tackling the aspect of job quality, optimal progress towards a sustainable transport 
system is unlikely to be achieved.  
